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PREFACE: A WORLDLY THEOLOGY?  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When I started my research project on “theology and economics” in 2006, the urgency of 
questions about values and meaning in relation to economic questions was not widely 
acknowledged. Back then, most people reacted to my research interests with polite interest, 
although they had puzzled look in their eyes. “Do they actually pay you to think about 
these questions?”, was sometimes even said out loud.  
Nowadays, however, the situation is different. Because of the recent financial and 
economic crises, we are confronted with difficult choices: if we cannot afford to live as we 
do now, what are the priorities? In these choices, economic considerations are inherently 
related to questions of what is valuable and meaningful. The actuality of a relation between 
economic questions and meaningful orientations is also reflected in developments that 
integrate traditional economic concepts with an evaluative perspective. For example, people 
who refer to themselves as social entrepreneurs, sustainable bankers, and impact investors, 
try to conduct their business while pursuing meaningful ends. As a recent study indicates, 
the desire to connect one’s work to a meaningful perspective is increasingly important, 
especially for young employees (Lancaster and Stillman 2010). For some, it can therefore 
be argued that “the market that intersects at money and meaning is growing”1. 
                                                 
1 Kevin Doyle Jones, organizer of SoCap 2011  (Social Capital Markets event), quoted in Bayrashi 2011.  
II 
For these reasons, studying the relation between economic practices and 
meaningful orientations is urgent for theologians. The question that has guided my 
research project from its very inception, is whether theologians might be able to benefit 
from the insights of economists. Therefore, in this thesis, the central question that is 
addressed is how a connection between theology and economics can be established, that 
allows for the exchange of knowledge. 
The theological approach that is followed in this thesis is public theology. This is 
a relatively new approach in theology that starts its theological analysis from within actual 
practices in society and make its analyses relevant for society. What does this “publicness” 
of theology indicate? It reveals that it does not consider questions of meaning of life to be 
part of a “private” domain, in which idiosyncratic evaluative orientations reign without 
having impact on –or being immune to critique from– other domains and modes of 
thought in society. That is, the “public” that is referred to can be defined as  
 
the debates and exchanges that people have in their families, with their friends, 
with fellow workers, in their professional organizations, as they read the papers or 
watch the news, [which] involve struggles to discern what is fundamentally true, 
what is finally right, what is ultimately good and merciful (Stackhouse 2007: 104) 
  
Therefore, in this thesis, an encompassing approach to questions of meaning of life is 
taken. It is not limited to a specific religious tradition, but open to all varieties of 
evaluative orientations to what is meaningful in life, secular or religious. 
The title of this thesis, Worldly Theology, thus refers to a “worldliness” that 
characterizes the theological approach in two ways. First, as a public theology, it starts with 
the actual practices of people in which questions of meaning of life arise. As will be 
elaborated in the first chapter, these practices take place within a context of secularization, 
individualization, and loss of tradition: questions of meaning of life have increasingly 
become a (this-)worldly matter, instead of being framed within a sacred canopy (cf. Berger 
1967). Second, it focuses on questions of meaning of life in economic practices –the 
practices in which people are engaged most directly with worldly matters– and attempts to 
make a connection to the work of economists, who are sometimes referred to as Worldly 
Philosophers2 (Heilbroner 1999). 
                                                 
2 As Robert Heilbroner (1999) points out, for most of the twentieth century, (neoclassical) economics can best 
 be considered as a “toolbox”, offering an abstract framework for looking at questions of production, 
III 
In order to establish a connection between public theology and economics that enables the 
exchange of knowledge, the argument takes the following steps. The first chapter 
elaborates public theology as a new approach to theology, and outlines why it is to seek a 
connection with economics. Two central foci in this connection to economics are 
discerned,  “meaning of life” and “contributing to a viable civil society”. These two 
concepts function as “heuristic devices” for investigating the affinity that economists have 
with the central concerns of public theology in the chapters 2, 3, and 4. That is, they are 
used to assess the feasibility of a connection between public theology and the approaches 
to economics that are discussed in this thesis, by inquiring whether these approaches to 
economics –in principle– can incorporate them as a shared interest. In the second chapter, 
the approach to economics that theologians have used as their “default option” in previous 
attempts to establish a connection, –neoclassical economics is investigated for its affinity 
with public theology’s central interests. Having pinpointed the main problems in making a 
connection with neoclassical economics, the following two chapters probe public 
theology’s possibilities in making a connection to some of the new approaches to 
economics. Chapter three concentrates on behavioral economics, as an example of a new 
approach to economics that explores actual economic behavior. The fourth chapter focuses 
on two new approaches to economics –happiness economics and the capability approach– 
that develop evaluative orientations for the ends of economic development. After these two 
chapters in which the affinity of several new approaches to economics with the central 
interests of public theology is assessed, in chapter five, a framework is elaborated by means 
of which public theologians can connect to economics, in order to enable the exchange of 
knowledge about meaningful perspectives on life in economic behavior. Chapter six 
concludes. 
  
                                                                                                                                     
 consumption, and distribution, instead of  studying actual economic practices. In several new approaches to 
 economic theory, however, a return of economics as “Worldly  Philosophy” can be discerned, as these 
 approaches do focus on actual economic behavior and also engage with policy concerns (cf. Colander, 
 Holt, and Rosser 2004, Loewenstein 1999, Camerer et al. 2003, Frey and Stutzer 2002, Sen 1999). This 
 thesis attempts to establish a connection between public theology and a selection of these new 
 approaches. Therefore, it seeks to make public theology “worldly” by connecting to the renewed  “worldly 
 philosophy” that can be found in the approaches to economic theory that have been developed in recent 
 decades. 
IV 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
TOWARDS A CONNECTION BETWEEN  
PUBLIC THEOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis aims at establishing a connection between public theology and economics as an 
academic discipline. It is the goal of this chapter to provide an argument why public 
theologians are to search for a connection with economics, and to formulate the central 
question of this thesis. To this effect, in section 1.1 public theology is explored as an 
approach in theology, and its perspective is defined. In section 1.2, the questions with 
which public theologians are concerned –questions of meaning of life– are elaborated 
upon, and the context in which these questions are to be answered is described. In the next 
section, the central question on which this thesis focuses is formulated, and an outline of 
the steps that are taken in the following chapters are provided (1.3). Section 1.4 concludes. 
 
1.1 THEOLOGY IN CHANGING SOCIETAL CONTEXTS 
1.1.1 Theology and its contexts: the impact of the twentieth century 
During the twentieth century, the task and self-understanding of theology have been 
subject to major change. The main reasons for the change are the stormy developments in 
society as the context or “situation” in which theology is to be done. In the introduction to 
his seminal overview of the work of theologians in the twentieth century, The Modern 
Theologians, David Ford (2005) presents a short overview of these developments: 
 
2 
The twentieth century has added its own conditioning, such as the Holocaust and 
concentration camps; the unprecedented scale of mass killing of fellow human 
beings in wars; the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian revolutions; the emergence of 
new, postcolonial societies; the collapse of Soviet and European communism; the 
spread of mass communications, business corporations, technology, and science of 
many sorts; an unprecedented dialectic of the local and the global, especially in 
economics and culture; struggles against fascism, racism, and sexism; the ecological 
crisis; and a vast expansion of professions and academic disciplines and institutions 
(Ford 2005: 12). 
 
All these important, and often traumatic developments, have called on theologians to make 
a shift in their work from earlier onto-theological approaches. The meaning of the context 
in which theology takes place came to have a central and determinative place for the 
subject and import of theology. This is not to say that in previous centuries, theology was 
not conditioned and influenced by, or engaged with its context. The development of 
Christianity and Christian theology in the early ages (Brown 2003, Van den Akker and 
Nissen 1999) show that theology has always stood in an often uneasy relation to political, 
economic, and cultural developments. Rather, it indicates that increasingly, for many –
though not all– theologians questions about “God” and “incarnation” could not be 
conceived except from within the developments in the context (Ricoeur 1974: 447, 
Klaushofer 1999: 135-136). As such, any kind of modern theology can be argued to be 
engaged in making a connection with its context, in whatever specific form this connection 
is set up (Tanner 1997). 
 Three examples from influential strands of theology in the twentieth century can 
illustrate the way theologians have given shape to the connection with their context. First, 
in liberation theology, theologians like Leonardo Boff (1972, 1977), Gustavo Gutierrez 
(1971), and Jon Sobrino (1984, 1993) related their interpretation and articulation of 
Christian faith to the broad theme of “liberation”1. The suffering and poverty of the 
people of South America and Africa, who were perceived to be oppressed by social and 
                                                 
1 Other emancipatory theologies, aimed at giving voice to the suffering and lack of freedom of people whose 
 voices are not generally heard in academic theological discourses, are for instance feminist or womanist 
 theology (see, for instance Daly 1973, McFague 1987, Ruether 1983, Schüssler Fiorenza 1995, Korte 2009, 
 De Haardt 2011), black liberation theology (Cleage 1968, Hopkins 1989), and queer theology (Stuart 2003, 
 Van Klinken and Pruiksma 2010). 
3 
economic institutions, were to be liberated and to gain freedom, based on the orientation 
towards justice and freedom that is given by the Christian Gospel. For instance, in the 
work of Gustavo Gutierrez, the theme “liberation” is conceived as the “pivot of 
apprehending faith” (Gutierrez 1971). In Gutierrez‟s perspective, “the liberation of poor 
countries is but a concrete step within the human march towards emancipation that 
characterizes modern human history” (Martinez 2001: 125). By discerning three 
dimensions in the concept “liberation”, Gutierrez connects his theological interpretation of 
liberation to a historical and social meaning. The first dimension is the gratuitous/gracious 
liberation from sin in Jesus Christ, that is to be the foundation for all other forms of 
freedom. Second, there is the historical process in and through which humankind conquers 
new levels of freedom. Third, liberation is interpreted as the radical change of hindering 
socioeconomic structures, at the service of human realization (Martinez 2001: 125). By 
grounding the concept “liberation” theologically, and relating this theological notion of 
liberation to historical developments and the concrete social and economic structure of 
society, Gutierrez‟s Teologia de la Liberacion connects his theology to the changing 
context of, in his situation, oppression and poverty in Latin America.  
 A second example of relating theology to developments in the context of society is 
the new political theology2 of theologians like Johann Baptist Metz (1968, 1977) and 
Jürgen Moltmann (1964, 1972, 1975, see also Huber 1973). New political theology seeks 
to appropriate the fruits of Enlightenment modernity in a positive way, by connecting the 
ideals of the Enlightenment to their origins in biblical and Christian traditions, and thus 
conceiving it as an important development on the road to emancipation (Martinez 
2001:55). For example, Metz applauds the separation of state and society, as it allows 
theology to contribute to a critical political discourse in the social-public realm on the 
basis of the social implications and tasks of the Christian message. In Metz‟s perspective, 
the eschatological theme of the “Kingdom of God” plays a central role in the relation of 
theology to the social and political context. It places developments in society in a double 
light: on the one hand it makes these developments relative and subject to critique from an 
eschatological perspective, on the other hand it places them in the “realm of freedom”, and 
                                                 
2 Authors such as Metz stressed the fact that they were proposing a new political theology, in order to 
 distinguish their work sharply from the earlier work by Carl Schmitt, whose work supported authoritarian and 
 totalitarian ideas predating National Socialism in Germany, see Schmitt 1922. The new political theology is 
 also to be distinguished from an American shape of political theology, that focuses on the state and 
 government as the comprehending institution of society, see Stackhouse 2007: 102. 
4 
thus on a road towards the realization of the Christian ultimate reality or “eschaton”. As 
such, new political theology does not advocate a “neo-politicizing of faith” or a “neo-
clericalizing of politics” (Martinez 2001: 55). That is, faith, which Metz defines as “the 
memory of suffering” (Roque 2007), is not to be conceived as a direct and ready-made 
political message, nor is it the intention of new political theology to propose a re-
evaluation of the separation between church and state. On the contrary, new political 
theology stresses the importance of historical and social experience, and wants to 
contribute to the development of a viable and just social-public realm by connecting this 
experience to Christian ideas and principles. 
 The first two examples of the way theologians have given shape to the connection 
with their context, liberation theology and new political theology, in principle give a 
positive appropriation of the context. Although these theologians are critical of actual 
developments and social institutions in their society, and advocate an increased freedom 
and emancipation, the experience of suffering and repression can be a starting point for 
true liberation in liberation theology, and the Enlightenment project is conceived as a step 
forward towards emancipation and freedom in new political theology.  
The third example, neo-orthodoxy, gives a totally different evaluation of the 
context of historical and social developments. The main impact of neo-orthodoxy predates 
liberation and new political theology in the work of its most prominent proponent, Karl 
Barth (cf. Barth 2009 (1932-38), Webster 2000). Neo-orthodoxy started as a response to 
nineteenth and early twentieth century liberal theologies, that had great confidence in 
science and reason, focused on social forms of Christianity, and were interested in religious 
experience (Davaney 2000). As Sheila Davaney (2000) puts it, “liberal theologies (…) 
were deeply damaged by the onslaught of neo-orthodoxy with its simultaneously negative 
evaluation of human capacities and its triumphant belief in an omnipotent but gracious 
and self-revealing God” (Davaney 2000: 15). Barth and other neo-orthodox theologians 
argued that neither reason, nor experience could yield legitimate knowledge of God. 
Instead, it was argued that God makes Godself known in an act of radical revelation in 
Jesus Christ. The true natures of God, the human self, and the world were believed to be 
disclosed in this revelation (Hardy 2005). As such, neo-orthodoxy proved to be a 
powerful argument against all human attempts to make true statements about God through 
reason or experience. Connecting this argument to the meaning of the “context”, neo-
orthodoxy appeared to be an “insightful diagnosis of a dangerously hubristic modernity 
5 
gone awry and a new, chastened hope, grounded not in the delusions of a sinful humanity, 
but in the love and power of God” (Davaney 2000: 15). 
By the end of the 1960s, neo-orthodoxy had lost much of its credibility, as 
Davaney relates that (1) revelation proved to be an elusive concept, and it became difficult 
to discern who was the recipient of such revelation as it could not be judged on rational or 
experiential criteria, (2) an utterly transcendent God proved to be remote and irrelevant, 
(3) the negative evaluation of human capacities appeared to be an excuse for quietism and 
noninvolvement in society, and finally (4) the idea that Christianity, through the revelation 
in Jesus Christ was the location of true faith, failed to be convincing in light of historical 
studies and the growing awareness of other, equally ancient and profound traditions 
(Davaney 2000: 15-16). These critical points notwithstanding, quite recently a revival of 
the interest in constructing an “orthodoxy” has gained strength in a movement called 
“radical orthodoxy” (cf. Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward 1999). 
 The three strands of twentieth century theology that are discussed as illustrations 
of how theologians have dealt with their context differ in their orientation, and in their 
appreciation of the context. Liberation theology can be described as an emancipatory 
theology that tries to change the socio-economic situation of a specific deprived group, the 
poor and suffering. New political theology, however, sought a more abstract contribution 
to the Enlightenment project through the “memory of suffering”, in order to “Enlighten 
the Enlightenment” (Metz 1999: 37-38). The interest of neo-orthodoxy was not with a 
specific group, or making any kind of contribution to man-made developments in history, 
but intended to create an “orthodoxy” based on a secure foundation of faith. Liberation 
and new political theology are, as it were, both “in this world” and “of this world” 
(Anderson 2001: 83), while neo-orthodoxy may be “in this world”, but it certainly does 
not seek to be “of this world”. As Barth himself put it, in a comment on the temporal 
particularity of God‟s revelation: “it must signify that revelation becomes history, but not 
that history becomes revelation” (Barth 2009 (1932-38): 58, cf. Hardy 2005: 31). 
Although the most influential “classics” of each of these three movements in theology have 
been written quite some time ago, still, their influence is present in current theological 
debates (Ford 2005: 13-14). 
In the next subsection, we will discuss a new shape of theology within the broader 
movement of “theology in relation to its context”, public theology. Public theology is a 
fairly recent and vibrant development within modern theology‟s engagement to a 
connection with the societal context. In the last few decades, many theologians have 
6 
presented their theological work as “public theology” (Anderson 1998, Atherton 2000, 
Browning and Schüssler Fiorenza 1992, Casanova 1994, Forrester 1997, McElroy 1989, 
Moltmann 1999, Smit 2007, Van der Ven 2006, see also Breitenberg 2003 and 
Stackhouse 2004). Apparently, these authors have deemed it necessary to mark their 
theological work by the adjective “public”, and thus signal that their work is intended for 
or engaged with a dimension of life or society that can be referred to as “public”.  
In the following subsections, the notion public theology is explored. To this 
effect, first, the meanings attributed to the word “public” by theologians are mapped in 
order to achieve a firmer grasp of what public theology entails. Second, the reasons that 
theologians give for engaging in public theology are discussed. Third, some continuities 
and discontinuities with earlier shapes of theology are outlined. 
 
1.1.2 The meaning of the notion “public” in “public theology” 
What does it exactly mean when theologians claim to engage in public theology? To 
understand what public theology entails, we first need to clarify the possible meanings of 
“public”. Dirk Smit (2007) distinguishes three broad categories that can help in discerning 
different interpretations of “public”. 
 First, public can refer to the “public sphere” (Smit 2007: 432). Using the work of 
Jürgen Habermas (cf. Habermas 1962/1987) as a prominent example, Smit defines the 
public sphere as  
 
the sphere, often represented by specific public spaces and practices, where an 
informed public opinion is formed and maintained, able to resist the powers of 
politics and market, and characterized by critical discussion between equal 
participants, free of constraint, threat and self-interest (Smit 2007: 433).  
 
The public sphere refers to spaces in society in which an opinion is formed by means of 
critical dialogue, that can protect the interests and freedom that are public, i.e. “shared” or 
“common”, goods against the possible threats of, for instance, politics and market 
economies. Therefore, the first usage of the term “public”, as discerned by Smit, has an 
evaluative import. Both the function of the public sphere as a safeguard and emancipatory 
area, and the criteria for the creation of such a public sphere, represent an evaluative 
perspective on what “public” entails. There has been substantive critique on Habermas‟ 
notion of the public sphere, as being either too idealistic or too rationalistic, and too much 
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focused on harmony and agreement (cf. Benhabib and Dallmayr 1991, Goode 2005, 
Rescher 1995). Smit, however, argues that all critics share the “fundamental conviction 
that the nature and quality of public life, of life together, of the common life, is extremely 
important and that ultimately at stake in democratic societies is this struggle for the public 
life” (Smit 2007: 436). Therefore, the first interpretation of “public” is closely related to 
the idea of a viable civil society. 
 Second, “public” can be understood as “life in general” (Smit 2007: 437). In this 
respect, the place, social form, and involvement of the church (understood as the Christian 
community in general, not necessarily an institutional organization) in society can be 
analyzed in relation to state power and politics, issues of law, justice, civic life, economic 
life, war and peace, etc. The second understanding of “public” consists in an 
acknowledgment of the inevitability of an encounter with other movements and domains 
in society, and the acknowledgment that a reciprocal relation exists between theology on 
the one side, and society on the other. The engagement or interwovenness of theology with 
all kinds of domains and practices in society that are not strictly religious or faith-related, 
indicates the necessity for theologians to create a connection with these domains and 
practices. 
 This leads us to the third interpretation, “public” as “discourse” (Smit 2007: 
442). In this understanding of the publicness of theology, the fact that theology has to 
shape actual connections with different audiences or “publics” is underlined. The most 
influential account of public theology in this sense can be found in David Tracy‟s 
Analogical Imagination (1981). Tracy discerns three different publics: the public of 
society, the public of the academy, and the public of the church (Tracy 1981: 6-13, 14-20, 
21-27). Each of these publics requires theology to take a distinctive approach in making a 
connection to them. Max Stackhouse (2007) has expanded the three publics as they were 
discerned by Tracy, by adding the “economic” as a separate public. Stackhouse argues that 
while in earlier times, economic questions were considered to be either aspects of the 
household or the state, economic practices and institutions “have begun to transcend the 
control of any familial or royal household and of every nation state” and that “the 
economy has become an increasingly independent public realm” as a result (Stackhouse 
2007: 110). The implications of adding the “economic” as a distinct public for public 
theology, and the way public theology is to relate to this new domain are further explored 
in section 1.3. 
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Although Smit presents an elucidating overview by distinguishing three categories 
of “public”, the different notions of public are often used at the same time by one author, 
or are connected in her work. For example, Owen Thomas (1992) has argued that the 
influential public theologian David Tracy uses “public” in two different senses. While 
Tracy on the one hand argues that theology is public theology as it tries to connect with 
different publics, Tracy also uses public as opposed to “private”, which he defines as “the 
realm of personal preference where de gustibus non est disputandum” (Tracy 1981: 132). 
According to Thomas, the latter interpretation refers to two connected notions of 
publicness, “the nature of a claim, namely, to universality or universal significance, and the 
nature of the grounds offered for a claim, namely, evidence, warrants, and backing” 
(Thomas 1992: 455, 457). This interpretation is apparently connected to the idea of 
public as a “public sphere” (Tracy 1992). Thomas indicates a problematic relation 
between on the one hand Tracy‟s abhorrance towards the “private” and his concomitant 
plea for evidence, warrants, and backing that are acceptable for every rational and well-
informed person, and on the other hand Tracy‟s claim to be attentive to the voices that are 
often not heard in “established academic white male” (Thomas 1992: 461) discourse, like, 
for example, liberation, black, queer, and feminist theologies. By connecting the two ideas 
of public as “discourse”, and the recognition that in order to engage in a genuine 
conversation, one has to “attend to the other as other, the different as different, [which] is 
also to understand the different as possible” (Tracy 1989: 20, quoted in Thomas 1992: 
465) Thomas deepens the understanding of “public” in public theology. It is not to be 
understood as “an agreement on a concept of reason or on specific criteria of argument and 
evidence” but instead, “it will mean both a commitment to accept one another as equal 
partners in conversation and a commitment to continuing the conversation” (Thomas 
1992: 466). The authenticity of the “other” is to be acknowledged if public theology seeks 
a connection to its context. 
Max Stackhouse, arguably one of the most prolific authors on public theology, (cf. 
Stackhouse 1987, 1991, 1999, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2007), also connects different 
notions of publicness in his work. In the concluding volume to a series of publications on 
“God and Globalization” (Stackhouse and Paris 2000, Stackhouse and Browning 2001, 
Stackhouse and Obenchain 2002, Stackhouse 2007) that are edited by Stackhouse and 
others, he reflects on the nature and task of public theology. In Stackhouse‟s view, it is the 
task of public theology to address the broadest public possible, the development of 
globalization that “bears the prospect of a new form of civil society, one that may well 
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comprehend all previous national, ethnic, political, economic or cultural contexts” 
(Stackhouse 2007: 2-3). Therefore, Stackhouse seeks to provide a more encompassing 
definition of the civil society than Smit‟s definition that was quoted above, as Stackhouse 
includes the political and economic spheres, which were not explicitly identified by Smit 
(cf. Dekker 2002). As was noted above, Stackhouse agrees with Tracy‟s systematic 
demarcation of three publics, and points out a fourth public, the “economic”. In his view, 
public theology is to study and test the validity of faith as “confidence in a comprehensive 
metaphysical-moral vision”, and therefore is  
 
a mode of public discourse that both interprets the key areas of the common life 
(…) by pointing out the religious and ethical presuppositions that are operating in 
a given ethos (…) [and] simultaneously offers normative ethical guidance for the 
reformation and sustenance of a viable civil society (Stackhouse 2007: 7, 85).  
 
By stating the task of public theology in this way, Stackhouse combines the three 
interpretations of public theology that were discerned by Smit. Stackhouse considers 
public theology to be “public discourse”, in line with the third category. He advocates an 
interpretive engagement with the “key areas of the common life”, thus stressing the relation 
between theology and the “public life” in line with the second category. Finally, 
Stackhouse connects public theology in an evaluative way to the “reformation and 
sustenance of a viable civil society”, which resonates with the first interpretation of public 
in the sense of a “public sphere” (cf. Stackhouse 2000: 9-18). 
Although the interpretations of public theology are given by different authors, and 
the three categories discerned by Smit that function as useful characterizations illustrate 
the breadth of the field, it is worth trying to formulate an integrative notion of public 
theology. Summarizing and integrating the perspectives discussed above, public theology 
can be delineated as a reflection on the interpretation and articulation of faith3 in its 
                                                 
3 Although faith is the classical focus of theology (cf. Anselm of Canterbury‟s fides quaerens intellectum), here,  
 faith is not intended in a narrow sense of, e.g. “the Christian faith” as a specific tradition of interpretation of 
 the meaning of life. Max Stackhouse has provided a more encompassing definition of faith: “faith is a 
 confidence in a comprehensive worldview [which] provides a framework for interpreting the realities of life in 
 the world, guides the basic beliefs and behaviors of persons and empowers believers to seek to transform the 
 world in accordance with a normative (…) view” (Stackhouse 2007: 7). Therefore, in this thesis, “faith” is 
 interpreted as an evaluative orientation towards the meaning of life, without a predetermined traditional 
 orientation. This will be further elaborated in section 1.2. 
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relation to the context of the actual practices of people in the key areas of the common life. 
To this effect, public theology engages in discourse with the four domains of church, 
society, academy, and economy in order to be able to contribute to a viable civil society. 
Having provided this general indication of the nature and task of public theology, 
in the next subsection the reasons theologians provide for engaging in public theology are 
explored. 
 
1.1.3 Reasons for engaging in public theology 
The first reason for engaging in public theology is the rejection of the modernist idea that 
religion and theology are to be confined to the “private” domain of society. As Davaney 
(2000) has argued, both in Kantian Enlightenment philosophy, in which religion and God 
were removed from the arenas of empirical and historically defined knowledge and 
argument, and in Romanticist counter-Enlightenment theology of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, that placed religious feeling in the sphere of the affective, religion and 
religiosity were excluded from critical scrutiny (Davaney 2000: 4-12), and therefore, 
religion became a private matter. That is to say, while religion and theology were not 
argued to be necessarily harmful or dangerous, in both –conflicting (Lavine 1991: 46, 
quoted in Davaney 2000: 11)– strands of modernity, religion was banned from the public 
domain, and thus no longer accessible and intelligible for all people. The concern to 
demonstrate that theology, on the contrary, can enter the public domain and make itself 
intelligible, is present in, for example, the work of David Tracy (cf. Tracy 1981). 
A second reason, that is somewhat related to the first, is the emerging awareness of 
pluralism4. In a relatively homogeneous and predominantly Christian society, theology 
need not worry about the reach of its statements. Yet, as cultural and religious pluralism 
increased enormously in the twentieth century, Christian theologians were confronted with 
radically other spiritualities and understandings of the divine. This triggered a voluminous 
literature on interreligious dialogue and theology of religions (D‟ Costa 1990, Eck 1993, 
Hick and Hebbletwaithe 1980, Hick and Knitter 1990, Küng 1986, Ogden 1992, cf. 
D‟Costa 2005), in which different options of relating to others5  were explored and 
debated. More in general, this development also challenged theologians to prove their 
                                                 
4 Pluralism refers to a “state or society in which members of diverse ethnic, racial, religious, or social groups 
 maintain an autonomous participation in and development of their traditional culture or special interest 
 within the confines of a common civilization” (cf. Merriam-Webster 2006). 
5 E.g., exclusivist/particularist, inclusivist, and pluralist. 
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capacity to explain and make intelligible the claims and traditions of their religion towards 
others, who were outside their community, that is, in public (cf. Tracy 1975). 
The third reason for stressing the task of theology to be a public one, is more 
antagonistic. As was described above, neo-orthodoxy, and in recent days, radical 
orthodoxy, attempt to create a theological position that negates any possibility for human 
constructs and movements such as “modernity” to be a source of revelation or grace. 
Especially with authors from the radical orthodoxy movement, some public theologians 
exchange fierce accusations and rebukes about the viability and integrity of their 
theological work. In short, public theologians are accused to uncritically follow modernity, 
capitalism, and other “Godless” human creations, while radical orthodoxy theologians are 
scolded for making theology an irrational whim of a sectarian movement (cf. Long 2000: 
Part 1, Stackhouse 2007: 83-84). Apparently, authors from the field of public theology 
are convinced that they are to present a theological position that is, in their view, a viable 
alternative to neo- and radical orthodox viewpoints that dismiss any possibility of finding 
meaning in the “soulless” secular modern society (cf. Milbank et al. 1999). 
 In the next subsection, the last step of the exploration of public theology is taken, 
by specifying what type of theology public theology is. 
 
1.1.4 Public theology as a practical fundamental theology 
Public theology can be considered as a practical fundamental theology (Stackhouse 2007: 
81-86, 105-114). Public theology is a shape of fundamental theology, as it seeks to 
understand and make concepts such as faith and spirituality intelligible towards and in a 
conversation with an “other”, who does not speak the same “language”. The interpretation, 
articulation, and evaluation of faith and spirituality are to take place in a public discourse, 
i.e. intelligible and contestable for others who do not necessarily believe in the truth of the 
existential claims that are made. In fundamental theology, the truth claims of a religious 
tradition and faith commitments are not interpreted as “unshakeable truths”, and the task 
of fundamental theology as “apologetics” has traditionally been to explain faith and 
religious ideas using the conceptual instruments and the methods of other disciplines, 
especially philosophy (Tracy 1981: 76, cf. Van Erp 2004: 16-20). 
Describing public theology as a shape of fundamental theology might obfuscate its 
concern with the context of actual practices and developments and with the viability of the 
civil society. Therefore, it is more appropriate to use the term “practical fundamental 
theology” (Schüssler Fiorenza 1982). Public theology also has a practical dimension, as it 
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engages in a “practical hermeneutics”, which entails “theologizing as critical analysis of and 
reflection on the ways in which religious communities and individual believers in specific 
situations probe their existence as the scene of God‟s actions” –that is, probe their 
existence from a specific religious or secular perspective on the meaning of life (Van den 
Hoogen 2011: 118). 
By combining a fundamental and a practical theological approach, in public 
theology a continuity with the new political theology of Johann Baptist Metz can be 
discerned. Metz was the first to consider his theology as a practical fundamental theology 
(Schüssler Fiorenza 1982: 289, see also Martinez 2001: 57). He wanted to contrast his 
engagement with the Enlightenment with earlier transcendental approaches (of, for 
instance, his teacher Karl Rahner, cf. Schüssler Fiorenza 1982: 292) by underlining his 
interest in actual practices and political developments. 
Public theologian Max Stackhouse affirms this continuity with new political 
theology (Stackhouse 2007: 101). Yet, he also highlights a difference in focus between 
new political theology and public theology. Stackhouse argues that the Enlightenment 
project, that was of major importance to new political theology, has to be overcome by a 
new “universal, genuinely ecumenical and authentically catholic way of speaking 
theologically and ethically about the increasingly common life” (Stackhouse 2007: 81). 
The cultural, social, and economic changes that have a great impact worldwide, offer a new 
context within which “theology has the duty to provide a reasonable proposal with regard 
to the moral and spiritual architecture and the inner guidance system of civilizations” 
(Stackhouse 2007: 84).  
Concluding, public theology, as a practical fundamental theology, seeks to reflect 
on faith as a search for meaning of life in its relation to the context of the actual practices 
of people in the key areas of the common life. The changed cultural context that 
Stackhouse describes, is thus the “material object” for public theology, especially with 
regard to questions of meaning of life. Within this new context, it is the task of public 
theology –through the interpretation, articulation, and evaluative critique of perspectives 
on meaning of life– to contribute to a viable civil society.  
In the next section, the changed cultural context with regard to questions of 
meaning of life is specified and interpreted, by using the work of the prominent social 
theorist Max Weber and others. 
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1.2 MEANING OF LIFE: CYNICISM IN AN AGE OF SECULARIZATION, INDIVIDUALIZATION, 
AND LOSS OF TRADITION 
1.2.1 Longing in an age that cannot name itself: Cynicism and Weber‟s Iron Cage 
In many western modern societies, especially since the 1960s, major changes have taken 
place in the way people approach questions about economic, social, and cultural matters. In 
previous times an all-encompassing perspective provided an a priori embeddedness, for 
instance, in terms of the Medieval Christendom in which every member of society more or 
less automatically took part from birth on, or in terms of the Enlightenment faith in the 
linear improvement of the human condition. Instead, the current time has been interpreted 
theologically by the statement that “we live in an age that cannot name itself” (Tracy 
1994: 3, cf. Borgman 2006, Houtepen 1997: 13-16).  This absence of a “name” for our 
age indicates that after the loss of the authority of traditions and the failure of all “grand 
narratives” (Lyotard 1984) to provide a sustainable option, there appears to be nothing 
more to strive for than “reflect[ing] on the available means to pursue and reach realistic 
and attainable ends” (Van Erp and Verstricht 2008: 7). This has led some theologians and 
theorists of culture to conclude that underlying the continuously expanding capabilities in 
terms of technological advance, a “culture of cynicism” exists (Sloterdijk 1983, Glucksman 
1981, Goldfarb 1991, Van Erp and Verstricht 2008). 
This culture of cynicism arises from a situation in which the focus is only on 
arranging available means with “realistic” and “attainable” ends, as this implies that a 
discussion of guiding values and ideals –which are by definition “impossible” to realize– is 
no longer a viable enterprise. In this culture of cynicism, the question of what is valuable 
cannot be object of any public argument, as the only question that can be answered is one 
of aligning means with attainable ends. Each person can follow whatever absurd or morbid 
values she likes, because in the absence of the possibility of providing an argument for 
evaluative issues, the only reason for adhering to some value is “taste” –and one does not 
argue about tastes. The only possibility for a shared perspective on what is valuable then 
becomes a matter of either coincidence or coercion, but cannot be achieved through 
interactive argumentation and reflection. In short, the culture of cynicism refers to a 
situation in which guiding values and ideals –i.e. conceptions of what is “valuable”– cannot 
be the object of argument. 
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This situation in some ways resembles the image that Max Weber6 once depicted 
as the result of the ongoing processes of modernization in terms of rationalization and 
disenchantment (Borgman 2006). Weber perceived the development of human societies by 
means of an evolutionary scheme7 (Schroeder 1992: 11). First, people used magic to exert 
control over their surroundings, and to explain the workings of nature. In the second 
phase, religion took over these functions, which implied a “rationalization” of thought and 
practices, as people tried to base their doings on codifications of knowledge in traditions, 
scriptures, and dogmatic creeds, instead of the “superstition” that formed the base for 
magic (Brubaker 1984: 30). In the third phase, science takes over the explanatory function 
of religion, and becomes the new way of exerting control over the environment. 
Accompanying this process of rationalization, the perception of reality became 
“disenchanted”. Whereas in ancient times, people believed that stones and trees had their 
own spirits, and that events were caused by these spirits, in the scientific era such beliefs 
are discarded, as in modernized society it is believed that there can be no objective evidence 
for these claims in terms of scientific standards. 
Although “rationalization” appears to refer to one single conception of rationality, 
Weber used different concepts of rationality in his analyses, of which “Zweckrationalität” 
(means-ends rationality) and “Wertrationalität” (value rationality) are the most important. 
Means-ends rationality is directed towards the achievement of some end(s) as the result 
from a certain way of acting. It focuses on the anticipated and intended consequences of an 
action (Brubaker 1984: 51). Therefore, the central aspects of means-ends rationality are 
calculation and control (Davydova and Sherrock 2003). Value rationality is directed 
towards the realization of some value believed to be intrinsic in a certain way of acting 
oriented towards an act‟s inherent properties, and presupposes a conscious belief about the 
intrinsic value and inherent rightness of a certain way of acting (Brubaker 1984: 51). The 
process of rationalization that characterizes modernity in Weber‟s account, is a 
rationalization in terms of a means-ends rationality (Brubaker 1984: 52). Using the two 
conceptions of rationality, in combination with the evolutionary scheme, it can be argued 
                                                 
6 In this chapter, Max Weber‟s work on modernization is used to interpret which developments have led to the 
 current culture of cynicism and nihilism with regard to questions of meaning of life. Weber‟s interpretation of 
 modernization has been criticized by many authors. However, the fact that his theories are still commented on 
 and reinterpreted in recent publications (cf. Schaltegger and Torgler 2010, Arrunada 2010, Kenny 2011), 
 legitimates using Weber as a “classical” interpreter of modernity in this thesis.  
7 The description of Weber‟s evolutionary scheme that is presented here, for reasons of brevity, is a 
 simplification. 
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that the ongoing ascent of means-ends rationality as an objective form of calculation, 
caused the decline and instigated the “irrationality” and “subjectivity” of the values that 
were “arranged into a unified constellation that comprehensively explains suffering and the 
„meaning‟ of existence” (Kalberg 1980: 1175). While technical questions of “how” to cope 
with reality were answered with increasing sophistication, the existential questions of 
“why” things are important became more difficult to answer, especially in a public 
discourse (Lough 2006: 12-17). Therefore, the “disenchantment” of reality, although 
instigated by a cognitive process of increased understanding of and control over processes 
in reality, also has an evaluative dimension. The value of an object or person is no longer 
determined by inherent aspects (such as, having a “soul”), but by the subjective attribution 
of value to objects and persons as entities that are –a priori– devoid of value or meaning. 
 The ongoing process of modernization in terms of means-ends rationalization, 
Weber predicted, would lead to a situation in which people end up in a metaphorical “iron 
cage”. The iron cage stands for a society in which there is a high level of bureaucracy 
(according to Weber the most efficient way of governing a society) and a high level of 
differentiation of life spheres (as the most efficient way of realizing the specific goals of 
for instance, politics, sports, work, etc., cf. Ekstrand 2000: 112-113). The dominant 
presence of means-ends rationality, both in the bureaucracy of governments and firms and 
in the various life spheres, leads, in Weber‟s view, to a situation in which the self-
determination or autonomy of human beings is threatened. Thomas Ekstrand (2000) 
interprets this Weberian “nightmare” of modernity as a state of alienation that 
corresponds to the culture of cynicism that was discerned by Van Erp and Verstricht 
(2008: 8) and others, as the means-ends rationality, that is the product and flagship of the 
ongoing development of modernity, is no longer recognized as a human creation, but as a 
given aspect of the workings of society (Ekstrand 2000: 116-117). Instead of being an 
option –a possible mode of human thinking–, it comes to determine all human practices. 
The sense of alienation that people experience amongst institutions and life 
spheres that are governed by means-ends rationality, is reflected by a sense of “longing” 
that is discerned in western societies (Tracy 2008). What does this longing refer to? As 
Tracy (2008: 15) puts it, “we long for meaning in our lives”. The instrumental focus of 
means-ends rationality apparently does not provide a helpful approach to finding meaning 
in life. The question which arises, then, is “what does constitute meaning of life”? In order 
to be precise about the concern with meaning of life, it is important to stress that the point 
of discussion here is not the specific content of meaning of life, but the way meaning of 
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life is constituted. Therefore, in the next subsection, the concepts “meaning” and “meaning 
of life” are explored. 
 
1.2.2 Meaning and meaning of life 
Meaning can be a misleading concept, as addressing it directly can end up in giving a 
circular definition of “the meaning of meaning”. Still, some scholars have ventured to do 
so. For instance, psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1990: 216) defines meaning by 
summarizing the three ways in which the word meaning is used: 
 
(1) meaning points to the end, purpose, significance of something (“what is the 
meaning of this new law?”) 
(2) meaning refers to someone‟s intentions (“Harry did not mean to offend you”) 
(3) meaning refers to an ordering of information (“wisdom means being able to make 
sensible decisions”) 
 
For the current argument, the first interpretation is the most useful as the question of the 
“meaning of life” is a question on the significance of life. The second interpretation does 
not apply to meaning of life, as life itself can have no intentions: there must always be a 
person or other acting entity that carries the intentions. In the third interpretation, 
meaning of life entails the opposite of being dead or inanimate. So, following the 
schematic overview presented by Csikszentmihalyi, for the purpose of this argument, the 
question about the meaning of life is a question about the end or purpose of someone‟s 
life. 
What does meaning of life in terms of “purpose” entail? Purpose can be 
interpreted as  a “directedness” (Van den Hoogen and Hijmans 2002: 10-11). All 
everyday human practices take place within a certain context. In a metaphorical sense, the 
practices that take place within a certain context reflect a “horizon” of meaning. This 
horizon represents a –mostly unclear and little articulated– perspective or vision that 
reflects what someone considers to be important in some part of his or her life. Someone‟s 
actions become meaningful in light of the directedness to this horizon containing a vision 
of what is important in life. The horizon can change in the various phases of life, or 
because of certain events. If someone meets friends at secondary school who appreciate 
hockey and polo and the culture that is connected to these sports, it is likely that playing a 
hockey game, and acquiring and wearing expensive polo shirts become a horizon of 
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meaning that surrounds her everyday practices. If she, in later years, comes to value soccer 
above hockey and polo, the culture and practices that are related to soccer come to be a 
horizon of meaning, and hockey and polo fade to the background. As such, all aspects or 
phases of life can be argued to be accompanied by a horizon of meaning. 
There are, however, horizons of meaning, that are less changeable and that reflect 
that which is of the highest or “ultimate” importance in one‟s existence. This type of 
horizon reflects a meaning that is qualitatively different from the meaning of a specific 
phase or aspect of life (Van den Hoogen and Hijmans 2002: 16). Whereas the latter 
reflects meaning that is limited to a certain aspect and phase, and therefore is transient and 
changing as life progresses, the former refers to meaning that encompasses “all of life”. 
The qualitative difference lies in the distinction between “being part or aspect of life” and 
“encompassing all of life”. The first is inherently connected to the way life actually evolves, 
and its related contingencies, the second refers to that what is meaningful –in the sense of 
“directive”, beckoning, guiding– for all of life, from the moments of utter joy and success, 
to the times of sorrow and adversity. This “ultimate” horizon, therefore, can be said to be 
“larger than life”, transcending the direct concerns and routines of everyday practices in 
meaning, though being inherently related to all of someone‟s life, and therefore all of 
someone‟s actions. For this reason, the “transcendent” aspect of meaning of life does not 
indicate that meaning of life is located above or outside “normal life”. Instead, in everyday 
practices, people relate their actions to their ideas about the significance of and 
directedness towards “all of life” (Van den Hoogen and Hijmans 2002: 16). 
In everyday practices, the ultimate horizon of meaning or meaning of life is often 
present as an unproblematic “given”. Especially in times of change and crisis, however, the 
meaning of life in terms of a directedness can become a question instead of something that 
speaks for itself. If someone is confronted with a situation that calls the “ordinary” 
character of daily life into question (for instance, being diagnosed with a life-threatening 
illness, becoming unemployed, losing a close relative), all ordinary meanings tend to 
become relatively insignificant. Therefore, these kinds of crises (in the sense of “moments 
of choice”, cf. the Greek krinein) can call for a reorientation towards the things that really 
matter in life (Van den Hoogen and Hijmans 2002: 14). In times of reorientation and 
reflection on what really matters in life, meaning of life, in the sense of a directedness 
towards an ultimate horizon of meaning encompassing “all of life”, is of central 
importance. 
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Of what does meaning of life as a “purpose” or “directedness” consist? A purpose 
refers to something that is of importance or value, as it calls on someone to shape her 
actions in its direction, thus expressing the desirability of the contribution to the 
fulfillment of that what is valued. Meaning of life in the understanding of “purpose” can 
therefore be interpreted as being determined by an evaluative relation between a person and 
her perspective of that what encompasses “all of life”. That is, the meaning of life is 
constituted by an evaluative relation in the sense of the “values” someone adheres to as 
most central, highest, and valuable. These values constitute the ultimate horizon of 
meaning, of the meaning of someone‟s life as it goes beyond her actual, historic life. 
Therefore, as Maynard Adams (2002: 81) has argued, “the meaning of life (…) lies 
ultimately in the fruition of being in an order of goodness”. 
This perspective can be contrasted with the sometimes heard claim that death 
negates the meaning of life (cf. Camus 2005 (1942)8). That is, as human beings are to die 
one day and thus leave their body, personality, relations, and possessions behind, life is 
considered meaningless as it leads to an inescapable end of all things that can be 
meaningful to a person. In this perspective, life becomes a “sickness unto death” 
(Kierkegaard 1968 (1849)), a tragic existence of despair in which someone cannot 
attribute meaning to anything because she knows that in the end, everything will vanish 
and thus become meaningless. Instead, it can be argued that it is not the unavoidable death 
that endangers the meaning of life, but the lack of purpose, in the sense of values and ends 
that can be pursued (Frankl 1985 (1956), Lewis 1966, Rescher 1992). Death may be 
perceived as the only certain “fact of life”, yet the purpose and values that concern 
someone ultimately –that give meaning to her life– encompass “all of life”. These values 
transcend her historic life, and thus literally go beyond death, as death is part of her life. 
Or, as Csikszentmihalyi puts it: “…the answer to the old riddle „What is the meaning of 
life?‟ turns out to be astonishingly simple. The meaning of life is meaning: whatever it is, 
wherever it comes from, a unified purpose is what gives meaning to life” (Csikszentmihalyi 
1990: 217). Meaning of life, then, concretely takes shape in the pursuit of ends that are 
defined by evaluative relations or values.  
This explains why Weber‟s means-ends rationality is not helpful in the search of 
finding meaning of life. Means-ends rationality is directed at the realization of ends, but in 
itself has no capability to address or problematize the questions that address “all of life”, 
                                                 
8 Albert Camus does not defend this thesis himself, but provides a valuable discussion by focusing on the 
 penultimate case of the meaning of life in relation to death, suicide. 
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as it cannot evaluate the desirability of different ends, but only whether they can be 
realized, and in what way this is done most efficiently. Ekstrand (2000) connects the 
ongoing process of rationalization in terms of means-ends rationality to the situation 
described above as Weber‟s “iron cage” or “nightmare”, in light of the question of 
meaning of life: “Perhaps the most disturbing consequence of rationalisation is that there 
can be no objective meaning of life. Rather, every individual has to make a choice for 
herself or himself and accept the rationalised culture of today” (Ekstrand 2000: 119). The 
statement by Ekstrand reveals two important elements of the question of meaning of life as 
it is posed today: first, “there can be no objective meaning” and second, “every individual 
has to make a choice”. The lack of objectivity of meaning is related to the process of 
disenchantment or “secularization”, the loss of objectivity of religious notions of 
understanding reality. The fact that, therefore, the burden of finding meaning of life is 
shifted to the individual, refers to the processes that are described as “loss of tradition” 
and “individualization”. In order to attain a firmer grasp of the implications of these 
developments for questions of meaning of life as they are posed nowadays, the processes of 
“secularization” and “loss of tradition and individualization” are explored in more detail as 
important determinants of the context of questions of meaning of life. 
 
1.2.3 Context of questions of meaning of life (I): Secularization 
Especially in western Europe, a diminished religious participation and a decreasing number 
of people believing in God and other central elements of Christian faith, have resulted in 
the idea that western societies have become “secularized”. In order to attain a firm grasp of 
the meaning of this phenomenon, first, two opposing theories in the sociology of religion 
are presented: secularization theory and religious markets theory. After a short evaluation 
of these theories, an interpretation of secularization from the perspective of the philosophy 
of religion is elaborated as a third option. 
In secularization theory, developments in (West-)European history are considered 
paradigmatic for the place of religion in a modern society. The proponents of the 
secularization thesis (Berger 1967, Bruce 2002, Lenski and Nolan 1998, Martin 1978) 
believe that in the Middle Ages, when there was a virtual religious monopoly for the 
Christian church and processes of modernization had not yet started, basically everyone 
was religious. Yet, as the development of modern science took off and the Reformation 
caused a multiplicity of religious options, the overall plausibility of religion decreased. 
Modern science challenged the plausibility of religious explanations for the functioning of 
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nature and the universe. The multiplicity of religious options dwindled religious 
plausibility, as this, according to the secularization theorists, led to a competition for 
plausibility amongst rivaling religions. As the modernization and pluralism of western 
societies increased, religiosity diminished in a linear fashion. Therefore, the explanation for 
the greatly lowered rates of church attendance and membership in (West-)European 
countries given by the secularization theorists, is a decrease of religiosity in itself. What 
was once a completely religious society, now for a large part consists of “secularized” 
people. In the view of secularization theorists, this process is likely to continue until 
religion has completely disappeared (cf. Aarts 2010: 16-18). 
The religious markets theory takes its cue from the religious situation in the 
United States of America, where there is both a high level of modernization and a 
relatively high level of belief in God and church attendance. The “demand” for religion is 
believed to be constant, and religious “preferences” are believed to be diverse. Therefore, 
proponents of the religious markets theory argue that the greater the amount of religious 
options or “supply”, the greater the religious involvement. As religious markets theorists 
argue that no single religion is able to satisfy the demands of all people by itself, more 
religious choice will increase individual religious participation. The religious situation in 
the U.S., with all its different denominations –sometimes ten different denominations in a 
single block– and its high level of religiosity, in the eyes of religious markets theorists 
delivers the proof for the idea that religious diversity brings about religious revival (Stark 
and Finke 2000, cf. Aarts 2010:18-19). 
The battle between the opposing theories of secularization and religious markets 
has not yet ended, nor is it likely to end any day soon as both theories have both strengths 
and weaknesses. Either is especially applicable to a certain context (western Europe or the 
U.S.), but neither of both has given a cogent explanation for the process of secularization 
that convincingly addresses both contexts. The fairly recent resurgence of religion in 
especially countries with relatively low religious diversity (Atherton 2008) adds another 
complexity for both theories. As one of the founders of secularization theory, Peter Berger, 
puts it: “The big mistake (…) was to believe that modernity necessarily leads to a decline 
in religion” (Berger 1998: 782, cf. Berger 1999). Moreover, as some scholars suggest, it 
might be the case that both mechanisms represent some aspect of the development of 
religiosity in modern societies, and that the two need to be combined to explore the 
dynamics of modernization and religious participation further (Kuiper 2007: 8). 
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A third perspective, from the philosophy of religion, may provide a deeper 
understanding of the meaning of secularization. Louis Dupré, who has extensively studied 
the process of modernization and its impact on society and religion (cf. Dupré 1995), 
argues that there always has been a sensitivity for the difference between “sacred” and 
“profane” aspects of reality. Whereas the sacred directly refers to the holy and the 
transcendent, the profane indicates a worldly status, although, crucially, it stands in a 
relation to the sacred: the fact that the sacred is the sacred, makes the profane the profane. 
Yet, the ongoing process of modernization, which Dupré traces back to the nominalist 
critique of the fourteenth century and the humanist creativity of the fifteenth century 
(Dupré 1995), has removed the necessity of a God as an encompassing and foundational 
reality for all existence. David Tracy formulates this change as follows: “The most 
important and widely overlooked consequence of modernity (…) is the breakup of both 
the ancient and the medieval senses of a synthesis of God, self, and cosmos” (Tracy 2000: 
245). This has caused a shift in the perception of everyday reality from “profane” to 
“secular” (Dupré 1998: 133). While the profane implies a relationship to something 
sacred, the secular stands on its own, and has no need for any transcendent counterpart. 
The shift towards a reality perceived as secular has important consequences for the 
nature of religious beliefs. Whereas in previous ages “experience, interpretation, and 
decision occurred in one continuous act (…) that connection today is broken. An 
ambiguous experience justifies the believer‟s faith as well as the unbeliever‟s unbelief” 
(Dupré 1998: 135). While people continue to attribute a sacred quality to persons, 
objects, and events, “they will do so because they hold them sacred, not because they 
perceive them as sacred. In the end it is their decision (…) that determines what they will 
hold sacred” (Dupré 1998: 136, emphasis in original, cf. Kaufman 2008). The givenness 
of a certain sacral order that functions as a reference point to the transcendent has 
disappeared, and this bars a direct experience of some phenomenon as sacred or holy. This 
development indicates an important change in the existential search for meaning of life, 
because whereas previously an objective institution provided guidance and reference, 
nowadays, “the center of gravity has shifted … to the subjective decision” (Dupré 1998: 
136, cf. Digance and Cusack 2008). According to Dupré, this does not necessarily imply 
that people nowadays make an eclectic choice of religious symbols belonging to different 
traditions, but that “genuine religion today differs from the past in that it integrates from 
within rather than from without” (Dupré 1998: 136-137). According to Dupré, there no 
longer exists a context or tradition that predetermines or guides questions of meaning of 
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life. The question of meaning of life comes from within the individual, and is to be 
answered by the individual. In the next subsection, the importance of the loss of tradition 
and the centrality of the individual as the constitutive locus where meaning is created, is 
discussed. 
 
1.2.4 Context of questions of meaning of life (II): Loss of tradition and individualization  
The concepts “loss of tradition” and “individualization” refer to two processes that have 
emerged especially in western countries since the 1960s. Loss of tradition refers to the 
shift of authority from the “outside” of tradition to the “inside” of the self (Kuiper 2007: 
28). As Paul Heelas (1996) puts it, loss of tradition  
 
entails the decline of the belief in the pre-given or natural order of things. 
Individual subjects are themselves called upon to exercise authority in the face of 
the disorder and contingency which is thereby generated (Heelas 1996: 2).  
 
The extent of the demise of tradition is disputed amongst scholars. On the one hand, there 
is the “radical thesis” that claims a virtual irrelevance of tradition in terms of authority to 
the modern individual. On the other hand, the “coexistence thesis” asserts the changing 
place, function, and meaning of tradition, but sees loss of tradition as “competing, 
interpenetrating or interplaying with processes to do with tradition-maintenance, 
rejuvenation and tradition-construction” (Heelas 1996: 2-3). Empirical studies support a 
general trend of a decreased importance of the authority of tradition and the concomitant 
increased importance of the judgment and choice of the individual (Felling 2004, Felling, 
Peters, and Scheepers 2000). The radical thesis of loss of tradition, however, is not 
supported by empirical studies. As Felling (2004: 33) points out, a radical transformation 
from a “traditional” to a “post-traditional” society has not taken place. People increasingly 
make their own choices within a multitude of possibilities, and shape their lives by 
connecting to other people in new networks, but nevertheless, the civil society is still of 
importance (Felling 2004: 33). Therefore, although the exact status and meaning of 
tradition is debated, the shift towards the authority or autonomy of the individual, that is 
captured in the concept “individualization”, is undisputed. 
 What does “individualization” exactly say about the way people live in our current 
societies? As Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (2002) put it  
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opportunities, dangers, biographical uncertainties that were earlier predefined 
within the family association, the village community, or by recourse to the rules of 
social estates or classes, must now be perceived, interpreted, decided and processed 
by individuals themselves (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 4).  
 
That is, a central aspect of individualization is the individual‟s task of creating and 
constantly reinventing her identity by making choices and decisions, in relation to other 
individuals and institutions in society (Lash 2002: xi). As modern society becomes 
increasingly differentiated (cf. Weber), the complexity of and tensions between different 
life spheres rises. These tensions cannot any longer be addressed by a tradition or 
community, but are to be solved by the individual. As Zygmunt Bauman, quoting Beck, 
puts it,  
 
“how one lives becomes a biographical solution to systemic contradictions”. Risks 
and contradictions go on being socially produced; it is just the duty and the 
necessity to cope with them that is individualized (Bauman 2002: xvi).  
 
With the grand array of options and choices that is available because of the relatively high 
level of prosperity, the individual, as the fated chooser (Bauman 2002: xvi), becomes a 
“homo optionis” who is characterized by a “vagrant‟s morality”. As virtually all matters, –
life, death, gender, identity, religion, sexual orientation, marriage, parenthood– have 
become decidable, it is up to the individual to make her own choices (Salecl 2009). There 
is no guiding “background” of a tradition, the individual passes through life like a 
“vagrant”, who sometimes moves this way, then finds temporary shelter in a new place. 
Whereas other people could previously provide a normative guidance or a sense of 
“marching shoulder to shoulder”, nowadays “the only service which company can render is 
advice about how to survive in one‟s own irreparable solitude and that everyone‟s life is full 
of risks which need to be confronted and fought alone” (Bauman 2000: 17, 2001: 35). 
In earlier ages, for instance in the early Italian Renaissance, processes of 
individualization have also taken place. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) quote historian 
Jakob Burckhardt, who describes the transition from the “collective veil (…) of faith, 
illusion, and childish prepossession” through which “man was conscious of himself only as 
a member of a race, people, party, family, corporation” to the possibility of an objective 
(dissociated) treatment and consideration of the state, and a concomitant subjective 
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recognition and assertion of the self (Burckhardt 1987 (1860): 161, cf. Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim 2002: 8). This transition was accompanied by the rise of the “politically 
indifferent private person”, the genesis of biographies and autobiographies, and the 
education of women according to masculine ideals.  
What, then, according to Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, distinguishes the current 
individualization from earlier trends like the one that took place in early Renaissance? The 
main difference is that the individualization that “was earlier expected of a few –to lead a 
life of their own– is now being demanded of more and more people and, in the limiting 
case, of all” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 8). There are two new elements to this 
shape of individualization: first, there is a democratization of individualization processes 
and, second, basic conditions in society favor or enforce individualization, for instance, in 
the job market, the need for mobility and training, labor and social legislation, and pension 
provisions (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 8). This means that individualization is a 
development that increasingly confronts all members of society, and not only the privileged 
rich or highly educated persons. 
In sum, the context of secularization, loss of tradition, and individualization 
indicates a shift in horizons of orientation and interpretation, and in authority, towards the 
individual. With the impact of traditions fading, or at least not any longer providing 
determinative guidance, the individual has to make choices for herself, about the things 
that are important in life. As everyday reality has become experienced a priori as secular, 
any “easy” account –in terms of a given frame of reference towards a horizon of 
transcendence– of the meaning of the individual‟s life cannot be provided either. As was 
pointed out above, this is a widespread or “democratic” phenomenon: society is 
increasingly geared to enabling free choices for individuals. 
 Having explored the three developments that together mark the context regarding 
questions of meaning of life, the question arises: in which of the four domains –church, 
society, academy, and economy– lies the greatest challenge for public theology, if it wants 
to address the question of meaning of life in an age of secularization, individualization, and 
loss of tradition? In the next section, by taking up the line of thought on Max Weber‟s 
“iron cage”, it is argued that the greatest challenge for public theology lies in the domain 
of economy.  
 
  
25 
1.3 A CHALLENGE FOR PUBLIC THEOLOGY 
1.3.1 Weber‟s “iron cage” and meaning of life in the economic domain 
As was related above, several authors claim that the Weberian “iron cage” has become 
reality to some degree. Especially regarding the constitution of meaning of life, Weber‟s 
analysis can prove to be insightful. Weber does not give a definition of meaning, although 
he does use a concept of “personality”, that is closely related to meaning of life:  
 
The essence of personality lies in the constancy of its inner relation to certain 
ultimate values and life-meanings, which, in the course of action, turn into 
purposes and are thus translated into teleologically rational action (Weber 1975: 
192, cf. Brubaker 1984: 95).  
 
Weber indicates a relation between personality and ultimate values and life-meanings, that 
are to be translated into teleologically rational action. This resonates with the discussion of 
meaning of life in section 1.2, in which meaning of life was described in terms of purpose 
and directedness towards an ultimate horizon of meaning that encompasses “all of life”. 
Weber himself acknowledges that he sets very high standards for the achievement of 
integrity and dignity in a “personality” and refers to a “heroic ethic” to describe the 
striving for the achievement of such a state (Weber 1978: 385-386, cf. Brubaker 1984: 
97). Still, in principle Weber deems the realization of a meaningful life possible, even 
within a modernized society. 
 Weber indicates a development that makes the connection between ultimate values 
and life-meanings and the translation to teleologically rational action difficult. To illustrate 
this difficulty, the concepts of rationality that are used by Weber need to be compared 
with regard to the way they relate to ends. As was argued above, in Weber‟s theory, the 
process of rationalization in modernity can be analyzed using the concepts of means-ends 
rationality and value rationality. Means-ends rationality consists in the calculation of 
means and procedures in relation to certain predefined ends. Value rationality, on the 
other hand, estimates the value of ends and results from a specific viewpoint (Brubaker 
1984: 35-36). In Weber‟s view, the end and distinctive character of rationalization in 
western societies is that it is a rationalization in terms of means-ends rationality. Therefore, 
the end of the process of rationalization is a “maximum calculability”. According to 
Rogers Brubaker (1984), however, this is not a real end, but rather a “generalized means 
that indiscriminately facilitates the purposeful pursuit of all substantive ends” (Brubaker 
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1984: 37, cf. Simmel 1978). Weber does not solely focus on calculability in his analysis of 
modernity, as he also mentions the significance of specialized knowledge, the erosion of 
traditional restraints, the regulation of social life through abstract norms, the increasingly 
powerful techniques of control over society and nature, and the growing impersonality of 
relations of power and authority. Still, Brubaker argues that these other elements of 
modernization are closely related to calculability and the enhancement of means-ends 
rationality, and thus contribute to the “purposeful, calculated achievement of any and all 
substantive ends” (Brubaker 1984: 37). 
 According to Weber, the social impact of the calculability of means-ends 
rationality reaches its zenith in the modern economic order, that is, in capitalism. He 
connects the calculative aspect of means-ends rationality to economic behavior, by arguing 
that 
  
from a purely technical point of view, money is the most “perfect” means of 
calculation. That is, it is formally the most rational means of orienting economic 
activity (Weber 1987: 86, quoted in Carruthers and Espeland 1991: 32). 
 
The relation between capitalism and rationalization in the sense of a calculative means-
ends rationality is well captured by economist Joseph Schumpeter9 (1975), who argues that 
 
Capitalist practice turns the unit of money into a tool of rational cost-profit 
calculations, of which the towering monument is double-entry bookkeeping. (…) 
Primarily a product of the evolution of economic rationality, the cost-profit 
calculus in turn reacts upon that rationality; by crystallizing and defining 
numerically, it powerfully propels the logic of enterprise. And thus defined and 
quantified for the economic sector, this type of logic or attitude or method then 
starts upon its conqueror‟s career subjugating –rationalizing– man‟s tools and 
philosophies, his medical practice, his picture of the cosmos, everything in fact 
including his concepts of beauty and justice and his spiritual ambitions 
(Schumpeter 1975: 123) 
 
                                                 
9 Although Schumpeter supports the relation between capitalism and rationalization that was indicated by 
 Weber, he is critical of Weber‟s thesis on the genesis of capitalism itself, cf. Schumpeter 1954. 
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As capitalism is deemed to reflect the high point of means-ends rationality, accordingly, in 
Weber‟s view, it is also completely irrational from the angle of value rationality. To 
illustrate this point, Weber uses the example of the virtue of “caritas”, love for the fellow 
human being. While caritas can only be expressed and given shape in a personal 
relationship, according to Weber 
 
this is not the situation in the realm of economically rationalized relationships, 
where personal control is exercised in inverse ratio to the degree of rational 
differentiation of the economic structure. There is no possibility, in practice or 
even in principle, of any caritative regulation of relationships arising between the 
holder of a savings and loan bank mortgage and the mortgagee who has obtained a 
loan from the bank. (…) The growing impersonality (“sachlichkeit”, AW) of the 
economy on the basis of association in the marketplace follows its own impersonal 
laws, disobedience to which entails economic failure and, in the long run, 
economic ruin (Weber 1978: 584-585, quoted in Brubaker 1984: 41). 
 
In Weber‟s view, caritas is “the foundation of every ecclesiastic ethic, from Islam and 
Judaism to Buddhism and Christianity” (Weber 1978: 1188). Translated in terms of 
meaning, caritas can be argued to be a value that forms an important part of the horizon of 
meaning of life of the great religious traditions. Yet, as Brubaker concludes,  
 
this ideal [caritas, AW] is rendered meaningless in the modern economic realm, 
since economic action predicated on caritas and ignoring the laws of the market is 
bound in the long run to be self-annihilating (Brubaker 1984: 41, italics added).  
 
Hence, in Weber‟s analysis, especially in the economic domain of modern society, 
rationalization in terms of a means-ends rationality is problematic for the question of 
meaning of life. Because of its focus on calculability and efficiency, and the disembedding 
of personal relations in which it results, means-ends rationality in the modern economic 
domain negates the possibility of action as a pursuit of values for their inherent 
“meaningfulness” or “goodness”10 (i.e., for their value rationality). Instead, from the 
                                                 
10 One “easy” option to solve this problem regarding meaning of life is to take recourse to “irrational” flights 
 from modernity to eroticism, art, and religion (Ekstrand 2000: 116). To some degree, phenomena that in 
 Weber‟s thought are interpreted as irrational flights from modernity can be discerned in contemporary 
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perspective of means-ends rationality, any sort of end is allowed and encouraged to be 
pursued by capitalism and its concomitant free markets, without discrimination to what 
“greater end” these lead. For example, a banker chooses to charge lower interest rates to 
poor people, because of her conviction that it is the right thing to do from the perspective 
of her “horizon of meaning” that encompasses solidarity and charity. In the Weberian 
image of the modern economy, she is bound to lose investors because of the relatively low 
profitability of her banking enterprise. The market demands the efficient use of resources, 
and therefore does not allow for other evaluative orientations to be mingled in its 
operations. Therefore, in the Weberian perspective, individuals and firms are not “free” to 
pursue careers and enterprises following the horizon of meaning that gives meaning to 
their life, but are forced by the dominance of means-ends rationality in the market to 
pursue maximal efficiency11. 
 
1.3.2 Meaning of life in the economic domain: a challenge for public theology 
By connecting Weber‟s perspective on the incommensurability between the evaluative 
question of meaning of life and calculative means-ends rationality, and the idea that means-
ends rationality is at its zenith in the economic domain, it appears to be impossible for 
public theology to discuss questions of meaning of life in the economic domain. Yet, as 
was outlined in section 1.1, “economy” is considered to be one of the four central domains 
of discourse for public theology. This leads to the question whether it is important idea 
for public theologians to try to connect their analyses to the economic domain of society. 
For several reasons, it is relevant and urgent for public theology to engage with the 
economic domain. First, as the quotation of Schumpeter already indicated, the logic or 
method of “cost-profit calculus”, that is the hallmark of capitalism, “conquers” other life-
spheres, and “subjugates” it to its principles (Schumpeter 1975: 123). Hence, the 
economic means-ends rationality increasingly plays a role in spheres of the individual‟s life 
other than the economic. A telling example of this influence is related by Vincent Miller 
                                                                                                                                     
 societies, for instance in excessive behavior during sports events and music concerts (Borgman 2006: 146) and 
 in the global resurgence of (especially strict and conservative) religion (Atherton 2008: 67-86). The individual 
 actor, confronted with a disenchanted reality and rationalized society, could find some comfort in these 
 “irrationalities”. Yet, the price that has to be paid, according to Weber, is giving up one‟s intellect. 
11 Therefore, in Weber‟s perspective, it is impossible to engage in virtuous behavior in the economic domain. For 
 a radically different interpretation of the relation between capitalism and virtues, see Deirdre McCloskey‟s 
 The Bourgeois Virtues (2006). McCloskey argues that in the process of the development of capitalism, 
 virtues have played an essential role.  
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(2003), who argues that the individualistic religious and spiritual practices of many people 
nowadays show characteristics of “consumerism”. That is, religion and spirituality are 
commodified, and the way people deal with religious “products” is similar to other 
practices of consumer behavior.  As Miller puts it, there is an “insatiable desire for stuff” –
exotic spiritual artifacts, ancient religious texts from different cultures– while at the same 
time, the content of the religious products suffers from “abstraction” –a loss of specific 
meaning, opening up space for idiosyncratic interpretations (Miller 2003: 77-84). In this 
way, the religious “products” have become the means to satiate the desire for religious and 
spiritual experiences. Yet, the meaning of the religious and spiritual traditions from which 
the “products” originate, is diminished, or even forgotten. In terms of meaning of life, the 
evaluative orientation or directedness that these religious texts and artifacts used to carry is 
lost in the process of abstraction. Therefore, the influence of considering different life-
spheres in economic terms is illustrated on the level of the individual. The great and still 
increasing impact of economic considerations in everyday life is also stressed by 
sociological research (Felling 2004). 
On a national and global scale, the enormous impact of economic developments 
has been illustrated by the very recent financial and economic crises, that have caused the 
bankruptcy of many banks and firms, and caused major unemployment worldwide. The 
economic and financial worries of banks and governments can even threaten the financial 
stability of entire nations (i.e., in recent years, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, and Spain). 
The astronomic amounts of money that are necessary to rescue a bank or state that cannot 
pay its debts are far removed from the everyday experience of the ordinary citizen –
although the taxpayer may of course be confronted with higher tax rates, because her 
government needs money to bail out banks. However, the effects of, for instance, a 
government default can result in throwing a country decades back in its development. The 
crises indicate the prominence and importance of the economic domain in societies. They 
show that the existence of a global free market capitalism is an important framework that 
connects national and global developments to the everyday activities of people and firms, 
creating both opportunities and threats (Atherton 2008). 
 Second, and to some degree in contrast with the increased influence of economic 
considerations, there are also movements from within market capitalism that appear to go 
against the claim that it is impossible to combine the economic demand for efficiency (in 
terms of means-ends rationality) with other, substantive ends. Developments like Business 
Spirituality (Bubna-Litic 2009, De Blot 2004, De Blot and Pronk 2007, Pauchant 2002, 
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Williams 2003,), Corporate Social Responsibility (Vogel 2005), Social Banking (Yunus 
2003, 2007),  and also Fair Trade, Ethical and Green Investment connect an economic 
concept (business, corporate, banking, trade, and investment) to another concept that is 
apparently a necessary addition in order to distinguish a special way of doing “business” or 
“trade” from the standard interpretation. Regular “banking” fits into Weber‟s framework 
of a calculating and impersonal institution aiming at maximal efficiency regarding the use 
of means in the realization of the given end of profit. Yet, the development of social 
banking illustrates that apart from the standard way of operating a banking business, an 
evaluative qualification is added to the nature of the enterprise. Nobel Laureate 
Muhammad Yunus (2007), founder of the Grameen microcredit bank in Bangladesh 
explains the difference between a “traditional” profit-maximizing business and a social 
business. While a social business uses the same management principles as a profit-
maximizing business, it is not geared at creating financial profits for shareholders. The aim 
is to cover costs, including repaying investors, while keeping profits within the business in 
order to be able to pursue long-term social goals (Yunus 2007: 22-23). The social goals –
for instance, providing high-quality food to poor people for low prices, enabling poor 
people to receive credit to start their own small business– are the real “profit” of the social 
business. The central free market tenet of competition is not considered to be problematic 
for social business, although the nature of competition is different from profit-maximizing 
business: social businesses compete for the best realization of social goals, and find pride in 
winning this competition instead of monetary rewards (Yunus 2007: 27). Therefore, social 
business diverts from Weber‟s conception of “standard” capitalist business practice. 
Instead of being directed at only efficiently allocating the means (money) towards the 
achievement of greater profits (as a further means), social business is directed at the 
realization of ends that are located outside the traditional realm of business. Although 
means-ends rationality undoubtedly makes up an important part of social banking, there is 
also a clear directedness to achieving ends that go beyond traditional banking –a 
meaningful horizon consisting of, for instance, improved health, education, and freedom. 
 Because of these two developments, it is especially relevant, even urgent, for public 
theology to connect to the economic domain. What kind of questions do public 
theologians study, when they are to reflect on questions of meaning of life in the economic 
domain? In general, in its analysis, public theology considers itself  
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engaged with the same questions that vex social analysts – (…) [amongst whom] 
sociologists, economists, and anthropologists–, as they try to discern what is going 
on in the world, whether things are as they ought to be and what, if they are not, 
can be changed (Stackhouse 2007: 94).  
 
Thus, according to Stackhouse, public theologians and social theorists share an interest in 
both descriptive knowledge (discerning what is going on) and evaluative knowledge 
(discerning what ought to be). Therefore, if public theologians want to understand 
questions of meaning of life in the economic domain, the analyses of social theorists may 
prove to be of value to the interpretations, articulations, and evaluative critiques of public 
theology. If public theologians want to reflect on questions of meaning of life in the 
economic domain, with which discipline within the social sciences should they connect 
their work? 
 To this effect, economics12 as a social science might appear to be a logical choice. 
In recent years, several theologians have already taken up the challenge to connect their 
work to economics13 (Barrera 2005, Tanner 2005, Rieger 2009, Meeks 1989, Long 2000, 
Long and Fox 2007). These studies may have provided valuable insights for fellow 
theologians, yet, they have not always been well received by economists14.  
                                                 
12 The academic discipline of economics can be defined in various ways. Here, the definition by the influential 
 economist and historian of economic thought Robert Heilbroner is followed, who argues that “at its core, 
 economics is an explanation system whose purpose is to enlighten us as to the workings, and therefore the 
 problems and prospects, of that complex social entity we call the economy” (Heilbroner 1999: 311). This 
 refers to the study of questions that are also of interest to public theologians (i.e., Heilbroner‟s “economy” is 
 what public theologians consider as the “economic domain”). Providing a definition of economics, however, is 
 a hazardous enterprise, as it is impossible to find a definition that incorporates all different questions and 
 perspectives that economists engage with (Backhouse and Medema 2009). As economist Jacob Viner is 
 reported to have said, illustrating this point, “economics is what economists do”, cf. Boulding 1941: 3. A 
 different possibility for defining economics is by focusing on its method. For instance, economist Gary Becker 
 (1976: 4) argues that “The combined assumptions of maximizing behavior, market equilibrium, and stable 
 preferences, used relentlessly and unflinchingly, form the heart of the economic approach”. The definition 
 used here is not meant to exclude any approaches in advance, but to give a general indication of the questions 
 with which economists engage. 
13 Each of the authors referred to here understands “ economics” in a different way. It is often not made clear to 
 what they refer to when they speak about economics. In this thesis, the focus is explicitly on (different 
 approaches to) economics as an academic discipline, as will be elaborated below. 
14 For instance, an economist reviewing Kathryn Tanner‟s Economy of Grace (2005) argues that the approach 
 that Tanner takes when it comes to economics, is “eclectic” and “far from presenting a persuasive argument” 
 (Nelson 2006: 782-784). 
32 
In a reflection on the attempts that have been made to forge a connection between 
theology and economics, economist Paul Heyne argues that the “pontifical mode” –the 
self-righteous attitude and commanding voice of theologians criticizing economic theory– 
is an important hindrance (Heyne 1999: 142). With some theologians using candid 
images to express their thoughts on economics and the market, –such as “the Beast” 
(Tanner 2005), “the Mammon” (McCarraher 2004), and a “Culture of Death” (Long and 
York 2007)–, Heyne‟s comments appear to be appropriate. 
Thus, although there have been attempts at making a connection between theology 
and economics, so far, little progress has been made. Although this may appear to be the 
result of a lack of conversational etiquette on the side of some theologians, the “pontifical 
mode” can be considered as the symptom of more profound problems. Anthony 
Waterman, who has extensively published on the relation between theology and economics 
(Waterman 1987, 2001, 2002, 2008, Dean and Waterman 1999, Brennan and Waterman 
2008), perceives a “mismatch” between the two disciplines, that disables theologians from 
creating a connection with the work of economists. In Christian Theology and Market 
Economics (Harper and Gregg 2008), Waterman and Geoffrey Brennan put it as follows:  
 
the experience of a conversation between theologians and economists is that of 
people talking past one another; and this is partly because basic attitudes towards 
epistemic and methodological issues are so different (Brennan and Waterman 
2008: 89). 
 
It appears that the theologians who have attempted to connect to economics have 
mistakenly assumed that they can do so directly15. That is, they do not reflect on the way 
in which such a connection is to be made. It is the goal of this thesis to explore the 
possibilities for an exchange of knowledge between public theology and economics. 
Therefore, the main question of this thesis can be formulated: 
 
                                                 
15 An exception to the “direct” approaches made by most theologians is the work by economist and theologian 
 Johan Graafland, who uses ethical theories as an intermediary field between Biblical theology and economics. 
 The use of ethical theories as an intermediary results in a connection that is focused on ethical prescriptions 
 for economic behavior and policy, based on Biblical ethics. This thesis, however, has a different focus, as 
 questions of meaning of life are considered to be the central interest of (public) theologians. Graafland‟s work 
 is discussed shortly in section 2.1. 
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How can a connection that enables an exchange of knowledge between public 
theology and economics be established? 
 
What steps are needed to establish such a connection? The first two sections of this 
chapter offer promising leads about where to focus in the search for this connection. First, 
public theology has two central interests: it seeks to interpret and articulate questions of 
meaning of life, and it wants to contribute to a viable civil society through its analysis and 
evaluative critique. These two interests can provide guidance in the search for a connection 
with economics, as for a viable connection, these interests should be shared to some degree 
(i.e., also on the side of economics).  
In recent decades, economic theory has become increasingly pluralistic (Salanti and 
Screpanti 1997, Sent 2006). The pluralism of economic theory harbors a wide variety of 
approaches, which creates many possibilities for public theologians to find an approach 
with which to connect. In the following chapters, a selection is made of different 
approaches to economic theory, and the affinity of these approaches with “meaning of life” 
and “contributing to a viable civil society” is assessed.  
How can the two central interests of public theology be used in the search for a 
connection between public theology to economics? With regard to both “meaning of life” 
and “contributing to a viable civil society”, the concept of means-ends rationality that 
Weber uses in his theory of modernization pose a problem. If, following Weber, economic 
behavior is understood solely in terms of means-ends rationality, economic behavior is only 
about achieving ends in an efficient way. As the evaluative deliberation about which ends 
are ultimately valuable and meaningful has no place in economic behavior in Weber‟s 
interpretation, questions of meaning of life are irrelevant to economic behavior. If 
economists were to understand economic behavior in a way similar to Weber‟s 
interpretation, this precludes any interest on their side with regard to the relationship 
between economic behavior and questions of meaning of life. 
Also, as was related above, Weber only considers means-ends rationality capable of 
being “objective”, while value rationality –constructing evaluative arguments, aimed at 
distinguishing what is valuable and meaningful– is always subjective. By making evaluative 
arguments fundamentally a subjective matter, the efforts by public theologians to 
contribute to a viable civil society by their evaluative critiques, also becomes a matter of 
subjectivity. The evaluative orientations and arguments constructed by public theologians 
are, following Weber‟s interpretation, fundamentally subjective, and can therefore be 
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considered as inappropriate in academic discourse16. However, if public theologians want 
to connect to economics, it is necessary that on the side of economics, the idea is shared 
that it is in principle possible to engage in evaluative deliberations as an academic scholar.  
Therefore, in the assessment of their affinity with public theology‟s central 
interests, two questions are posed towards the different approaches to economics that are 
discussed in following chapters (2-4). First, the question whether these approaches can 
establish a relation between economic behavior and meaning of life is inquired. Second, the 
question whether it is possible to engage in evaluative deliberation –geared at contributing 
to a viable civil society– as a scholar in these approaches is investigated. In both cases the 
questions focus on whether there is place for evaluative deliberation or evaluative 
arguments  –deliberation or arguments about values. If the answer to these questions is 
positive, a connection between public theology and economics can in principle be 
envisioned, and the construction of a framework for making this connection is enabled. If 
this affinity cannot be discerned in the work of economists, designing a framework for a 
connection between public theology and economics comes down to building a castle in the 
sky. It is through the exploration of the approaches to economics that show an affinity 
with public theology‟s central interests, and the construction of a framework for making a 
connection to economics, that this thesis seeks to contribute to public theology. 
Thus, if public theology wants to connect to economics in order to be able to 
interpret, articulate, and critique questions of meaning of life in the economic domain, it 
first needs to ascertain whether there is affinity with its central interests in economics. This 
step is taken in chapters 2-4. In each of these chapters, approaches to economics17 are 
investigated from the viewpoint of the central interests of public theology. Chapter 2 
reviews previous attempts at making a connection between theology and economics by 
discussing an approach in economics that theologians have often used as their “default” 
option, and which can be identified as neoclassical economics. Chapter 3 explores an 
economic approach that is interested in the motivations for economic behavior, –and 
therefore might be able to account for meaning of life as a motivation for economic 
behavior– and that engages in evaluative deliberations about the ends of economic 
behavior, behavioral economics. Chapter 4 focuses entirely on the question of evaluative 
                                                 
16 I.e, it is the work of an academic scholar to strive for objectivity in her work. Objectivity is discussed more in 
 detail in sections 2.4 and 5.3.  
17 The reasons for choosing these particular approaches are presented in sections 2.5 and 3.5. 
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orientations in economic theory, and questions how happiness economics and the 
capability approach provide such an evaluative orientation. 
The second step, the construction of a framework that allows for the exchange of 
knowledge between public theology and economics, builds on the findings of this inquiry, 
by showing how both the central interests of public theology –as interests in evaluative 
deliberation at the level of economic behavior and evaluative arguments at the level of the 
scholar– can be elaborated. In doing so, a relationship between economic behavior and 
meaning of life can be founded, and the possibility for the objectivity of evaluative 
arguments from the perspective of public theology and economics can be indicated. To 
this effect, the dichotomous understanding of means-ends rationality and value rationality 
with regard to objectivity in Weber‟s work is also addressed in the construction of the 
framework, as the understanding of value that underlies the Weberian dichotomy is a 
hindrance to the elaboration of evaluative arguments. 
 
1.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter started by exploring and defining public theology as a new approach to 
theology, and embedding it in the broader tradition of theology that starts its analyses 
from within its societal context. The context was typified by means of the concepts 
secularization, individualization, and loss of tradition. In this context, questions of 
meaning of life –a central interest for public theologians– have become increasingly 
difficult to answer. Using Weber‟s theory of modernization, the difficulty with regard 
questions of meaning of life was pinpointed, by the concepts means-ends rationality and 
value rationality. It was argued that studying questions of meaning of life in the economic 
domain is urgent for public theologians. On the one hand means-ends rationality is at its 
zenith in the economic domain, and on the other hand new developments such as social 
banking and business spirituality connect traditionally economic concepts to evaluative and 
meaningful orientations. As public theologians share an interest in both understanding 
actual practices in society and in providing evaluative critiques with social theorists, it was 
proposed that public theology is to search for a connection with economic theory. Earlier 
attempts at making such a connection have failed.  
This thesis wants to contribute to the development of public theology by 
establishing a connection between public theology and economics that allows for the 
exchange of knowledge. The first step of this thesis consists in exploring whether there are 
approaches in economic theory that have affinity with the central interests of public 
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theology, meaning of life and contributing to a viable civil society. The second step is the 
construction of a framework for making a connection to economics, by building on the 
findings of the first step and providing a foundation for the relationship between 
economic behavior and meaning of life, and the objectivity of evaluative arguments. 
In the next chapter, an exemplary case of an attempt at making a connection 
between theology and the “default” option for theologians interested in economics –
neoclassical economics– is investigated. Based on an examination of this case, it is inquired 
whether neoclassical economics has affinity with the two central interests of public 
theology.  
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CHAPTER 2  
 
PUBLIC THEOLOGY AND  
NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
As was analyzed in the first chapter, questions of  meaning of life in the current age of 
secularization, individualization, and loss of  tradition, are the central focus of  public 
theology. Through interpreting, articulating, and evaluating questions of  meaning of  life, 
public theology seeks to contribute to a viable civil society. The central problem that was 
identified is the difficulty that arises with regard to evaluative questions of  meaning of  life, 
because as a result of  processes of  modernization, the dominant mode of  thinking in 
society only relates to the efficient achievement of predetermined ends (i.e. means-ends 
rationality). It was argued that in this regard, the greatest challenge for public theology lies 
in the economic domain, as in this domain means-ends rationality is at its zenith.  
In order to address this challenge, several theologians –public theologians and 
others– have already attempted to connect their work to economics. Yet, their attempts 
have so far proved unsuccessful. This thesis seeks to contribute to public theology by 
inquiring whether there are approaches to economic theory that share public theology‟s 
central interests, and by constructing a framework for making a connection to economics. 
As was argued in section 1.3, previous attempts by theologians to connect to 
economics have not been very successful. Most theologians who have intended to make a 
connection, have engaged with a specific approach in economics, that can be identified as 
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neoclassical economics. Neoclassical economics can be considered as the intellectual 
orthodoxy of  economics (as will be elaborated upon below, cf. Colander et al. 2002, Davis 
2006). This may explain why theologians have chosen this approach instead of  more 
recent, less established approaches in economics. Therefore, neoclassical economics can be 
considered as the “default” option for most theologians who want to connect to 
economics. The central question that is to be answered in this chapter is whether 
neoclassical economics has affinity with the central interests of  public theology. 
To this effect, in the following section (2.2), first, neoclassical economics as an 
approach in economics is introduced. Also, a short overview of  the variety of  ways that 
theologians have pursued to connect to economics is presented. In section 2.3, one specific 
example of  a previous attempt at making a connection to economics is explored further. 
This example is a direct conversation between a theologian and a neoclassical economist. In 
this conversation, their respective disciplinary viewpoints are elaborated in detail. The 
conversation can provide valuable insights with regard to the question whether neoclassical 
economics has affinity with the central concerns of public theology, meaning of life and 
contributing to a viable civil society. In section 2.4, an evaluation of  the conversation is 
given, and the central question of  this chapter is answered. Based on the results of  this 
chapter, the question on which approach to economic theory the next chapter is to focus is 
addressed. Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT ESTABLISHING A CONNECTION WITH NEOCLASSICAL 
ECONOMICS 
2.2.1 Neoclassical economics 
For the largest part of  the twentieth century, economics has been dominated by the 
“neoclassical” approach (Rizvi 2003, Davis 2008). The term “neoclassical” was coined by 
Thorstein Veblen (1900) at the end of  the nineteenth century (Colander 2000: 128). With 
neoclassical, Veblen indicated that certain characteristics of  the approach of  his 
contemporaries already existed in the work of  the “classical” economists like Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo. Especially Ricardo‟s abstract analysis of  economic questions was 
influential in this regard. Yet, there were also new elements in the neoclassical approach. 
Neoclassical economists like William S. Jevons (1835-1882), Leon Walras (1834-1910), 
and Alfred Marshall (1842-1924), applied a subjective theory of  value, and used 
“marginal analysis” as an important tool (Landreth and Colander 2002). Marginal analysis 
focuses on the significance in terms of utility or productivity of  a marginal (i.e. 
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infinitesimal) change in the quantity of  a good or service. For example, if  one is thirsty in a 
desert with only a little water available, the marginal benefit or utility of  a glass of  water is 
much greater than if  one has just drunk a bottle of  water, and is near a properly 
functioning water tap. Contrary to the marginalist approach, classical economists used 
value-theoretical approaches in which goods were considered to have an inherent value, for 
instance, in terms of  the amount of  labor needed to make a good. The neoclassical 
marginalist approach focused entirely on the utility that is added by an incremental change 
in the amount of  a good that is used18. 
 What are other distinctive characteristics of  the neoclassical approach? A general 
definition of  neoclassical analysis is given by David Colander, Richard Holt, and Barkley 
Rosser (2004), who argue that neoclassical economics is the “theory of  equilibrium, based 
on the optimizing behavior of  fully rational and well-informed individuals in a static 
context” (Colander et al. 2004: 7). The economic actor, or “homo economicus”, is 
represented in neoclassical economics as an individual who seeks to maximize her utility by 
engaging in transactions in a market and allocating her scarce means in the most efficient 
way with regard to her preferences. The “optimizing behavior” is enacted by aligning the 
marginal added utilities of  different goods in such a way that the highest possible utility is 
gained. If  all individual homines economici engage in a similar way, and if  there is perfect 
competition between firms (the suppliers of  goods and services), the market will attain an 
equilibrium.  
Although there are several slightly differing interpretations of what exactly 
constitutes the core of  the neoclassical approach, most definitions share the elements 
discerned by Colander, Holt, and Rosser. For instance, Christian Arnsperger and Yanis 
Varoufakis argue that the three distinctive characteristics of  all different neoclassical 
approaches are methodological individualism, maximizing instrumentality, and equilibrium 
(Arnsperger and Varoufakis 2006). 
The neoclassical approach has undergone substantial development (Mirowski and 
Hands 1998), and represents a variety of authors who do not necessarily agree on all 
                                                 
18 Economist Eugen Von Böhm-Bawerk (1891) illustrated marginal analysis by telling the story of  a farmer who 
 has five sacks of  grain: he uses the first to stay alive, the second to be strong enough to work, the third to feed 
 his animals, the fourth to make whisky, and the fifth to feed his pigeons. If  he loses one-fifth of  his grain 
 harvest, he will most likely not cut all uses of  grain by twenty percent, but instead stop feeding the pigeons, as 
 this gives him the least utility (Cf. Book III, Chapter IV: “the Marginal Utility”). 
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points19. Still, it is often referred to as the “orthodoxy” of  economics (Landreth and 
Colander 2002). The terms orthodoxy, heterodoxy, and mainstream are used by historians 
of  economic thought to indicate either the intellectual or sociological status of different 
approaches in economic theory. Colander et al. (2004: 7) relate that what is classified as 
orthodoxy is the most recently dominant school of  thought. Orthodoxy is predominantly 
used as an intellectual classification, and refers to a static view20 of  what was the most 
influential approach in economics in previous decades. The “mainstream” is used as a 
sociological concept that indicates presently influential approaches and research programs 
in economics, while not suggesting that there is a shared and static core of  ideas and beliefs 
that unites them. Finally, “heterodoxy” refers to approaches that on the one hand have 
formed their own schools of  thought21, and on the other hand reject the current orthodoxy 
and mainstream (Colander et al. 2004: 9). 
 As John Davis (2006: 8) has argued, the dominant influence of  the neoclassical 
orthodoxy as the “standard economic theory” reached its zenith in the 1970s22. From the 
1980s onwards, several new approaches have arisen in economics, such as behavioral 
economics and neo-institutional economics (Heukelom 2009, Coase 1998, cf. Coase 
1937, Greif  1994, North 1990, 1994, 2005, Williamson 2000). These previously 
heterodox approaches gained status and influence in journals, and thus became part of  the 
mainstream in economic research. As a result, the present situation in economic research 
reflects a pluralism of  different strands of  research (Sent 2006). 
The new pluralism in economics has an increasing impact on research in 
                                                 
19 In discussing the meaning of neoclassical economics, Roy Weintraub (1993) argues that the disagreements 
 between economists are often matters of detail, while they do agree on “broad economic theory”, which in 
 Weintraub‟s view is comprised by neoclassical economics (Weintraub 1993) 
20 As Colander et al. argue, defining an approach in economics as orthodox “gives a critic an easy target; it 
 implies a static unchanging dimension of thought” (Colander et al. 2004: 8). This characterization can never 
 be fully appropriate, as economics as an academic discipline continuously evolves itself. 
21 For an overview of important heterodox schools of thought, see the final chapter of Landreth and Colander 
 2002. In this chapter, various influential heterodox perspectives, such as Radicals, Austrians, and Post-
 Keynesians are discussed. Landreth and Colander omit feminist economics in their overview. For a recent 
 survey of feminist economics, see Ferber and Nelson 2003. Although elements of heterodox approaches may 
 prove to have interesting insights for public theologians, in this thesis, they are not focused upon, as it is 
 considered more helpful to search for a connection with economic approaches that are currently part of the 
 mainstream. 
22 Standard economic theory comprises three main subsets, the General Equilibrium Theory of  Kenneth Arrow 
 and Gerard Debreu, the Chicago School, and the Revealed Preference approach of  Paul Samuelson and others. 
 Cf. Hands and Mirowski 1998, and Mirowski & Hands 1998. 
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economics. However, the neoclassical orthodoxy is still present in both research and 
education (Davis 2006, Arnsperger and Varoufakis 2006). Several authors refer to 
“standard economic theory”, or “standard neoclassical theory” (Davis 1995, Wilkinson 
2007). Also, in undergraduate economic textbooks, the principles of  neoclassical theory 
are presented as the basic approach of  economics (Perloff  2008, Varian 2006). As Davis 
(2006: 4) has argued, the absence of  the new developments in basic economic textbooks is 
the result of  a “lag”, in which the content of  the instruction to students consists of  
summaries of  previously dominant approaches. As a result, however, each year thousands of  
undergraduate courses in economics across the world are taught based upon the principles 
of  neoclassical analysis. Therefore, it can be concluded that neoclassical economics has had, 
and continues to have both an important intellectual and societal impact. Because of  this 
intellectual and societal impact, and the fact that it is often referred to as standard 
economic theory, neoclassical economics can be considered a logical “default option” for 
theologians who have attempted to connect to economics. 
 
2.2.2 Theologians seeking a connection with economics – a short overview of  different 
approaches 
In recent decades23, a considerable number of  theologians24 has attempted to connect with 
economics in a great variety of ways (Atherton 2008, Barrera 2005, Beaudoin 2003, 
Cavanaugh 2008, Graafland 2007, 2010, Long 2000, Long and Fox 2007, McCarraher 
2004, Meeks 1989, Miller 2003, Novak 1993, Rieger 2009, Stackhouse 2007, Tanner 
2005, cf. Oslington 2003a, 2003b, 2008, Dean and Waterman 1999, Brennan and 
Waterman 2008, Heyne 2008, Yuengert 2004). There is a great diversity in the way 
theologians engage with economics, with regard to both the approach they follow in 
constructing a connection, and the topics they discuss. The diversity of  the different ways 
                                                 
23 In Christianity‟s –and other religions‟– theological tradition, the discussion of economic issues from a 
 religious or theological perspective has ancient roots. For instance, in Christianity, the relation between 
 material wealth and spiritual life plays an important role in the New Testament. Also, in later theological 
 reflections, for example in the work of St. Thomas Aquinas, concepts such as “usury”  and “just price” were 
 elaborately discussed (Landreth and Colander 2002). 
24 The interest for a conversation between theology and economics apparently is a matter of greater concern for 
 theologians than it is for economists (although Heyne 2008, Oslington 2000, and Nelson 1991, 2001 are 
 notable exceptions). In economics, the question of a conversation between theology and economics is mostly 
 asked by economists who seek to find a bridge between their (Christian) faith and their work as an economist. 
 See, for instance Waterman 1987, Bateman and Banzhaf 2008, and the website of the Association of 
 Christian economists, http://www.gordon.edu/ace/default.htm.  
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of  seeking a connection makes it unfeasible to provide a comprehensive overview or 
complete classification. Still, it is possible to give a tentative systemization of  three 
different modes of connecting to economics. These three different modes are direct 
approaches, indirect approaches, and discussions of  a specific economic topic or problem. 
Each of these approaches is shortly elaborated upon. 
 First, in a direct approach, a theologian seeks to connect her work directly to the 
work of  economists. That is, a theologian takes up the challenge to engage with economic 
theories, or with the academic discussions on economic issues, by presenting her 
theological analyses and reflections to the debates on these matters. An example of  a direct 
approach is Kathryn Tanner‟s Economy of Grace (2005). Tanner seeks a “direct 
conversation with economics” by constructing a “theological economy” and confronting 
this with the “economic principles that rule the world of  our experience” (Tanner 2005: 
x). These principles entail that “economics is about money”, which is used as “a short 
hand for material wealth and success and the like” (Tanner 2005: 5). By means of  her 
theological economy, Tanner seeks to counter the harsh control that is exerted by economic 
principles, as in her view “our world seems at the mercy of fickle and unsparing economic 
winds” (Tanner 2005: ix). Tanner‟s method of  connecting theology to economics is a 
formal analysis by means of  a comparative study. As she puts it, “one compares the ways 
grace [as the core “currency” of  a theological economy, AW] and money are placed within 
the differential networks or fields constituted by their respective principles of  distribution” 
(Tanner 2005: 10). By comparing a theological concept of  “economy” with the principles 
that govern economic processes in contemporary societies, Tanner directly connects 
theology to her interpretation25 of  economics. 
  Second, in an indirect connection, a third academic discipline is used as an 
intermediary to help construct a connection between theology and economics. An example 
of  an indirect connection can be found in Johan Graafland‟s Het Oog van de Naald (“the 
Eye of  the Needle”, 2007). Graafland uses ethical theories as a middle field by translating 
both theological and economic ideas and theories into ethical terms. On the one hand, 
Graafland explores how Biblical principles and comments on economic behavior can be 
                                                 
25 Tanner does not provide a clear definition of what she considers as “economics”. At some points in her 
 argument, she appears to refer to basic aspects of market exchange, while at the end of her argument, she 
 (once) uses the ideological classification “neoliberal economics” to pinpoint economics (Tanner 2005: 90). 
 Therefore, it is unclear whether Tanner intends to connect to the actual market economy as it functions in 
 society, the academic reflection about the functioning of the economy, or an ideological perspective about this 
 functioning of the market economy (or a combination of these three). 
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translated into ethical principles. On the other hand, Graafland discusses the way economic 
theories and the findings of  economists about the functioning of  the market relate to 
ethics. By integrating these two translations, Graafland formulates a Christian ethical 
approach to economic issues, founded on Biblical principles, and informed by the insights 
of  economics26. 
Third, there are theologians who choose to focus on a specific economic topic, 
such as consumption (Miller 2003), branding (Beaudoin 2003), or globalization (Rieger 
2009). An example of  this kind of  approach is Thomas Beaudoin‟s Consuming Faith 
(2007). Beaudoin provides an analysis of  the phenomenon “branding”, and its 
implications for the way people make economic choices in relation to their identity. 
Beaudoin seeks to find a way in which people who want to live in accordance with 
Christian virtues and values can engage with a “branded culture”. To this effect, Beaudoin 
explores an “economic spirituality”, a way of  making economic choices that is in line with 
the person someone desires to become27. 
 As was related above, in the next section one specific example of  a previous 
attempt by a theologian at making a connection to economics is elaborated. This is an 
example of  a direct approach, in the shape of  a conversation between theologian Stephen 
Long and economist Nancy Fox‟ Calculated Futures (2007).  
 Why is a direct approach chosen, instead of  an indirect approach or a discussion 
of  a specific topic? It is the purpose of  this chapter to understand whether neoclassical 
economics has affinity with the central interests of  public theology. In an indirect 
approach, the help of  a third discipline is invoked to enable a connection between theology 
and economics. The third discipline serves as a mediating field in which viewpoints from 
theology and economics are translated in terms of, for instance, ethical concepts –concepts 
that are extraneous to theology and economics28. For this reason, an indirect approach is 
                                                 
26 In making this indirect connection between theology and economics, Graafland refers to previous work on the 
 relation between theology, ethics, and economics (cf. Daly 1992). In this perspective, theology is concerned 
 with the determination of ultimate values and ends, and economics is concerned with instrumental or 
 “technical” affairs of allocation and distribution. Ethics, in which values are related to questions of “right” 
 versus “wrong” in practices, can connect the levels of deliberation of theology and economics as an 
 intermediary field. 
27 Beaudoin‟s perspective is discussed in detail in section 5.4. 
28 For example, if theologians are interested in questions of meaning of life, and economists in questions about 
 consumption, introducing an ethical theory would add a specific focus to a discussion about the relation 
 between consumption and questions of meaning of life. This leads to an alteration of the way the relation 
 between meaning of life and consumption are discussed, as they are only understood in terms of morality 
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not helpful for the concern of  the present chapter, as the question is about public theology 
and neoclassical economics: introducing a third perspective is likely to obfuscate their 
specific viewpoints. Likewise, engaging with neoclassical economic thought through the 
discussion of  a specific topic by a theologian also leads to an indirect confrontation. In this 
case, a theologian presents her perspective on, for instance, consumption, and in doing so, 
also discusses an economic understanding of  consumption. In this situation, everything 
would depend on the adequacy of  the theologian‟s interpretation of the economic 
understanding of  consumption. A direct approach, however, does not suffer these 
disadvantages. There are no concepts from a third discipline involved, and the perspective 
of  neoclassical economics can be presented on its own terms. Therefore, for the purpose of 
the present chapter, a direct approach is the best choice. 
 Why is the conversation between theologian Stephen Long and economist Nancy 
Fox chosen as an example of  a direct approach, and not, for instance, Kathryn Tanner‟s 
Economy of  Grace? The most important advantage of Long and Fox‟ work is that it is a 
rare case of  an actual interactive exchange of  arguments between a theologian and an 
economist, in which the convergences and clashes between their disciplines are discussed 
directly29. Long and Fox can both present their own views, and can immediately react to the 
other‟s perspectives. As was already related above, Tanner‟s approach, like many other 
attempts by theologians to connect to economics, suffers from a lack of  clarity with regard 
to its understanding of  economics. In the conversations between Long and Fox, however, 
the neoclassical economist is enabled to make her own case. Therefore, it illustrates the 
benefits of  a direct approach in an optimal way. 
Stephen Long is a theologian who is sympathetic with the radical orthodoxy 
movement in theology30. This movement was already introduced in section 1.1. Nancy Fox 
                                                                                                                                     
 (Graafland 2007: 43). Moreover, as this ethical connection is made using specific ethical theories (utilitarian 
 ethics, ethics of justice, virtue ethics), the conceptual framework of these theories is also part of the connection 
 between theology and economics that is sought. By introducing concepts that are extraneous to both theology 
 and economics, this strategy runs the risk of creating extra hurdles, instead of enabling a connection. 
29 The only other case in which such an exchange of arguments between an economist and a theologian takes 
 place within one text that is known to the author, is the conversation between the fictive theologian Mary and 
 fictive economist John, in Gordon Menzies‟ (2008) Economics as Identity. 
30 As was indicated in section 1.1, there are tensions between public theology and the radical orthodoxy 
 movement in theology. The focus of this chapter is to find out whether neoclassical economics has affinity 
 with the central interests of public theology. The discussions between Long and Fox can provide valuable 
 input for this question, as in these discussions Fox will be invited to outline her views as a neoclassical 
 economist in relation to a theological perspective. That is, the way Fox presents her perspective in reaction to 
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presents herself  as a neoclassical economist. Before the actual discussions between Long 
and Fox are analyzed in section 2.2, in the following subsection, some introductory 
remarks are made about neoclassical economics in order to explain the specific background 
of  economist Fox. 
After the introductory remarks about neoclassical economics and the short 
depiction of  the various approaches theologians have taken to connect with economics, in 
next section the two discussions between theologian Stephen Long and neoclassical 
economist Nancy Fox in their Calculated Futures (2007) are elaborated.  
 
2.3 A DIRECT ENCOUNTER BETWEEN A THEOLOGIAN AND A NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIST: 
CALCULATED FUTURES 
In the introduction to Calculated Futures, Long writes that after the failures of socialism 
and communism, capitalism appears to be the only viable option31. Long wants to engage 
with economics by “think[ing] reasonably and practically about what faithful exchanges 
look like within the orthodox confession that we believe in the one, holy, catholic and 
apostolic church” (Long 2007: 4). With this question in mind, Long intends to engage in 
a conversation about the market. He considers the market a theological reality, as “it is a 
creature. As such it bears theological significance” (Long 2007: 7).  
Long wants to engage in a conversation with an economist, in order to better 
understand the main differences between theology and economics. To this effect, two 
conversations between Long and neoclassical economist Nancy Fox are set up. The first 
conversation explores the main differences between theology and economics. In the second 
conversation, the discussion takes a sharper tone, as Long and Fox critically reflect on their 
interpretations of “value”. 
 
2.3.1 Prophets and Profits: the first conversation between Long and Fox 
In a short introductory statement to the first discussion, the end of economics is identified 
as “efficiency”. The question is raised whether efficiency can serve the ultimate end of 
                                                                                                                                     
 a theological perspective is more important than the specific theological outlook that radical orthodox 
 theologian Long brings to the discussion. Therefore, for the purpose of this chapter, the differences in 
 approach between public theology and radical orthodoxy are no hindrance. 
31 Long quotes theologian Michael Novak who argues that “we are all capitalists now, even the pope” (Novak 
 1993, quoted in Long 2007: 1-2). 
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charity, which characterizes the theological end of “friendship with God”32. As such, the 
question about the end of economics is phrased from a theological horizon: it is an 
evaluative question about the place of efficiency from the perspective of charity. 
Fox starts off by arguing that efficiency is the appropriate goal of an economic 
system. In her view as a neoclassical economist, this is a positive (i.e. value-neutral), rather 
than a normative statement (Fox 2007: 29). By putting a price on everything and thus 
making everything a “commodity”, exchange is enabled. This allows for efficiency in terms 
of “Pareto optimality”, which is achieved when nobody can be made better off than in a 
previous distribution, without others becoming worse off33. 
 This leads Fox to discern the first important difference between economists and 
theologians: their understanding of “value”. Fox explains Adam Smith‟s distinction 
between “value in use” and “value in exchange”. Value in use cannot be determined by 
economists, as they consider it a subjective or normative matter. Yet, value in exchange (in 
the market) can be a proper object of study for economics (Fox 2007: 33). Fox claims that 
for theologians, on the contrary, the focus lies on inherent aspects of a good when its value 
is to be determined34. 
A second difference, according to Fox, is the understanding of “scarcity”. 
Economists assume that people have unlimited wants and desires, and that there are 
limited resources: this causes scarcity. Therefore, economic choice takes place between 
alternative allocations of someone‟s resources, it is a trade-off. Economists study the way 
people make choices under conditions of scarcity, and the implications of these decisions 
                                                 
32 Note that in Chapter 1, the issue of the (im)possibility of integrating economic ends-means rationality and 
 charity was raised by Weber. 
33 For instance, Fox argues that it is inefficient that many organs that could be used for transplantation are 
 buried after their “owners” have deceased. The market, in Fox‟ view, could enable the exchange of these 
 organs, helping many people who are suffering, without making anyone worse off (Fox 2007: 30-31): the 
 exchange is voluntary, as no one is coerced to enter into exchange. 
34 For example, in the eyes of an economist, the value of a bread is the price for which it is bought and sold in 
 stores. In the eyes of a theologian, however, the value lies in the inherent aspects of a bread, as it is a means to 
 satisfy someone‟s need for food. Another way to illustrate the different understanding of value, is how an 
 economist and a theologian want to compare the value of a gun to the value of a bread. To this effect, an 
 economist seeks to determine their relative prices, while a theologian focuses on the value of the use of the 
 bread and the gun, relating it to concepts like “sustenance” and “violence”. The economist understands the 
 value of bread by determining the value of exchange in relation to the value of a gun: if a gun is exchanged for 
 one bread in a market, they have an equal value. For a theologian, the value of bread or guns can be 
 determined in an objective sense, and therefore should not be traded: the possibility of exchanging these goods 
 is not relevant for their value. 
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on society (Fox 2007: 34). In Fox‟ view, theologians are not interested in the wants of 
people, but in their needs. However, as economists consider themselves incapable of 
determining the needs people have and therefore limit themselves to studying their wants, 
economists and theologians understand the interests of people differently. 
A third crucial difference between economists and theologians that is discerned by 
Fox is the way economists and theologians relate to policy advice. In Fox‟ view, theologians 
want to impose evaluative principles like charity and justice on the functioning of the 
market economy. According to neoclassical economists, however, these policy suggestions 
made by theologians may lead to inefficiencies, as theologians do not have a view of the 
whole system (Fox 2007: 31). Redistributive interventions into the market, for instance by 
transferring money from the rich to the poor, however well-intended, lead to inefficiencies 
in the market economy35. Although Fox notes that virtually every economist asserts the 
need of the market to be “kept in its place”, this is a legitimate role for the theologian, not 
the economist. Thus, Fox, as a neoclassical economist, considers her approach to policy 
issues as a “positive” or value-neutral approach. Instead, in Fox‟ view, a theologian takes an 
evaluative approach. 
Long criticizes the distinction that Fox makes between the economist‟s “hard-
headed analysis of the facts” and the theologian‟s “soft-hearted morality” of theology 
(Long 2007: 36). In Long‟s view, economics is not about “natural facts”, but about 
contingent historical and social “facta”, that is, things that are made (Long 2007: 38). 
What appears to be an “efficient” allocation of resources at a certain moment, is 
contingent upon social conditions, and therefore not “value-neutral”. Neoclassical 
economists need to recognize this contingency, because otherwise, in Long‟s view, “when 
they deny this, they inevitably become spokespersons for the present distribution of social 
and political power (…) under the illusion that it is natural” (Long 2007: 38). 
  Also, Long stresses the difference between theology and economics when it comes 
to attributing monetary value to all things. Long agrees that it is possible to put a price on 
everything, but he argues that from the perspective of theology such a “formal equivalence” 
                                                 
35 In this regard, Fox refers to the work of neoclassical economist Arthur Okun (Fox 2007: 35). Okun used the 
 metaphor of a bucket of water to illustrate the redistribution of income from the rich to the poor. As water 
 (income) is transferred from the rich to the poor, the market as a whole becomes less efficient, because the 
 intervention does not follow the law of Pareto optimization (as the rich are made worse off). As such, the 
 bucket used to transfer income, is a “leaky bucket”. According to Fox, the question whether, and to what 
 degree the leaky bucket is to be used, cannot be answered by an economist. The only thing an economist can 
 do is determine the size of the hole in the bucket (Fox 2007: 35). 
48 
should not be imposed. Some things, such as virtue, friendship, and family life, are not to 
be valued in this way. 
 Third, Long wonders where the economist‟s concern for the “whole system” 
comes from. In Long‟s view, the only criterion neoclassical economists give for this 
concern is the generic “purpose of increasing pleasure or decreasing pain”, and that, 
therefore, “economists repeat nineteenth-century moralists36 who thought that the increase 
of pleasure and the diminishment of pain could adjudicate moral differences in human 
actions” (Long 2007: 39). Fox‟ claim that economists do see the whole system, in 
combination with the utilitarian framework, leads Long to criticize neoclassical economics 
as a totalitarian perspective. He argues that  
 
economics claims to see the total whole, which is embodied this time, not in the 
state (as it was for fascism) but in the natural workings of the market; and then it 
requires some people to sacrifice for the sake of this totality. Those sacrifices are 
then justified on the basis of the natural truth of the totality. They are necessary 
phases toward the best possible outcome assessment, whether they are willed or 
not. This is double ironic in that the basis for this economic analysis is then 
viewed as individual preference (Long 2007: 40). 
 
Long pursues his criticism by focusing on the way Fox uses the concept “scarcity”. Instead 
of an empirical claim, in Long‟s view, scarcity functions as a metaphysical claim for 
economists37. According to Long, this metaphysical claim entails a “fundamental scarcity in 
an individual consumer to consume the infinite commodities which could possibly satisfy 
her or his desires” (Long 2007: 41). As there is no end to the desires of the individual 
economic actor, as a logical consequence, there is always an insufficient amount of 
resources to satisfy these desires. Long argues that in a Christian theological perspective, 
the only desire that can be infinite is the desire for God. All other infinite desires are 
“sinful”, as they consider something other than God as ultimately valuable. Therefore, in 
Long‟s view, the endless desire for consumption corresponds to the vice of pleonexia or 
“greed”. This leads Long to a harsh conclusion about economics: “Modern economics 
                                                 
36 That is, influential utilitarian philosophers like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. 
37 Long quotes neoclassical economists William Baumol and Alan Blinder, who argue that “the market resolves 
 THE fundamental problem of the economy: the fact that all decisions are constrained by the scarcity of 
 available resources” (Baumol and Blinder 1997: 49, quoted in Long 2007: 41). 
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does not merely assume sinfulness, it needs it. It would not work without the proliferation 
of disordered desire” (Long 2007: 42). For this reason, Long concludes that he cannot 
allow an autonomous space for economics, and that economics needs to be subordinated 
to theology. As he puts it:  
 
Because I do confess that “I believe in the one, holy, Catholic, and apostolic 
church,” I cannot concede any autonomous space for a putatively neutral and 
natural analysis of what I find to be a competing catholic institution –the global 
market (Long 2007: 43). 
 
Fox concludes the first discussion by arguing that while theologians and economists may 
agree on some points, the main “matter on which we will never reach a consensus” (Fox 
2007: 45), is Long‟s claim that economic “facts” are instead evaluative statements that 
arise out of a historical and social context.  
 
2.3.2 The first discussion between Long and Fox: a preliminary reflection 
Before moving on to the second discussion between Long and Fox, some observations are 
made with regard to the exchange of arguments that has taken place so far. 
It seems that Long and Fox relate to their object of study –economic practices, the 
workings of the market system– in a different way. Before the actual discussion is started, 
Long sets out a guiding and, for him, determinative evaluative framework by making his 
“orthodox confession” (Long 2007: 3, 43). This confession creates a perspective based on 
which Long evaluates the functioning of the market economy and the work of the 
economist: both can only be legitimate, if they are directed at the ultimate end of charity. 
After Fox has presented her neoclassical perspective, Long repeats his confession, and 
concludes that he cannot allow an autonomous space for economics38. This appears to be a 
good example of the “pontifical mode” (Heyne 1999: 142) that was related in section 1.3. 
Based on the truth that he confers to the evaluative viewpoint in his confession, Long 
speaks to economics from a “moral high ground”. This leads him to create a hierarchical 
relation between theology and economics, in which theology is to (re-)orient economics in 
                                                 
38 From the start of his contributions, Long offers little space for an autonomous voice of economics, as in the 
 introduction to Calculated Futures, Long argues: “Make no mistake, capitalism can never have an 
 understanding of liberty that is something other than Bentham‟s. To embrace capitalism is to embrace this 
 liberal ontology and for that reason Christianity can never finally embrace capitalism” (Long 2007: 15). 
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the correct evaluative direction. 
  Fox, however, considers her work as a neoclassical economist to be purely 
“positive”, geared at providing a factual and causal analysis of the way a market economy 
works. Any evaluative guidance that is to “keep the market in its place” is to come from 
outside economics. Thus, in the analysis of a neoclassical economist, there is no room for 
an evaluative orientation. As such, the nature of the task of the theologian and the 
economist as academic scholars –as perceived by Long and Fox themselves– is 
fundamentally different39.  
Up to this point, it could be argued that a theologian and neoclassical economist 
should encounter no difficulties if they were to cooperate. If the theologian sets out a 
normative vision with regard to the ends that are to be achieved, and the economist 
provides the technical pathway towards the most efficient achievement of these ends, their 
perspectives do not “bite”40. Instead, they could be considered as complimentary 
ingredients for a “normative social theory”41. 
However, in Long‟s perception, the situation is not that simple. In his view, 
neoclassical economics is not as value-neutral as Fox claims it to be. According to Long, 
neoclassical economists refer to at least two evaluative principles. First, they seem to accept 
the utilitarian pleasure-pain duality, and consider achieving pleasure as the desirable end of 
economic behavior. Second, the totality of the accumulated pleasure of all human beings 
appears to be the evaluative benchmark for achieving efficiency through the “natural 
workings of the market”. For Long, these points are far from “positive”, in the sense of a 
value-neutral appraisal of the functioning of the market economy. 
The difference in understanding between Long and Fox can be traced back to the 
                                                 
39 This difference is reflected in the distinction between “wants”  and “needs” that is made by Fox. A 
 neoclassical economist can only study wants, as these are the factual representations of the actual desires that 
 people have. In economics, this is known as the principle of “revealed preference”: people show their real 
 interests in the choices they make. If someone buys two apples and a pear, in the eyes of a neoclassical 
 economists, this is her preferred option (“preference”). See, for instance, Samuelson (1948) and Sonderman 
 (1982). The question whether these desires are good for them –of whether these desires are in line with their 
 “needs”– cannot be answered by Fox, as this would imply making a value-judgment as an economist, which is 
 something she does not consider part of her work as a scholar. 
40 According to some authors, the separate focus on facts by economists and values by theologians, reflects a 
 “division of labor”. See Wijngaards, Van den Hoogen and Peil 2011, and Yuengert 2004.  
41 Some authors argue that a “normative social theory” –a positive social theory that is directed by normative or 
 evaluative– orientations is to be the ultimate result of the encounter of theology and economics. See, for 
 instance, Dean and Waterman (1999). 
51 
way they interpret the relation between “facts” and “values”. According to Fox, an 
economist deals with facts in a positive, value-neutral way. For Long, these facts about the 
economy are not value-neutral, but are “made” in a specific historical setting, and are thus 
embedded in the evaluative horizon of their social and economic context. Because facts 
about the economy are not value-neutral, in Long‟s view it is misguiding to assume that an 
economist (or any other social theorist) can engage in a purely positive study of these facts. 
The major difference in understanding with regard to facts and values appears to be one of 
the reasons why a conversation between theologians and economists can be characterized as 
people “talking past one another” (Brennan and Waterman 2008: 89, cf. 1.3). 
In the second discussion, Long and Fox focus more specifically on their 
understanding of value, and the place of evaluative orientations in their work as academic 
scholars. 
 
2.3.3 The second discussion: The conception of value in neoclassical economics 
Fox sets off the second discussion by commenting on the different understandings of value 
in economics by, again, commenting on the distinction between “value in use” and “value 
in exchange”. Value in use can be defined as “the utility of some particular object”, and 
value in exchange can be defined as “the power of purchasing other goods which 
possession of that object conveys” (Fox 2007: 49). Although neoclassical economists have 
focused entirely on value in exchange42, Fox notes that it is incorrect to say that 
neoclassical economists eschew the concept of value in use, yet that they “choose not to 
investigate its foundations” (Fox 2007: 49). 
 Long replies to Fox by arguing that apart from value as “value in exchange”, a 
fundamentally different interpretation of value has been used: value can also refer to a form 
of life, such as the martial life of valor. Therefore, value has often been understood as “an 
estimation of things in terms of their goodness, where this estimate was assumed to belong 
to God alone” (Long 2007: 51). Long contrasts this understanding of value, which locates 
the origin of value in God, with an approach that considers a human being to be the only 
                                                 
42 Fox provides a brief historical sketch of how value in exchange came to dominate the focus of neoclassical 
 economics. In the work of the marginalist economist Alfred Marshall, the theory of value in exchange became 
 codified as a “theory of price” (cf. Mirowski 1991). As supply (based on cost of production) and demand 
 (based on utility) meet, the price of a good is determined (Fox 2007: 51). Therefore, the value or price of a 
 good is completely dependent on the value attributed to it by economic actors (the producers and consumers 
 of goods). 
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actor capable of attributing value43. In order to attain a freedom to will as human beings, 
Long argues that –as Friedrich Nietzsche claimed– God needs to be “murdered”. Long 
thinks Nietzsche is correct in “revealing to us that the power let loose in the modern world 
becomes disconnected from any account of truth or goodness” (Long 2007: 54). He 
wonders whether economics –because it claims to be uninterested in the foundations of 
value in use–, actually has embraced this Nietzschean power to give value to things, a 
power that, in Long‟s view, implies the death of God (Long 2007: 54). 
 In response to Long, Fox argues that since the “canonization” of the neoclassical 
concept of value in the work of Alfred Marshall, various critiques have been elaborated44. 
Fox shortly discusses two of these critiques. First, neoclassical economists have been 
criticized for not being interested in the way the preferences of people are formed –that is, 
in the place of evaluation in economic behavior. This is often referred to as the “givenness 
of preferences”. Fox declares this criticism to be unfounded, by pointing out that 
economists45 like Veblen, Leibenstein, and Galbraith have paid attention to the formation 
of preferences by using concepts like “conspicuous consumption” (Veblen) and the 
“Bandwagon effect” (Leibenstein) (cf. Fox 2007: 55-57). 
 The second criticism is that the “demand” of the consumers reflects wants rather 
than needs. As such, the outcome of the market process may well reflect the satisfaction of 
wants that are perceived as misguided from an evaluative perspective. Furthermore, demand 
on the market is an “effective demand”: only the consumers who have money can actually 
translate their wants and desires into demand on the market46. Fox counters these points by 
                                                 
43 To illustrate this position, Long quotes Thomas Hobbes, who argues that “the value or WORTH of a man, 
 is as of all other things, his price (…) For let a man, as most men do, rate themselves at the highest value they 
 can; yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by others (Hobbes 1983: 115, quoted in Long 2007: 
 52). Long refers to Hobbes, because he considers him to be the first political thinker who contrasts civil 
 society and nature, and thus represents the “intellectual origins for the development of modern society” (Long 
 2007: 52). Also, Hobbes‟ perspective marks the shift from a theological context to an anthropological one. 
44 However, in Fox‟ view all neoclassical economists have followed the canonized interpretation of value as value 
 in exchange, so the critiques come from “outsiders”, i.e. heterodox approaches in economics. 
45 Interestingly, however, the economists that Fox refers to are no typical neoclassical economists. Instead, for 
 instance, Veblen is a main representative of institutional economics, an approach to economics that was 
 crowded out by neoclassical economics during the first half of the twentieth century (cf. Samuels 2008). In 
 recent decades, the institutional approach has regained strength in neo-institutional economics, which 
 combines elements of the (old) institutional approach and standard economic theory (cf. Coase 1998, Ostrom 
 2005, Williamson 2000). 
46 Fox quotes Elizabeth Anderson, “The market is a want regarding institution. What it responds to is „effective 
 demand‟, that is, desires backed up by money or the willingness to pay for things” (Anderson 1993: 182, 
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arguing that the fact that economists study consumer preferences “regardless of their 
source”, does not say anything about the desirability of the market outcome (Fox 2007: 
57). Also, the satisfaction of market demand does not say anything about the wants of the 
poor and others who are for some reason incapable of taking part in the market process 
(Fox 2007: 57-58). 
 
2.3.4 The evaluative orientations of economists and theologians 
Although Fox thus acknowledges these limitations of economic analysis, she denies the 
idea that it is a matter of ignorance. As she puts it: “not to be concerned with something is 
different from denying its existence”47 (Fox 2007: 58). 
Long responds to the idea that economics merely provides a “technical” analysis of 
the market, and refrains from any value judgment. The problem that Long discerns is the 
spread of “economic rationality” –by means of which economic actors can individually 
attribute value– to other domains of society: politics, morality, and also religion. This leads 
to a disappearance of any common “telos” (goal) for society. Whereas there used to exist a 
directedness “rooted in a presumption of what constitutes a good, true, and beautiful life”, 
the increasing dominance of the economic conception of individual value-attribution has 
caused this to fade away48 (Long 2007: 59-62). 
 Long contends that behind the economist‟s focus on individual value-attribution 
lies “a complex metaphysical understanding of human action that bears the particularity of 
a philosophical position known as stoicism” (Long 2007: 64). Long traces this influence 
of Stoicism back to Adam Smith. Smith, in Long‟s perception, argued that all actions and 
events –both happiness and suffering– are necessary elements of an all-encompassing order 
that serves the benefit of all people49. Long connects this perspective –which he interprets 
                                                                                                                                     
 quoted in Fox 2007: 57-58). 
47 Fox finds support for this view in the work of Marshall, who argues that economics “having done its work, 
 retires and leaves to common sense the responsibility of the ultimate decision” (Marshall 1925: 164, quoted 
 in Fox 2007: 59). 
48 Long does not exclusively blame economists for this development. In his view, “theologians, moralists, and 
 politicians” have been unable to resist “this dominant paradigm that renders their values subordinate to the 
 overarching architectonic of the economist‟s values” (Long 2007: 59). 
49 Long relates Smith‟s argument: “The ancient stoics were of the opinion, that as the world was governed by the 
 all-ruling providence of a wise, powerful and good God, every single event ought to be regarded, as making a 
 necessary part of the plan of the universe, and as tending to promote the general order and happiness of the 
 whole: that the vices and follies of mankind, therefore, made as necessary a part of this plan as their wisdom or 
 their virtue; and by that eternal art which educes good from ill, were made to tend equally to the prosperity 
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as a Stoic point of view– to Smith‟s “doctrine of unintended consequences” which explains 
how people through pursuing their self-interest, actually contribute to what is best for 
society as a whole50. 
Therefore, in Long‟s interpretation, “interests, values, and virtues run together in 
Smith‟s world, and all can do so precisely because of an underlying theology of 
providence” (Long 2007: 65). Thus, Long identifies a theological perspective that lies 
underneath neoclassical economics. The difference between the perspectives of theology 
and economics, in Long‟s view, can be traced back to a competition or clash between two 
gods –the god of the agora (market) and the God of the church or synagogue. As Long 
puts it:  
 
If someone is convinced that stoicism is the morally and theologically best form of 
life, the theology that undergirds capitalist economics should be received 
congenially. If, however, other forms of the good life compel one, the neoclassical 
economist‟s conception of value must be refused (Long 2007: 65). 
 
Following the “god of the agora” leads to attributing a formal value to everything, ranging 
from automobiles and food to fetal tissue and adoptable children (Long 2007: 66). 
 In a final reply to Long, entitled “the propriety of market exchange”, Fox argues 
that while theologians and economists apparently agree that everything can have a price, 
the question is whether everything should have a price. She notes that the idea that 
everything should have a price has been widely criticized, as it causes the “priceless itself to 
surrender to price” (Fox 2007: 67-69). Fox does not agree with this criticism, as in her 
perspective, “the market measures value; the market does not create value” (Fox 2007: 69, 
italics in original).  
The commodification that takes place in a market economy is geared at creating a 
commensurability of value. The value of commodities on the market is an indication of 
                                                                                                                                     
 and perfection of the great system of nature” (Smith 1982: 36, quoted in Long 2007: 64-65). Long relates 
 that Smith does not claim that this should make us indifferent to the evils in the world, but that through the 
 all-ruling Providence (of God) human beings are inspired to sympathy towards others: “we recognize and are 
 repelled from vice even though we see that it cannot harm Providence‟s plan” (Long 2007: 65). 
50 Long quotes Smith: “[a merchant] intends only his own gain and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by 
 an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the 
 society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more 
 effectually than when he really intends to promote it” (Smith 1965: 423, quoted in Long 2007: 65). 
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“relative worth”, instead of “intrinsic worth” (Fox 2007: 70). In the eyes of an economist, 
the inherent value of a good is impossible to identify, let alone measure. The “economist‟s 
embrace of the concept of individual freedom and determination implies that there is no 
such thing as inherent value” (Fox 2007: 70). 
Although non-economists criticize the market for being averse to inherent value, 
and for answering to “effective demand” instead of needs, Fox notes that from the 
perspective of a neoclassical economist, this is exactly the strength of the market. In her 
opinion,  
 
the market can be viewed as the great equalizer. If all one needs is money to 
acquire goods, then everyone has a chance in the sense that economic success is not 
limited by political power or family background (Fox 2007: 71). 
 
Concluding her argument, Fox discusses the sale of goods such as organs, blood, child 
labor, and babies. These “trades of last resort” are often criticized as they are believed not 
to be the result of free choice, and thus “diminish [the sellers] as persons” (Radin 1996: 
50, quoted in Fox 2007: 72). Fox, however, argues that by banning these transactions, 
individual actors lose opportunities that can lead to an improvement of their situation51. If 
society forbids these kind of exchanges, without providing a compensation, the individuals 
who want to sell their organs or babies are made worse off than if they were allowed to 
make the trades (Fox 2007: 72). 
 In his final contribution to the discussion, Long connects the rise of the “spirit of 
rationalist individualism” (Schumpeter, cf. quotation in section 1.3) with a strict 
dichotomy between facts and values. In Long‟s view, this led to a situation in which 
 
facts were distinguished from values; and values were utterly separated from the 
facts themselves. Values became subjective, facts objective. (…) [The] individual 
now looks out on a life-less and form-less world of mathematical facts and can 
only see them valuable in terms of his or her own will (Long 2007: 73-74). 
 
                                                 
51 Fox quotes economist Arthur Okun, who puts forward that “in shutting the valve, society implies that there 
 must better ways of preventing or alleviating that desperation” (Okun 1975: 20, quoted in Fox 2007: 72). 
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As economics focuses only on the “facts about values”52, Long raises the question if 
economics should be thought of as an autonomous discipline that only deals with facts, or 
“should we think of it as a traditioned inquiry that requires an underlying, but contingent, 
politics in order to produce in us the virtues that politics needs to sustain itself?” (Long 
2007: 75). With this question, the second discussion between economist Fox and 
theologian Long comes to an end. In the next section, an evaluation is provided of the 
results of the discussions between Long and Fox for the central question of this chapter. 
 
2.4 EVALUATION: PUBLIC THEOLOGY AND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS 
The main question of this chapter is whether neoclassical economics has affinity with the 
central interests of public theology: questions of meaning of life and contributing to a 
viable civil society. To this effect, in this section, a reflection is given on how the 
discussions between Long and Fox can be related to the central interests of public 
theology. In order to assess the affinity with public theology‟s central interests, first, it is 
investigated whether a relation between economic behavior and meaning of life can be 
established from the perspective of a neoclassical economist. Second, it is inquired whether 
it is possible to engage in evaluative arguments for a neoclassical economist. As was 
pointed out in section 1.3, in both cases the focus lies on whether there is place for 
evaluative deliberation or evaluative arguments  –deliberation or arguments about values. If 
there is place for evaluative deliberation in economic behavior and evaluative arguments at 
the level of the scholar, the construction of a framework for making a connection between 
public theology and economics is enabled. If not, public theology needs to find another 
approach to economics that does have affinity with its central interests. 
In the discussions between Long and Fox, two major topics can be discerned: the 
way value is understood in neoclassical economics, and the distinction between positive 
and normative approaches. In the following two subsections, the import of these two 
topics for the central interests of public theology is assessed. 
 
2.4.1 Value in neoclassical economics and theology 
In the discussions between Long and Fox, it becomes clear that a neoclassical economists 
                                                 
52 In Long‟s opinion, economists like Veblen and Leibenstein only discuss the source of value in an 
 epiphenomenal sense. These economists conclude that people mimic one another, yet the question why they 
 do this is left unanswered. In Long‟s opinion, these mimetic desires have metaphysical and theological 
 foundations (cf. Long 2007: 74-75). 
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and theologians conceive value differently. A neoclassical economist is only interested in 
“value in exchange”. Value in exchange represents the value of a good that is attributed to 
it by individuals, depending on how much resources they want in exchange for the good, in 
either buying or selling it on a market. As the value of a good is fundamentally determined 
by the idiosyncratic value attribution of an individual, neoclassical economics53 can be 
argued to adhere to a subjective theory of value. This means that, for a neoclassical 
economist, the value of a good is completely dependent on the value attribution of the 
evaluating subject. That is, a good can have no inherent value –no value except for the 
value that is attributed to it by a subject. Whether the good is a pound of coffee or a baby, 
the value lies in the eyes the “beholder”, the subject. 
This perspective on value contrasts with Long‟s theological perspective, as for a 
theologian the value of a good is not constituted by the idiosyncratic value attribution of 
an individual. Certain kinds of goods should be exempted from having a price, as their 
inherent value exempts them from any kind of market exchange. The value attribution of 
an individual does not affect the inherent value of, for instance, a human being. For Long, 
there is a source of value that can override the (idiosyncratic) value attribution of the 
individual. Long refers from an evaluative perspective, which is captured in his 
“confession”. This provides him with an evaluative directedness with regard to what is to 
be deemed valuable. This confession is not something he made up himself, but is shared by 
many other people –in his case, by many people who adhere to Christianity. As it is an 
evaluative perspective that is shared by many people, it can be considered to contain a 
degree of “objectivity”, as, in the words of Armand Borel 
 
something becomes objective (…) as soon as we are persuaded that it exists in the 
minds of others in the same form that it does in ours, and that we can think about 
it and discuss it together54 (Borel 1983:13). 
                                                 
53 This a priori absence of value of any good contrasts with earlier economic approaches, like the “labor theory 
 of value” that can be found in the work of classical economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo. The 
 labor theory of value states that the value of a good is (at least partially) determined by the amount of labor 
 that is needed to produce the good. In a labor theory of value there is an objective standard of value; in a 
 subjective theory of value the value of a good depends on the whim of the individual evaluator. 
54 Note that objectivity, in this interpretation, cannot be equated with “truth”, as it would be in, for instance, 
 logical positivism (McCloskey 1994: 3-24). In Borel‟s definition, objectivity is a matter of culturally and 
 historically located intersubjective verification and adjustment through exchange. An objective fact is thus no 
 ahistorical truth, nor is an objective value universally and timelessly right. Within each culture and moment in 
58 
 
Therefore, Long‟s position as a theologian with regard to the concept of value can be 
characterized as one of “value objectivity”. 
 
2.4.2 Neoclassical economics and meaning of life 
Thus, a neoclassical economist and a theologian can be argued to hold different views with 
regard to the way value is constituted. What are the consequences of this difference for the 
possibility of incorporating meaning of life in economic behavior? Strictly speaking, the 
idea that the fundamental source of value is the attribution made by the subject, does not 
raise problems for understanding meaning of life in economic behavior. Theoretically, an 
(ultimate) horizon of meaning can be understood as consisting of the value attributions of 
a subject –independent of the values of other people. That is, there is no need for value 
objectivity (shared by the individual) in order to create an individual‟s horizon of meaning. 
In practice, however, people are influenced by the values of their family, friends, and 
society in general, which does refer to some value objectivity in terms of values that “exist 
in the minds of others in the same form as [they] do in ours” (Borel 1983). 
 Yet, the way neoclassical economists deal with the subjective value attributions in 
their theories does raise a problem if questions of meaning of life are to be related to 
economic behavior. As was related in the discussions between Long and Fox, preferences 
are “given” in neoclassical theory of economic behavior as economists “choose not to 
investigate the foundations of value”. Neoclassical economists are not interested in the way 
preferences are formed –the way value attributions take place. Economic behavior, in 
neoclassical theory, can be understood as the allocation of scarce resources based on given 
ends, which, if performed in an economically rational way, is done consistently and 
efficiently (cf. Robbins 1932). This understanding of economic behavior resonates with 
the Weberian concept of means-ends rationality, that was discussed in sections 1.2 and 
1.3, as according to Weber, means-ends rationality is geared at efficient calculation based 
on predetermined goals (Brubaker 1984: 35-36). As was related in chapter 1, means-ends 
rationality cannot account for questions of meaning of life, as it only deals with questions 
of efficiency, and not with evaluative questions about what is valuable. Therefore, the 
“givenness” of preferences in neoclassical economics appears to hinder a discussion of 
questions of meaning of life in economic behavior.  
                                                                                                                                     
 history, objectivity is something that needs to be (re-)constituted, and is adjusted through the interactions 
 between people. 
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The only thing that neoclassical economists do say about the content of a market 
exchange, is that the economic actors engaged in the exchange are motivated by a search for 
utility maximization (cf. section 2.1; Varian 1999, Perloff 2008). By representing human 
motivation and ends in this way, two important points are made about the way people 
pursue ends in economic behavior. First, for neoclassical economics, the motivation that 
drives people is a search for utility, a generic indication of the result of an action. Second, 
the end of economic action is a maximization of utility.  
The notion “utility”, that is used in neoclassical economics originates with 
utilitarian philosophers like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. In utilitarian 
philosophy, human beings search for “pleasure” and are abhorred by “pain”. The concept 
utility reflects, in a very abstract way, a “pleasurable” result or outcome of an action, as it is 
what all human beings in principle are believed to desire. In neoclassical economics, the use 
of utility as a generic indicator of a beneficial or desirable outcome has been adopted in the 
construction of theories about economic behavior.  
Yet, while utilitarian philosophers ventured to give indications about sources of 
utility –such as, for instance, avoidance of regret, anticipation, altruism, fairness, 
reciprocity, and identity, (cf. Karlsson, Loewenstein, and McCafferty 2004: 61-62)–, in 
neoclassical economics, there is no interest in the source of utility (Fox 2007). People 
desire and acquire a good, and through this action their “preference” for a particular good 
is revealed (Samuelson 1948, cf. section 2.1), and the result of this action is indicated in 
terms of utility.  
As neoclassical economics is not interested in the source of utility, the concept 
utility as it is used by neoclassical economists can be argued to be essentially “vacuous” 
(Loewenstein 2007). As economist George Loewenstein explains,  
 
utility maximization, which lies at the heart of neoclassical economics, is a 
psychological theory of behavior. It states that human behavior can be explained as 
an attempt to achieve a certain goal, whether it be happiness (in the Benthamite 
account) or satisfaction of preferences (from the ordinal utility perspective). The 
ordinal utility/revealed preference approach does not divorce economics from 
psychology, but builds economics up from a hollow foundation (Loewenstein 
1999: 337, italics in original). 
 
Loewenstein argues that the way neoclassical economists use the concept utility actually 
60 
does not say anything about what people try to achieve in their behavior or about what 
motivates them to act. By being indiscriminate and all-encompassing –anything that is 
desired by people reflects utility, which is revealed as they make a choice for a certain good 
that reflects the highest utility– the concept utility becomes vacuous. In Loewenstein‟s 
view, explaining economic behavior by claiming that people choose what they want, 
because that is what leads to the highest utility, actually does not have any explanatory 
value regarding the motivation for economic behavior, as the “highest utility” is simply an 
indication of the good that people want amidst other options. 
The way utility is conceptualized in neoclassical economics leads to a similar 
problem with regard to the ultimate horizon of meaning of economic behavior. If the end 
of economic behavior is achieving maximum utility, this reflects that people want to have 
the things they want to have. From the perspective of public theology, the motivations and 
ends of economic behavior are part of, and refer to (ultimate) horizons of meaning. As 
neoclassical economists are not interested in the content of the motivations and ends, and 
the abstract conception of utility that they use encompasses any kind of motivation or end, 
the motivations and ends of economic behavior are essentially “vacuous” concepts. Public 
theologians, however, do want to interpret these motivations and ends, in terms of 
meaningful horizons. 
Concluding, can it be argued that neoclassical economics has a shared interest in 
questions of meaning of life in economic behavior? By not discerning specific motivations 
and ends, and thereby relegating all possible motivations and ends to a generic category of 
utility that only denotes that people have chosen what they preferred, neoclassical 
economics does not exclude meaning of life as a motivation and end. Yet, by reducing all 
possible motivations and ends to a unidimensional category of “utility”, meaning of life 
cannot be discerned separately, not as a motivation for, nor as an end of economic 
behavior. For this reason, neoclassical economics cannot account for questions of meaning 
of life in economic behavior. 
 
2.4.3 Neoclassical economics and the positive-normative distinction 
As was related in the discussion between Long and Fox, neoclassical economists follow a 
purely “positive” approach. This means that a neoclassical economist only seeks to provide 
factual information about how the economy actually works, and does not want to give a 
value judgment about the functioning of the market economy. The only criterion that is 
upheld by neoclassical economists is “efficiency”, which Fox argues to be value-neutral. 
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 The distinction between “positive” (value-free) and “normative” (evaluative) 
approaches55 is based on a strict dichotomy between facts and values (Yuengert 2004). 
What does this fact-value dichotomy entail? The basic assumption in a strict fact-value 
dichotomy is that facts are verifiable, while values are not. Facts are believed to represent 
knowledge about reality that corresponds to “reality as it is”, and therefore can be 
identified objectively by all human observers (Putnam 1993, 2002). Economic 
methodologists Daniel Hausman and Michael McPherson (2006: 298) present56 an 
overview of “exaggerated contrasts” between factual claims and evaluative claims: 
 
Factual Claims Evaluative Claims 
Disagreements can be resolved by evidence 
Relatively little disagreement 
Descriptive: say how things are 
True or false 
Objective 
Independent of  evaluative claims 
Help to achieve goals 
No good way to resolve disagreements 
Relatively little agreement 
Prescriptive: say how things ought to be 
Not true or false 
Subjective 
Dependent on factual claims 
Help to determine goals 
 
Although Hausman and McPherson present the contrasts between positive/factual and 
normative/evaluative claims in an exaggerated way, still, they argue that “the distinction 
between factual claims and evaluative claims, and hence between positive and normative 
economics is often drawn very sharply57” (Hausman and McPherson 2006: 298). 
                                                 
55 At the end of  the nineteenth century, John Neville Keynes (1890) consolidated the distinction between 
 “positive” and “normative” approaches in economics. He used the term “normative” in order to distinguish 
 the economic approach of  the German historical school from the earlier classical economists (such as Adam 
 Smith and David Ricardo) and his own (what was to be called) neoclassical approach. The German historical 
 school focused on the cultural and historical situation and context of  an economy, and connected their 
 economic work closely to social philosophy. The classical and neoclassical approaches focused more on finding 
 abstract laws of  economic behavior, and were inspired to do so by the rigor and exactness they perceived in the 
 natural sciences. Inspired by the work of  scientists, economists wanted to study facts only, and refrain from 
 any value-judgments (Giocoli 2003, Klamer 2003). As the neoclassical approach to economics gained 
 dominance in the twentieth century, interest in other approaches, such as the German historical and 
 institutional approach, declined. This led to a predominant understanding of  economics as a positive science. 
56 Hausman and McPherson present this overview in a discussion of the distinction between positive and 
 normative approaches. They do not endorse the contrast between positive and normative approaches 
 themselves, as will be elaborated below. 
57 The sharpness of the distinction is visible in the work of prominent neoclassical economists. For instance, 
 Lionel Robbins, in a comment on the evaluation of ends, argues that: “if we disagree about ends, it is a case of 
 thy blood or mine – or live and let live, according to the importance of the difference or the relative strength 
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 Connecting this point to the discussion of  the conception of  value in the previous 
subsection, it can be argued that the neoclassical positive-normative distinction translates 
the theory of  value subjectivity into a methodological position: as values cannot be 
objective, a neoclassical economist cannot take an evaluative standpoint in her academic 
work. Economist and historian of  economic thought Robert Heilbroner (1999) has 
criticized this idea of  objectivity in neoclassical economics. Heilbroner relates that 
neoclassical economists have proposed that “economists try to address their subject with a 
scientist‟s objectivity” (Mankiw 1997: 18, quoted in Heilbroner 1999: 315, italics added). 
In Heilbroner‟s view, while neoclassical economists have been “beguiled” by the ideal of  the 
natural sciences (cf. Mirowski 1988, 1994), it is not appropriate to equate the object of  
study in economics with that of  the natural sciences. Economists study human behavior, 
which –although it can reflect lawlike principles– is the result of  choice based upon 
volition, not of  the laws of  nature (Heilbroner 1999: 316-317). As Heilbroner argues 
 
What does it mean to be “objective” about such things as inherited wealth and 
immiserating poverty? Does it mean that those arrangements reflect some 
properties of  society that must be accepted, just as the scientist accepts the 
arrangements studied under a microscope? (…) When it comes to policy 
recommendations, it is impossible to present economic analyses as if  they stemmed 
unchallengeably from the givens of society. This is because there are no such givens 
comparable to those of  nature (Heilbroner 1999: 318-319). 
 
Heilbroner thus criticizes the use of a concept of  objectivity in neoclassical economics that 
stems from the natural sciences. Although this idea of  objectivity may be upheld as an ideal 
by neoclassical economists, the “positive” approach that they seek to pursue, is not 
undisputed –as a positive approach. This point comes to the fore in the discussions 
between Long and Fox.  
In his criticism of  Fox‟ argument, Long marks two evaluative positions in 
neoclassical economic thought. In the neoclassical concern for the aggregated economic 
                                                                                                                                     
 of opponents” (1932: 150). Also, Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, in his extremely influential Essays in 
 Positive Economics (1953), argues that: “differences about economic policy among disinterested citizens 
 derive predominantly from different predictions about the economic consequences of taking action –
 differences that in principle can be eliminated by the progress of positive economics– rather than from 
 fundamental differences in basic values, differences about which men can ultimately only fight” (Friedman 
 1953, italics added). 
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benefit, he sees the influence of  utilitarianism. In the “naturalism” that is reflected in the 
confidence in the market to lead to an efficient outcome as long as all economic actors 
pursue their self-interest, Long discerns a Stoic perspective. Fox does not counter these 
allegations regarding the evaluative influences in neoclassical theory, but points out that a 
market economy in which anything can be exchanged makes people better off  –especially 
the poor and destitute, as the market would allow them to trade their organs or babies 
instead of  starving to death. This reply to Long reflects Fox‟ concern for making people 
better off, which is in itself  an evaluative point of  view.  
 The alleged refraining from normative statements in neoclassical economics has 
also been criticized by economists. For instance, Uwe Reinhardt (2010) argues that many 
economists propose their policy advice in terms of  attaining greater efficiency and 
increased overall wealth, as value-neutral. The underlying criteria for “efficiency” and 
“increased overall wealth”, however, are not as ethically neutral as economists pretend. 
According to Reinhardt, the ubiquitously used Kaldor-Hicks criterion58 states that if  
person A loses $10 because of  a certain policy, while person B wins $20, in economic 
terms, the policy is efficient. This kind of policy advice makes “economists act like 
collectivists who seek to allocate society‟s resources under a preferred [utilitarian, AW] 
moral doctrine” (Reinhardt 2010: 3). 
 There are economists who even go further, and argue –in a similar vein to 
theologian Long‟s argument in his conversation with Fox– that behind both classical and 
neoclassical economic theory, an “economic theology” is hidden (Foley 2006, Nelson 
1991, 2001, Waterman 2002). For example, Duncan Foley (2006) identifies an economic 
theology in the work of  Adam Smith. Foley argues that Smith demarcates a separate 
economic sphere in society, in which people are to follow their self-interest in order to 
achieve a socially desirable outcome (Foley 2006: 2). Foley distinguishes three different 
categories of  behavioral assumptions in Adam Smith‟s work that require human beings to 
act in a way that runs against their human nature. Foley considers these categories of  
behavioral assumptions “fallacies”: 
 
(1) A moral fallacy, as people are urged to accept direct and concrete evil in order 
that indirect and abstract good may come of it. 
                                                 
58 Note that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is a less stringent criterion than Pareto optimality that is discussed by 
 Fox, as Pareto optimality only holds if no one is made worse off by the improvements of other people, while 
 Kaldor-Hicks, as Reinhardt explains, does not require this (Reinhardt 2010). 
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(2) A logical fallacy, as in Foley‟s view neither Smith nor any of his successors has 
been able to demonstrate rigorously and robustly how private selfishness turns 
into public altruism. 
(3) A psychological fallacy, as Smith‟s rationalization requires a strategy of 
wholesale denial of the real consequences of capitalist development, 
particularly the systematic imposition of costs on those least able to bear 
them, and the implacable reproduction of inequalities that divide people from 
one another in society (Foley 2006: 3). 
 
In Foley‟s view, many economists have implicitly defended this economic theology. 
Although there are economists who agree with Foley‟s general line of argument (Nelson 
1991, 2001, Anderson 1988, Waterman 1989, Hill 2001), other recent reinterpretations 
of Smith‟s work come to different conclusions about Smith‟s alleged implicit theology59 
(cf. Peil 1999). 
 The neoclassical idea that economics is to be completely value-free in its analyses 
has also been criticized by several influential heterodox economists (Landreth and 
Colander 2002: 478-489). For instance, Nobel laureate Gunnar Myrdal argues that 
 
There is an inescapable a priori element in a scientific work. Questions must be 
asked before answers can be given. The questions are an expression of our interest 
in the world, they are at bottom valuations. Valuations are thus necessarily 
involved already at the stage when we observe facts and carry on theoretical 
analysis, and not only when we draw political inferences from facts and valuations 
(Myrdal 1955: vii-viii) 
 
The idea that a positive approach in economics can never be completely value-free has 
received increased support from economic methodologists. For instance, Hausman and 
McPherson argue that, while positive and normative approaches can be distinguished,  
 
positive science is not, however, independent of all values. On the contrary, it is 
                                                 
59 There are also economists who do not use “economic theology” in an antagonistic sense, but instead focus 
 upon the blessings that market capitalism has brought –both in terms of greater welfare and in terms of a 
 greater virtue of the inhabitants of bourgeois societies (McCloskey 2006). Still, the work on economic 
 theology has drawn severe criticisms (cf. Sent 2003). 
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guided by the values of scientific inquiry; moreover, a plethora of scientific values, 
including policy interests, play a large and legitimate role in determining which 
questions to ask and even possible leads to follow (Hausman and McPherson 
2006: 306).  
 
Likewise, in a comment on positive and normative economics, Eric van de Laar and Jan 
Peil, following the philosophers Putnam and Quine, relate that 
 
the idea that it is possible to separate value judgments from statements of  facts 
conflicts with established findings from linguistic research and the philosophy of 
language. (…) Since the philosopher Quine (…) demonstrated that all knowledge 
consists of  a mix of  experience and convention, it has no longer been possible to 
deny that science is inherently value-laden, or that values permeate science as a 
whole (Van de Laar and Peil 2009: 377). 
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the understanding of  the value-free positive approach 
in neoclassical economics is criticized in various ways. However, the positive-normative 
distinction is still important in economics, as it is both discussed amply in contemporary 
introductory volumes to main economic subdisciplines (e.g., Perloff  2008: 6; Stiglitz 
2006: 20-22; Landreth and Colander 2002: 1-17) and in methodological reflections 
(Blaug 1992, Hausman and McPherson 2006). 
 
2.4.4 Neoclassical economics and contributing to a viable civil society 
The question whether neoclassical economics has affinity with the second central interest 
of  public theology, contributing to a viable civil society, is relatively easy to answer. Based 
on the elaboration of  the neoclassical perspective, the strict positive-normative distinction 
can be considered as a major hindrance. In this perspective, neoclassical economists are 
only interested in supplying value-free analyses of  the functioning of a market economy. 
Taking an evaluative stance towards the functioning of  a market –as an economist– is 
abhorred, as neoclassical economists deem themselves incapable of  constructing convincing 
arguments about values, because values are considered subjective.  
 Therefore, the type of  questions that neoclassical economists engage with are “the 
facts about values”, not evaluative questions themselves. The interpretation and analysis of  
evaluative orientations –both at the level of  the economic actor and at the level of  the 
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economist as a scholar– fall outside the domain of neoclassical economics. This is well 
captured in the words of  the neoclassical economist Abba Lerner, who argues that 
 
an economic transaction is a solved political problem. (…) Economics has gained 
the title Queen of  the Social Sciences by choosing solved political problems as its 
domain (Lerner 1972: 259, italics in original). 
 
Because of the explicit disinterest of  neoclassical economists to engage in evaluative 
questions regarding economic behavior and the functioning of  the market economy, it is 
not to be expected that public theology will find affinity regarding its interest in 
contributing to a viable civil society.  
Moreover, if  a distinction between neoclassical economics as a positive approach 
and theology as a normative approach is maintained, theology –according to Hausman and 
McPherson‟s overview quoted above– would be considered as a “subjective” discipline, in 
which there is “relatively little agreement” on its claims and, most importantly, “no good 
way to resolve disagreements”. Public theology cannot accept this positive-normative 
distinction based on a dichotomy between facts and values. As value judgments are deemed 
to be subjective, theology –as a supposedly “normative” discipline– is relegated to the 
realm of  subjectivity, thus disqualifying it as an academic discipline. 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Based on the evaluation of  the possibility of  incorporating questions of  meaning of  life in 
the neoclassical understanding of  economic behavior and the discussion of  the positive-
normative distinction that is upheld by neoclassical economists, it can be concluded that 
neoclassical economics has no affinity with the central interests of  public theology. For this 
reason, it is necessary that the search continues for an approach in economic theory that 
does have affinity with public theology‟s central interests. As was related in section 1.3, the 
mainstream of economic theory has become increasingly pluralistic in recent decades. 
Perhaps one of  the new approaches in economic theory offers a more promising 
perspective with regard to the central interests of  public theology. 
 Out of  the variety of new approaches, which one is to be chosen? The central 
interests of  public theology can provide guidance in this choice. Starting with the first 
central interest, questions of  meaning of life, the question is whether there are viable 
alternatives to neoclassical economics if  the relation between questions of  meaning of  life 
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and economic behavior is to be studied. There are several new approaches to economic 
theory that seek to distinguish themselves from the neoclassical orthodoxy by means of 
their reinterpretations of  economic behavior. Notable examples are behavioral economics, 
experimental economics, and neuroeconomics (cf. Colander et al. 2004: 18). 
 Behavioral economics is an approach that seeks to integrate findings from 
psychology into economic theory, and has provided several new ways of  understanding 
economic behavior (Wilkinson 2008). One aspect of  this renewed interest (Sent 2004) in 
the psychological aspects of  economic choice, is the attention that behavioral economics 
pay to the motivations for economic behavior (Akerlof  and Kranton 2000, Loewenstein 
2007). This interest in motivations for economic behavior has even led some behavioral 
economists to inquire into meaning as a motivation for economic behavior (Loewenstein 
2007, Karlsson, Loewenstein, and McCafferty 2004), and others have elaborated upon 
motivations that are closely related to meaning, such as identity (Akerlof  and Kranton 
2000, 2005, 2010) and symbolic utility (Khalil 2000, 2004). 
 Experimental economics is an approach that reorients the predominant theoretical 
focus of  neoclassical economics to a study of  actual economic behavior in experimental 
situations (Samuelson 2005). As the prominent experimental economist Vernon Smith 
(1989) argues, experiments allow an economist to go beyond mere “theoretical 
interpretations of  data” by studying the relation between environment, institutions, and 
actual economic behavior in an experimental setting. This allows experimental economists 
to test theoretical assumptions about economic behavior –for instance, the principle of  
utility maximization–, and can lead to new insights with regard to actual economic 
behavior. Although some economists have been critical of  the degree to which experiments 
can further the understanding of  economic behavior (cf. Davis and Holt 1993: 14-17, 
510-515), experiments have become increasingly accepted as a “tool” in economics 
(Samuelson 2005: 65). 
 Neuroeconomics uses insights from neuroscientific research in order to gain a 
clearer grasp of how the brain as “the ultimate black box” (Camerer et al. 2005) of 
economic behavior plays a role in economic behavior. Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, 
and Drazen Prelec (2005) relate that in their construction of  the foundations of  economic 
theory, neoclassical economists have chosen not to investigate the way thoughts and feelings 
influence economic behavior, as thoughts and feelings were considered not to be 
measurable in an objective way. Neuroscience, however, offers possibilities for measuring 
thoughts and feelings, which in turn enables economists to study the role of  thoughts and 
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feelings in economic behavior (Camerer et al. 2005). However, methodologists of  
economics have argued that neuroeconomics needs to overcome several methodological 
flaws before it can actually prove the value of  its claims for the understanding of  economic 
behavior (Harrison 2008, cf. Bennett and Hacker 2003). 
 Each of these new approaches to economic theory shows a renewed interest in 
studying economic behavior, and wants to go beyond the neoclassical assumptions 
regarding economic behavior. (i.e. given preferences, utility maximization). Therefore, with 
regard to the question of  meaning of  life in economic behavior, each of  these approaches 
might be able to offer interesting perspectives. That is, based on the first central concern of 
public theology, no choice can be made for focusing on one of  these three approaches. 
 However, the second central interest of  public theology, contributing to a viable 
society, allows for a choice among the three new approaches. Within behavioral economics, 
there is a profound interest in questions of  economic policy (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, 
Camerer et al. 2003, Loewenstein and Haisley 2008). It appears that behavioral 
economists want go beyond the neoclassical abstention from evaluative questions regarding 
societal issues. Insights from behavioral economics have already been amply used in policy 
advice (cf. Tiemeijer et al. 2009, De Beaufort et al. 2009, Tiemeijer 2011). This possibly 
offers an opening with regard to the second central interest of  public theology, 
contributing to a viable civil society. The other two approaches do not show a similar 
interest in questions of  economic policy, although their findings may of  course prove 
useful for policy concerns. Therefore, in Chapter 3, the affinity of  behavioral economics 
with the two central interests of  public theology is investigated. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
PUBLIC THEOLOGY AND  
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, it was investigated whether neoclassical economics –the “default” 
approach for theologians who seek to connect their work to economics– has affinity with 
the two central interests of public theology. The goal of this inquiry is to find an approach 
in economics that shows a promising outlook with regard to both evaluative interests of 
public theology. If such an approach is found, a framework can be elaborated that enables 
the exchange of knowledge between public theology and economics. 
 In neoclassical economics the concept utility maximization makes it difficult to 
understand the relationship between meaning of life and economic behavior. Also, the 
neoclassical distinction between positive and normative approaches, based upon a 
dichotomous understanding of facts and values, disables neoclassical economists to engage 
in evaluative debates and places theology in an allegedly subjective realm of evaluative 
questions. Therefore, the other central interest of public theology, contributing to a viable 
civil society, is impossible to discuss with neoclassical economics. For these reasons, 
chapter 2 concluded that neoclassical economics does not have affinity with public 
theology‟s central interests. 
It is the focus of this chapter to inquire whether behavioral economics, a recent 
approach in economic theory, might be able to offer a good alternative, as it appears that 
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behavioral economists are more open to public theology‟s central interests than neoclassical 
economists. One of the ways in which behavioral economics can be characterized, is a 
broadening of the range of motivations60 for economic behavior (Loewenstein 2007). This 
may prove to be an important step forward with regard to the understanding of meaning 
of life in economic behavior. Also, as behavioral economists take a different approach to 
evaluative issues regarding economic policy, the second central interest of public theology, 
contributing to a viable civil society, may find more resonance in behavioral economics 
than it does in neoclassical economics.  
To this effect, in the next section (3.2), a brief historical sketch is provided of 
how behavioral economics has developed itself as an approach in economics, and the 
research interests of behavioral economists are introduced. In section 3.3, a systematic 
overview is presented of the various ways behavioral economics research deviates from 
standard neoclassical theory in its understanding of economic behavior. This overview is 
intended to shed light on the different levels of adaptations that behavioral economists 
have made to standard neoclassical economic theory, and to provide a context within 
which the work by behavioral economists on meaning can be interpreted. Section 3.4 
focuses on the first central interest of public theology, meaning of life, by inquiring 
whether there are behavioral economists who integrate meaning of life in their 
understanding of economic behavior. Section 3.5 inquires to what degree the second 
central interest of public theology, contributing to a viable civil society, is shared by 
behavioral economists. For this reason, the evaluative perspective of behavioral economists 
regarding questions of economic policy, subsumed under various interpretations of “light 
paternalism”, is elaborated upon. Finally, section 3.6 assesses the affinity of behavioral 
economics with the two central interests of public theology. Section 3.7 concludes. 
 
3.2 BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AS A NEW APPROACH IN ECONOMIC THEORY 
3.2.1 The acceptance of behavioral economics in mainstream economics 
As Esther-Mirjam Sent (2004) has analyzed, the acceptance of behavioral economics into 
mainstream economics was caused by two developments. First, orthodox, neoclassical 
                                                 
60 There is little interest in motivations for economic behavior in standard neoclassical economic theory, based 
 upon the idea that discerning amongst different motivations and preferences “explains everything, and 
 therefore nothing”. As George Stigler and Gary Becker put it “one does not argue over tastes for the same 
 reason one does not argue over the Rocky Mountains –both are there, will be there next year, too, and are the 
 same to all men” (Stigler and Becker 1977: 76). As Bryan Caplan has argued, this approach does not leave any 
 room for investigating motivations for economic behavior (Caplan 2003: 392). 
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economics –which used to be strongly focused on mathematical formalization of economic 
models– ran into some serious mathematical difficulties during the 1970s, which indirectly 
opened the door for alternative approaches (Sent 2004: 751-753). Second, behavioral 
economists such as Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979, cf. 2000) and Richard 
Thaler (1980) positioned themselves less antagonistically in relation to neoclassical 
economics than previous economists who tried to incorporate insights from psychology 
into economic theory61 (cf. Camerer and Loewenstein 2004: 3). Instead of presenting a 
radical  alternative to the neoclassical approach (i.e., a heterodox approach, cf. 2.2), the 
“new” behavioral economists aimed at modifying assumptions concerning economic 
behavior by using insights from psychology, in order to improve the empirical accuracy of 
economic theory and make it more realistic. Therefore, the increased openness of 
mainstream economics to other approaches than mathematical formalization, and the less 
radical alterations that were advocated by a new generation of behavioral economists, 
allowed behavioral economics to become part of mainstream economics itself (Sent 2004). 
That is, for both sociological and institutional reasons, behavioral economics can be 
considered to have established itself as a mainstream approach in economics62. In the next 
subsection, the specific focus of behavioral economics is explored. 
 
3.2.2 Behavioral economics: defining its perspective 
As was argued above, behavioral economics is an approach in economic theory that 
distinguishes itself by incorporating insights from psychology, in order to enhance the 
understanding of economic behavior (Wilkinson 2008). This enhancement is necessary in 
the eyes of behavioral economists, as standard neoclassical economic theory, in their 
perception, has a limited view of economic behavior.  
                                                 
61 Already in the 1950s, attempts were made to make use of psychological research on human behavior to enrich 
 economic theory. Yet, it was only during the 1970s and 1980s that behavioral economics gained stable 
 ground within economics (Heukelom 2009, Sent 2004). It took quite some time before behavioral economics 
 became accepted as a mainstream approach, because early behavioral economists, such as Herbert Simon 
 (Simon 1955, 1959, 1963, cf. Sent 1998), pursued a research program that dismissed the focus on profit and 
 utility maximization and equilibrium in economics, and sought to develop an alternative (Sent 2004: 741). 
 Therefore, the “old” behavioral economists did not find much support for their research within the discipline 
 of economics in general. 
62 That is, with the start of the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization and the Journal of Economic 
 Psychology in the 1980s –two academic journals that are devoted to behavioral economics–, and the Nobel 
 awards of behavioral economists George Akerlof (in 2001, see Akerlof 2002) and Daniel Kahneman (in 
 2002, see Kahneman 2003b), it can be argued that “behavioral economics has arrived” (Sent 2004: 753). 
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What are the limitations of standard neoclassical theory exactly, from the 
viewpoint of behavioral economics? According to behavioral economist Richard Thaler 
(2009), “behavioral economics” appears to be a pleonasm, as “economics” in general is 
believed to entail the study of economic behavior. Adding the adjective “behavioral” would 
thus seem an unnecessary qualification. Yet, in Thaler‟s view, standard neoclassical 
economic theory is not about the economic behavior of a human being, but about the 
behavior of “homo economicus”. Homo economicus is a theoretical construct by means of 
which economists intend to capture the way a human being acts in her economic interests. 
The assumptions about the behavior of homo economicus are pointed out by Nick 
Wilkinson (2008: 5-7), who argues that it entails that each individual has stable and 
coherent preferences, and that she rationally pursues those preferences, in order to 
maximize her utility.  
The assumptions that are made by neoclassical economists regarding the economic 
actor‟s preferences, rationality, cognitive capabilities, utility maximization, are quite 
stringent. The homo economicus exactly knows what goods she wants to acquire in order 
to be able to achieve a maximum utility. She also possesses the information about the 
availability of goods and the calculative capability to deploy her means in such a way that 
she can indeed maximize her utility. Each of these points is criticized and amended by 
behavioral economists, based upon empirical research.  
The behavioral assumptions regarding homo economicus are modified to different 
degrees. In the next section, a systematic overview is presented of the different levels of 
amendments to the neoclassical view of economic choice. This overview will provide a 
context within which the work of behavioral economists on meaning in section 3.3 can be 
understood. 
 
3.3 THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF MODIFICATIONS OF STANDARD NEOCLASSICAL THEORY 
BY BEHAVIORAL ECONOMISTS 
In recent years, several authors have described the main findings of behavioral economics 
from their specific vantage point (Rabin 1998, Camerer et al. 2004, Wilkinson 2008, 
Mullainathan and Thaler 2008). For the purpose of this section, Matthew Rabin‟s (1998) 
overview is the most helpful, as he specifically focuses on the different categories of 
amendments to neoclassical theory in behavioral economics, whereas Camerer et al. 
(2004), Wilkinson (2008), and Mullainathan and Thaler (2008) have a more thematic 
focus.  
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Rabin discerns three dimensions in the modifications to neoclassical theory that 
are made by behavioral economists. In the following subsections, each of these dimensions 
is discussed. 
 
3.3.1 Modification of utility functions 
The first category that is discerned by Rabin encompasses insights from psychology that 
require economists to modify the utility functions they employ. That is, the idea that 
economic actors aim at utility maximization by pursuing their preferences –represented by 
a utility function– is not challenged itself. The main point of the findings in this category 
is that the way economic actors attempt to maximize their utility function is subject to 
certain behavioral principles. 
  An example of such a behavioral principle is “reference dependence” (Rabin 
1998: 13-16). In their behavior, people often compare their present situation and possible 
outcomes of their actions with a reference level63. In economic behavior, reference 
dependence translates into several important phenomena. For instance, economic actors are 
“loss-averse”. As Rabin, referring to the work of Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and 
Richard Thaler (1990) puts it, “in a wide variety of domains, people are significantly more 
averse to losses than they are attracted to same-sized gains” (Rabin 1998: 14). For 
example, when it comes to winning or losing money, people value losing money roughly 
twice as much as a gain with an equal size (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). Another 
example of reference dependence is the “endowment effect”. This means that if someone 
acquires a good, the value that is attributed to a good by that person increases: if someone 
were to receive a book, the (monetary) value that is to be offered to this person in order to 
make her decide to sell the book, is likely to be higher than the value she attributed to the 
book before it came into her possession. 
Other-regarding preferences and preferences for fair allocations are another 
example of behavioral principles that require a modification of utility functions. Although 
economists have traditionally focused on self-interest as the sole motivation for economic 
choice64, behavioral economists have started to include social goals (often referred to as 
                                                 
63 For instance, if the temperature is 15 degrees Celsius, it feels “warm” in Spring, as the human body has grown 
 used to lower temperatures in Winter. Yet, after a hot Summer, 15 degrees Celsius can feel like refreshingly 
 “cool” in Autumn. While 15 degrees Celsius indicates exactly the same temperature either in Spring or 
 Autumn, the experience of this temperature as either “warm” or “cold” depends on a previous reference level. 
64 As Rabin relates, in a well-known part of his Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith claims that “It is not from the 
 benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard for their 
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“altruism”) and principles of fairness in their theoretical representations of economic 
behavior (Fehr and Gaechter 2000, Gintis et al. 2005, Henrich et al. 2004, Ostrom and 
Walker 2003, Rabin 1993). For example, research indicates that people are prone to both 
(conditional) altruistic cooperation and altruistic punishment (Fehr and Fischbacher 2005, 
Boyd et al. 2005). That is, in their economic behavior, people are in principle prepared to 
contribute to the “common good” of a group even if it results in a worse personal outcome 
than if they had chosen to follow their self-interest, as long as other group members 
contribute as well. Similarly, people are willing to punish “free-riders” –members who 
benefit from the group without contributing to it–, even if this punishment comes at a 
greater cost to themselves than the cost of the free-riding itself (Gintis et al. 2005).  
The first category that is discerned by Rabin comprises behavioral principles that 
have an impact on the way people maximize utility in their economic behavior. That is, 
there are certain aspects of how people relate to goods or to other people, that influence 
the outcome of the maximum utility that they pursue. The second category focuses 
specifically on the pursuit of these outcomes. 
 
3.3.2. Deviations from “perfect” rationality 
The second category of amendments to standard neoclassical economic theory by 
behavioral economists, focuses on the principle of rational maximization (Rabin 1998: 25-
31). As was related above, neoclassical economists have perceived economic choice as 
“rational maximization” in terms of a utility maximization “given a set of options and 
probabilistic beliefs” (Rabin 1998: 11). The economic actor, knowing her preferences, 
faces a set of options among which she can choose. In order to maximize her utility, she 
needs to choose the option of which she expects that it provides the highest satisfaction of 
preferences. The rationality of homo economicus thus entails a calculation of the 
probabilities of the satisfaction of preferences by choosing out of the different options that 
are available. In standard neoclassical economic theory, this rationality is believed to be 
“perfect”, which means that a homo economicus has unlimited calculative capacities under 
any circumstances. However, several empirical studies in behavioral economics show that 
                                                                                                                                     
 own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our 
 necessities, but of their advantage” (Smith 1776: 26-27, quoted in Rabin 1998: 16). Many economists have 
 interpreted Smith as solely advocating the pursuit of self-interest. Yet, in doing so, they have only selectively 
 read his work, as recent reinterpretations of Smith‟s work indicate that he also paid extensive attention to 
 questions of “moral philosophy” –and did not limit the motivations for behavior to self-interest. See, for 
 instance, Peil 1999. 
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rationality is not as “perfect” as it is assumed. Especially in the case of uncertainty, people 
tend to rely on “heuristic principles” (Rabin 1998: 24, Ariely 2009: 155-172, Conlisk 
1996). 
 A first important example of the failure to enact the “perfect” or “full” rationality 
of standard economic theory is the “law of small numbers”, or “gambler‟s fallacy” (Rabin 
1998: 24-25). This fallacy entails that when faced with a small number of repeated 
instances, such as the flipping of a coin, people expect that the outcome will reflect a 
“regression to the mean” (Rabin 1998: 25). That is, if a coin is flipped three times with 
“heads” as a result, people often believe that the next outcome has to be “tails”. The 
expected regression to the mean leads to a belief that extraordinary or unusual outcomes 
will not come to pass. Yet, as Nobel laureate Vernon Smith puts it: “Events of small 
probability happen at about the expected frequency, and since there are many such events 
the unexpected is not that unlikely” (Smith 2003: 513). Whereas the “mean” represents 
an average outcome, unusual outcomes are not as unlikely as economic actors believe them 
to be. 
 A second example of the limitations of economic rationality is “anchoring”, which 
means that after having formed an initial belief, people will try to hold on to this belief by 
on the one hand ignoring additional evidence that contradicts it, and on the other hand 
misreading evidence as additional support for it (Rabin 1998: 26). The initial belief 
functions as an “anchor”, from which it is difficult to steer away: although new 
perspectives are being sought, the economic actor is pulled back to the initial belief. This 
leads the actor to “emphasize the strength and reliability of confirming evidence but the 
weaknesses and unreliability of disconfirming evidence” (Rabin 1998: 28). Therefore, the 
capacity to accurately establish correlations is not as perfect as is assumed in neoclassical 
theory (Nisbett and Ross 1980). Still, this need not lead to the conclusion that economic 
actors are not intelligent and purposive in their behavior. The research of behavioral 
economists is only intended to present cases of how people depart from perfect rationality 
(Rabin 1998: 24), in order to gain a more realistic perspective of actual economic 
behavior. 
 The second category of adaptations to neoclassical economic theory challenges the 
assumption of perfect rationality, by outlining the “errors” that people make by choosing 
rules of thumb over complex calculations in their pursuit of a maximization of their utility. 
The third category takes one step further, by questioning whether utility maximization in 
itself is an appropriate concept to describe economic behavior. 
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3.3.3 The departure from the principle of utility maximization 
The third category of modifications to the behavioral principles that are used in 
neoclassical economics involves the most far-reaching change in perspective. As Rabin puts 
it, the suggestion is raised that “it may be wrong to conceptualize some types of economic 
behavior in terms of an agent who maximizes a stable, coherent utility function” (Rabin 
1998: 32-33). 
A first example of this category is the way utility is understood as the result of 
economic choice. In the standard neoclassical economic framework, an economic actor 
makes a choice based upon her preferences, that is, her beliefs about the preferred 
outcomes in terms of utility of her choice. Based upon empirical research, behavioral 
economists have concluded that this representation does not adequately capture the actual 
relation between choice and utility or well-being as it is experienced. To illustrate the 
difference between “economic choice based upon preferences” and “the experience of 
utility as a result of economic choice”, researchers have made a distinction between two 
types of utility, as Daniel Kahneman (1994) elaborates: “The experienced utility of an 
outcome is the measure of the hedonic experience of that outcome (…) The decision 
utility of an outcome is the weight assigned to that outcome in a decision” (Kahneman 
1994: 21). As results of experiments indicate, there is an incongruence65 between the 
decision utility and the experienced utility of an economic action (Kahneman et al. 1997). 
One important implication of these findings is that the notion “revealed preference” –the 
choices that people make reflect the outcomes that they desire (Samuelson 1948, cf. 
section 2.2)– cannot be maintained (Loewenstein 1999). Therefore, the idea that an 
economic choice reflects or reveals a process in which an economic actor maximizes her 
utility, needs to be interpreted in a different way according to behavioral economists. 
 The second category of findings that challenge the model of utility maximization 
encompasses the elicitation of preferences in terms of “framing” and “context effects” 
                                                 
65 One explanation for the incongruence between decision utility and experienced utility is a change in reference 
 points that is not anticipated by the economic actor while making her choice (Rabin 1998: 33). That is, while 
 the result of the choice is expected to lead to an increased level of utility, a change in the circumstances and 
 experiences of the actor may lead to a different level of actually experienced utility. An illustrative example is 
 the ubiquitous expectation that winning a lottery leads to a significant increase in one‟s (experienced) utility, 
 while researchers have found no significant difference between the reported happiness of lottery winners and a 
 control group of people who were not similarly lucky (Brickman et al. 1978). A possible explanation is that 
 people become used to certain circumstances, and that thus their frame of reference at least partially 
 determines the utility they experience. 
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(Rabin 1998: 36-38). As was related in chapter 2, in standard neoclassical economic 
theory, the preferences of an economic actor are presumed to be “given” and stable: a pre-
determined input in the choice process, and relatively unchanging over time (Loomes 
1999: 37, cf. 2.3). Yet, based upon several studies in behavioral economics, the assumption 
of “given preferences” (Stigler and Becker 1977) is seriously challenged. 
 A first example of elicitation of preferences is “framing”. The framing effect has 
been elucidated through experiments in which economic actors had to choose between 
logically equivalent but not transparently equivalent options (Rabin 1998: 33). For 
instance, by framing the logically same question “where to go on a holiday?” differently, in 
either positive (“preferring”) or negative (“canceling”) language, the general question 
regarding the pick of a holiday destination resulted in significantly different outcomes66 
(Shafir et al. 1993: 17). The results of these experiments indicate that “more than 
confusing people in pursuit of stable underlying preferences, the „frames‟ may in fact 
partially determine a person‟s preferences” (Rabin 1998: 37). The way an economic choice 
is framed can lead to a change in the preferred outcome based on the way the choice is 
framed, that is, the framing can lead to a “preference reversal” (Slovic 1991, Loewenstein 
2007, cf. Kahneman and Tversky 2000). 
 A second example of the elicitation of preferences are “context effects” (Rabin 
1998: 38). Context effects entail changes in the context of choice, that increase or decrease 
the range of possible options for the economic actor. In standard neoclassical economic 
theory, preferences are considered to be “complete”: for any good, the economic actor has 
a well-defined and stable preference. Adding or removing options should therefore have no 
impact on the relative preferences for the goods that were already present or remain present 
in the set of options. Yet, research done by behavioral economists indicates otherwise. 
Based upon their studies, behavioral economists conclude that the availability of different 
options influences people in their economic choices, by causing a shift in their 
                                                 
66 Shafir et al. (1993) provides several examples of the framing of a logically equivalent choice. In the experiment 
 referred to above, people were asked to choose between two optional holiday destinations –which shared an 
 overall desirability, yet differed in specific aspects– in terms of either “preferring” an option or “canceling” an 
 option. Other experiments studied similar questions, for instance by framing the question of the custody of a 
 child in a divorce case in terms of “awarding” or “denying” the custody to one of the parents (Shafir et al. 
 1993: 15-16). These experiments yielded the result that the framing of a logically equivalent choice 
 significantly influences the outcome. 
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preferences67 (Simonson and Tversky 1992) and by influencing the experienced utility in 
which a choice results (Schwartz 2004, Thaler and Sunstein 2009). 
In the eyes of behavioral economists, elicitation –in which preferences are found to 
be partially dependent on the framing and context of the choice– cannot be adequately 
explained in terms of utility maximization based upon given preferences (Loewenstein 
2007). An alternative for explaining framing and context effects that is proposed by 
behavioral economists is “reason-based choice”: the idea that economic actors base their 
choice upon reasons (Simonson and Tversky 1992, Shafir et al. 1993, cf. Lave 1997). As 
economic actors‟ preferences depend on the context of choice, reasons –which are defined 
by Shafir et al. (1993) as “factors or motives that affect decision, whether or not they can 
be articulated or recognized by the decision maker” (Shafir et al. 1993: 13)– are proposed 
as a promising alternative68 to the principle of utility maximization.  
This section has provided an overview of the different ways in which behavioral 
economics modifies the behavioral assumptions of standard neoclassical economic theory. 
The modifications range from alterations of the content of the utility function to findings 
that call for an alternative interpretation of economic behavior. The overview that is 
presented in this section serves as a context for the interpretation of the attempts by 
behavioral economists to incorporate meaning of life in their theoretical reflections on 
economic behavior. The next section focuses specifically on the inquiries by behavioral 
economists into meaning of life as a motivation for economic behavior. 
 
3.4 BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND MEANING OF LIFE 
3.4.1 Economics and meaning: a new area for behavioral economics 
Until quite recently, meaning of life was a topic that was left untouched by economists. As 
Niklas Karlsson, George Loewenstein, and Jane McCafferty argue, this lack of attention 
does not necessarily reflect a lack of interest, but rather “the fear that modeling meaning, 
                                                 
67 For example, in an experiment run by Itamar Simonson and Amos Tversky (1992), two groups were offered a 
 choice either between a beautiful pen or a small monetary reward, or between a beautiful pen, a cheap pen, and 
 a small monetary reward. The result of the experiment was that more people chose the beautiful pen when 
 they were also offered the cheap pen, than in the situation in which they could only opt for either the 
 beautiful pen or the money. That is, in a comparison between the two sets of choices, adding the cheap pen as 
 another option –which might be expected to lead to a decreased interest in the two options that were also 
 present in the other set of options–, actually caused a change in the preferences for the other two goods. 
68 In section 3.5, reason-based choice is more elaborately reflected upon as an alternative for utility maximization 
 in light of the question of meaning of life. 
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and its role in economic behavior, is (…) difficult”, (Karlsson et al. 2004: 71), that is, 
difficult within the standard neoclassical economic framework of utility maximization69. 
Some representatives of behavioral economics have ventured into researching the role of 
meaning in economic behavior. 
In their The Economics of Meaning, Karlsson et al. (2004) present a first 
explorative study into the relation between meaning and economic behavior. They place 
their interest in meaning within the widening of the scope of motivations for economic 
behavior that behavioral economists have pursued with regard to other topics, like altruism, 
fairness, and reciprocity (Karlsson et al. 2004: 61-62, cf. 3.2). The reason for their interest 
in meaning, is that they claim that “the search for meaning [is] the activity which brings 
value to life” and therefore consider “meaning-making as the fundamental activity of 
human existence” (Karlsson et al. 2004: 62). They refer to the work of psychologist 
Viktor Frankl (cf. section 1.2), by arguing that it is “people‟s innate will to find meaning, 
and not their striving for pleasure, power, or wealth, that is the strongest motivation for 
living” Karlsson et al. 2004: 62). Karlsson et al. connect meaning to economic behavior by 
discerning four different interpretations of meaning. 
 
3.4.2 Four interpretations of meaning 
In order to provide a starting point for the analysis of meaning in behavioral economics, 
Karlsson et al. provide a taxonomy of four different interpretations of meaning in relation 
to economic behavior (Karlsson et al. 2004: 63): 
 
1. Meaning as the resolution of uncertainty about preferences: if someone is 
uncertain about her preferences, meaning can be a guide to knowing what one 
really values, and thus help resolving uncertainty. 
2. Meaning as an extension of self, either socially or temporally: someone can ease 
feelings of the inconsequentiality of her life by identifying herself with a social 
context, that has a past and a future. 
                                                 
69 There is a voluminous literature on the “economics of religion”, in which economists seek to explain religious 
 behavior and developments both at a micro (personal/local) and macro (national/societal) level. These 
 studies, however, use standard neoclassical economic behavioral principles such as rational choice and utility 
 maximization: there is a market for religion, in which believers seek the best products in order to maximize 
 their utility. As was argued in Chapter 2, these neoclassical behavioral principles are problematic for 
 understanding meaning of life in economic behavior. For more information on the Economics of Religion, see 
 Iannacone 1998, Ekelund et al. 2006, Witham 2010. 
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3. Meaning as an act of sense-making: the world someone experiences is chaotic 
without meaning. By creating a meaningful order, someone can organize experience 
and make sense of the world.  
4. Meaning as an assertion of free will: the autonomous decisions someone makes can 
give her the sense of acting out of “free will” (instead of command, instinct, or 
habit), which increases the satisfaction she experiences.  
 
The first interpretation, meaning as the resolution of uncertainty about preferences, refers 
to a situation in which an economic actor has competing preferences amongst which she 
must choose. For instance, consider a choice between a pound of luxurious and excellently 
tasting coffee from a regular brand, and a pound of more modest and average tasting coffee 
from a fair-trade and ecologically responsible brand, that come at the same price. If the 
economic actor is uncertain about which of the two options she is to choose, the meaning 
that is related to either of the two sorts of coffee can provide guidance. By associating 
drinking a particular brand of coffee with either “living a life of refinement and delight” or 
“contributing to a fair and sustainable world” –which can both be meaningful frames–, the 
meaningful perspective associated with the coffee can provide a preference about 
preferences70. Therefore, the experience of meaning can lead to a situation in which 
“choices in life are truly aligned with purposes” (Karlsson et al 2004: 63), a situation that 
gives certainty about what people want out of life. 
The second interpretation of meaning is the extension of the self in either a social 
or temporal sense. This implies that people identify with a group, for instance a culture or 
religion, and thus come to carry the beliefs and values of this group as their own. As 
research has indicated, the impact of such an allegiance to a group on the behavior of 
people is enormous (Haslam 2000). Adherence to the beliefs and values of a group can be 
strengthened by the awareness of the temporal finality of someone‟s life (Greenberg et al. 
1997). As belonging to a certain group or culture provides an individual with both a 
history and a future, i.e. previous and future generations of members of the group, 
someone‟s own limited lifespan becomes embedded in a tradition or continuity of people 
who share the same beliefs and values. 
 The third interpretation of meaning entails “making sense of one‟s life as a 
whole”. People make sense of their life by seeking a meaningful order or pattern in their 
                                                 
70 Karlsson et al. refer to “higher level preferences”, see also the work by Amartya Sen on “meta-preferences” 
 (Sen 1977). 
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experiences and activities, as they find randomness and chaos unsatisfactory (Gilovich 
1991). The most basic and important way to make sense of happenings is by creating a 
narrative account, in which individual occurrences are connected to a purpose and are 
evaluated from the viewpoint of certain values71 (Wyer et al. 2002). Finding a meaningful 
perspective that provides an overarching framework for events in life can have a beneficial 
effect on both psychological and physical health outcomes, which increases well-being, and 
therefore according to Karlsson et al. can be considered of interest to economics as well 
(Karlsson et al. 2004: 67). 
The fourth interpretation of meaning refers to the experience of meaning as the 
expression and assertion of “free will”. As Karlsson et al. (2004: 70) argue, people want to 
believe that they have control over their behavior and their “destiny”, the overarching end 
towards which they strive in their actions. The most significant category of decisions that 
can be experienced as free, are the decisions in which people consciously opt not to pursue 
pleasure and well-being. George Loewenstein (1999) discusses an illustrative example of 
this type of behavior: mountaineering. In mountaineering, people choose to face hardships 
(extreme cold, social isolation, exhaustion) and severe dangers (loss of fingers and toes, 
eyes, or even one‟s life) because of the decision to climb a mountain72. While “mastery” –
the desire to test and display one‟s capacities– can be an important motive, experienced 
mountaineers show no concern for being admired by others (Loewenstein 1999). Instead, 
in the view of mountaineers, a mountain is to be climbed “because it‟s there”. The 
mountain provides the mountaineer the opportunity to make the autonomous choice to 
attempt to climb it, waging one‟s life and well-being for a clear “destiny”. 
 
3.4.3 Meaning and utility maximization 
As was related above, it is a new development in behavioral economics to consider meaning 
as a motivational factor. For this reason, Karlsson et al. (2004) inquire the possibilities of 
                                                 
71 The impact of narrative accounts that are used to make sense of life is related by Jerome Bruner (1987), who 
 argues that: “Eventually the culturally shaped cognitive and linguistic processes that guide the self-telling of 
 life narratives achieve the power to structure perceptual experience, to organize memory, to segment and 
 purpose-build the very „events‟ of a life. In the end, we become the autobiographical narratives by which we 
 „tell about‟ our lives” (Bruner 1987: 15, quoted in Karlsson et al. 2004: 69). 
72 It can be argued that mountaineers also pursue “pleasure”, as they do what they want to do, albeit in a 
 masochistic way. Yet, this explanation runs the risk of being “vacuous” (Loewenstein 1999) and even 
 contradictory, as pain is interpreted as pleasure, while the (utilitarian) distinction that underlies the utility 
 maximization framework opposes pleasure and pain. This point is further elaborated below. 
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integrating meaning with the standard economic principle of utility maximization. This 
can be relevant for the central question of this chapter, as in section 2.4, the concept utility 
maximization was argued to be difficult to align with the way public theologians 
understand meaning.  
  The first interpretation of meaning is the easiest one to reconcile with utility 
maximization in the perspective of Karlsson et al. (2004: 70). If meaning provides insights 
into what brings utility, it allows someone to do a better job of maximizing it. The idea of 
uncertainty about preferences does not fit well with the utility maximization as it is 
understood in standard economic theory, as the economic actor needs to know her 
preferences in order to be able to realize utility maximization. Still, if meaning helps 
realizing someone‟s preferences, it helps maximizing utility. 
 The second interpretation, meaning as social or temporal extension of the self, is 
also considered amenable to the utility maximization principle. A concrete example of  
how this is applied in economic theory is the work of George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton 
on economics and identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2005, 2010, cf. Davis 2007). 
Akerlof and Kranton argue that social identification and categorization play a major role in 
the interaction of economic actors. Social identity can be seen as a situation of framing (cf. 
3.2), in that it represents the beliefs, values, and ideals of a social group, that guide the 
actor in her economic behavior (Akerlof and Kranton 2005, cf. Kahneman and Tversky 
1979). Therefore, identity can lead to utility for the economic actor as she has an identity-
based payoff derived from her own actions, and an identity-based payoff from other 
people‟s actions (Akerlof and Kranton 2000: 717-718). Another example is the work of 
Elias Khalil (2000, 2004), who integrates the temporal and social extension of the self by 
distinguishing between two categories of goods: substantive and symbolic. The substantive 
dimension of goods is about the satisfaction of substantive wants, for instance: hunger, 
warmth, entertainment, and aesthetics. The symbolic dimension of a good satisfies the 
desire for self-regard, in terms of pride (self-respect), prestige (self-admiration), and 
identity (self-dignity and integrity) (Khalil 2000: 55, see also Brennan and Pettit 2004, 
Michel and Barron 2008). Khalil argues that the symbolic dimension of a good is created 
by a connection between a good and a specific context, while the substantive dimension is 
context-independent. The symbolic connections that engender pride and prestige are 
considered “forward-looking”, while identity connects the present self with past 
experiences that help constitute someone‟s personality (Khalil 2004). 
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The third interpretation of meaning, making sense of someone‟s life, is 
considerably more difficult to conceive as a shape of utility maximization. As Wyer et al. 
(2002) relate, the narratives that people use to make sense of their lives have an impact on 
the knowledge that forms the “input”, that is, the “frame” or “context”, for many 
decisions. Karlsson et al. (2004: 69) indicate that these narrative accounts seldom are 
shaped as “I was happy as much of the time as I possibly could have been given the 
opportunities that I faced”. Although a life-story can have many happy events, the sad 
happenings, –such as the loss of one‟s parents, a major illness, or the loss of one‟s job–, 
also contribute to the meaning that is attributed to someone‟s life (Hijmans and Van den 
Hoogen 2002). This leads Karlsson et al. (2004: 70) to conclude that meaning may be 
considered as a source of utility, but that it does not fit the utility maximization principle 
in terms of a pleasure/pain duality. In fact, whereas “pain” decreases utility in the ordinary 
understanding of utility maximization, in the case of meaning it may at some points 
enhance utility, which makes the understanding of “utility” troublesome. 
The fourth interpretation, meaning as the assertion of free will, presents an even 
greater challenge to the principle of utility maximization. As the example of 
mountaineering illustrates, the way people seek to assert their free will and autonomous 
choice can go against any kind of “seeking pleasure”. It is possible to conceive losing 
fingers, friends, or one‟s life during a mountaineering expedition as part of the experience 
of utility. As Karlsson et al. (2004: 71) put it: “if we assume that people derive pleasure 
from the assertion of their free will, then voluntary misery might be assimilated into a 
model of utility maximization”, yet, they continue by arguing that “this paradox only 
reveals the skeleton in the closet: the concept of utility is irrefutable and, hence, vacuous”. 
The quote by Karlsson et al. reveals an ambiguous perspective regarding the 
relation between utility and meaning. On the one hand, meaning can be considered as a 
source of utility, as it helps people choose what they prefer, and gives people a sense of 
belonging through the social networks that connect them. On the other hand, when it 
comes to making sense of someone‟s life, and to making free and autonomous decisions, 
utility and meaning appear to refer to completely different matters. That is, meaning can 
go directly against utility, unless utility is interpreted in such a broad sense that it 
encompasses anything that is desired, and thus becomes an empty concept.  
The discussion of the relation between meaning and utility indicates that the only 
way to make meaning fit the utility maximization framework, is to make utility itself a 
vacuous concept. Connecting this discussion to the different levels of adaptations that were 
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discerned in section 3.2, it can be argued that if behavioral economists want to integrate 
meaning in their theories of economic behavior, this would ask for a departure from the 
concept of utility maximization (i.e., the third category discerned by Rabin). As the 
examples from the work of Khalil (2000, 2004) and Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005, 
2010) point out, however, utility maximization functions as the framework in which 
behavioral economists formulate their theories. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
influence of the neoclassical orthodoxy can still be perceived, at least as a “benchmark” for 
behavioral economists who seek to incorporate meaning of life in their theories of 
economic behavior (cf. Davis 2007, Wijngaards and Sent 2012). 
Having explored the ways in which behavioral economists have inquired the 
possibilities of integrating meaning of life in their theory of economic behavior, in the next 
section, an investigation is made of the new approach that behavioral economists take 
towards evaluative issues, such as questions of economic policy. As was indicated in section 
2.3, in this new approach, behavioral economists appear to go beyond the positive (value-
neutral) neoclassical abstinence from intervention in economic behavior.  
 
3.5 BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND EVALUATIVE QUESTIONS REGARDING ECONOMIC 
POLICY 
As was related in sections 3.2 and 3.3, behavioral economists have gained many new 
insights on economic behavior by integrating findings from psychology. These new 
insights diverge from the behavioral assumptions of “homo economicus” that are used in 
standard neoclassical economic theory (Wilkinson 2008: 5-7). Based upon these findings, 
behavioral economists have formulated a new approach with regard to economic policy as 
well (Heukelom 2009: 139-143). In this section, the approach of behavioral economists 
regarding economic policy is explored, as their approach to policy issues may shed light on 
the question whether behavioral economists are interested in contributing to a viable civil 
society –the second central interest of public theology. 
 
3.5.1 Translating findings to policy 
As was related in section 3.2, the findings of behavioral economics indicate that economic 
actors do not have stable preferences, and that their calculative capacities are limited. 
Principles such as framing effects, context effects, and limited rationality, prove that 
whereas standard economic theory claims that a homo economicus knows what her 
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preferences are, and knows how to achieve them, a real economic actor faces a more 
complicated decision process.  
Several behavioral economists have taken up the new perspective on economic 
decision-making as a challenge to the idea that people always make choices that are in their 
best interest (Thaler and Sunstein 2003). Instead, as Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein 
argue, “in some cases individuals make inferior choices, choices that they would change if 
they had complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of willpower” 
(Thaler and Sunstein 2003: 175). Based upon the research that “describes ways people 
sometimes fail to behave in their own interests” (Camerer et al. 2003: 1217), behavioral 
economists consider it their duty in their policy advice to help people in correcting their 
mistakes (Loewenstein and Haisley 2008).  
In line with framing and context effects, behavioral economists have advanced the 
idea that every possible way a choice is presented to economic actors has an impact on the 
actual decision that is made. Every choice is influenced by its “choice architecture”, that is, 
the context in which it takes place, or the way the choice is framed. This implies that every 
choice is constructed by a “choice architect”, which is someone “who has the responsibility 
for organizing the context in which people make decisions” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 
3). As Thaler and Sunstein argue, a seemingly “neutral” or random choice environment 
also has its implications for the decision process, which leads them to conclude that “there 
is no such thing as a „neutral‟ design” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 3). This implicates that 
whatever context of choice is created –or deliberately left unchanged73–, the economic 
actor is always confronted with an evaluative decision by the choice architect to facilitate 
the choice architecture in a certain way. If the economic actor always feels this influence of 
the choice architect, in the view of behavioral economists it should be used to help people 
in making choices that are in their best interests. As George Loewenstein and Emily 
Haisley (2008) put it: 
 
As economists, how should we respond to the seemingly self-destructive side of 
human behavior? We can deny it, and assume as an axiom of faith that people can 
be relied upon to do what‟s best for themselves. We can assume that families 
paying an average of $1,000 per year financing credit card debt are making a 
                                                 
73 From this perspective, the choice of neoclassical economists to take no evaluative position in their positive 
 analysis, is not value-neutral at all. That is, the choice not to intervene also implies advocating a certain choice 
 architecture. 
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rational tradeoff of present and future utility, (…), that people are obese because 
they have calculated that the pleasures from the extra food, or the pain of foregone 
exercise, is sufficient to compensate for the negative consequences of obesity 
(Loewenstein and Haisley 2008). 
 
Behavioral economists thus consider themselves to be “morally obliged to act against the 
violations of full rationality” (Heukelom 2009: 142). That is, they think it is in the best 
interest of economic actors if an economist (or other “choice architect”) creates a choice 
architecture that helps them make decisions that are in their own best interests. For this 
reason, behavioral economists believe an intervention in the decision process economic 
actors , through the way the choice architecture is set up, is legitimate and necessary. 
  
3.5.2 Economic policy as “light” paternalism 
An approach to economic policy in which the decisions that are made by economic actors 
are influenced by “choice architects” can be interpreted as a form of paternalism. That is, 
as economic actors are to some degree “guided” towards a certain option, the choice 
architect meddles with the decision process of the economic actor. 
 Within economics, paternalism is an untraditional –and unorthodox– approach to 
policy questions. In the perspective of the neoclassical orthodoxy, people are considered to 
know what they want and know how to achieve this, which is reflected in the behavioral 
assumptions of well-defined and stable preferences, and full rationality. For neoclassical 
economists, if people pursue their preferences, the “invisible hand” that is at work in the 
market (Smith 1776) ensures the best economic outcome. Therefore, neoclassical 
economists have defended the opposite of paternalism: policies of “laissez faire” and 
“sovereignty” of the economic actor (cf. Friedman 1953, Lerner 1972). Recent accounts 
from the perspective of standard economic theory also argue against paternalism (Gul and 
Pesendorfer 2008). For this reason, behavioral economists seek to qualify their 
interpretation of paternalism in economic policy, in order to make it acceptable towards 
their colleagues. 
 The pivotal reason why the behavioral economists‟ shape of paternalism fits in the 
tradition within economics that stresses freedom and liberty, it that it is a “light” 
paternalism (Loewenstein and Haisley 2008). Light paternalism means that while 
policymakers try to steer, –or as Thaler and Sunstein (2009) put it, to “nudge”– the 
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economic actor towards the option that is in her best interest, the economic actor should 
have the possibility not to choose this option as well.  
This approach is reflected in several different interpretations of paternalism that 
are forwarded by behavioral economists. For instance, Thaler and Sunstein (2003, 2009) 
argue for a libertarian paternalism. The qualification “libertarian” is to guarantee that 
people are not in any way coerced to choose a certain option in their economic behavior 
(Thaler and Sunstein 2003: 175). Instead, policymakers are advised to either promote the 
option that a majority of the economic actors would choose or to ensure that people make 
their choices explicit in their economic behavior (Thaler and Sunstein 2003:178). 
Another interpretation of paternalism, forwarded by Colin Camerer, Samuel 
Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O‟Donoghue and Matthew Rabin (2003), is 
asymmetric paternalism. Camerer et al. argue that “a policy is asymmetrically paternalistic 
if it creates large benefits for those people who are boundedly rational (…) while imposing 
little or no harm on those who are fully rational” (Camerer et al. 2003: 1219). That is, 
while economic actors who need help in pursuing their best interests are supported, other 
people, who are capable of pursuing their best interests by themselves, are not to be 
hindered by the policy. In other words, “asymmetric paternalism helps those whose 
rationality is bounded from making a costly mistake and harms more rational folks very 
little” (Camerer et al. 2003: 1254). 
 By proposing “light” versions of paternalism with regard to economic policy, 
behavioral economists thus go beyond previous approaches within economics that 
defended unhampered freedom of choice, based upon the idea that economic actors are 
fully rational and know what they want. Still, as behavioral economists underline in their 
arguments about policy advice, it is the goal of economic policy to enable economic actors 
to pursue what is best for them as they themselves perceive it (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). 
A behavioral economist seeks to offer a helping hand in achieving the true preferences that 
economic actors have. 
 In sections 3.4 and 3.5, the way in which behavioral economists try to incorporate 
meaning in their theory of economic behavior, and the evaluative approach that behavioral 
economists take with regard to questions of policy have been explored. The findings of 
these two sections are used in the final section, which focuses on the central question of 
this chapter, by inquiring whether behavioral economics has affinity with the two central 
interests of public theology. 
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3.6 EVALUATION: PUBLIC THEOLOGY AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
In this section, it is assessed whether behavioral economics has affinity with the central 
interests of public theology. Parallel to sections 3.3 and 3.4, the two central interests of 
public theology –meaning of life and contributing to a viable civil society– are discussed in 
different subsections. 
 
3.6.1 Public theology and behavioral economics: meaning of life 
In chapter 2, it was argued that the main problem for connecting public theology and 
neoclassical economics with regard to the question of meaning of life is the behavioral 
principle of “utility maximization” (cf. section 2.4). Utility maximization encompasses any 
possible motivation for economic behavior, and reflects an instrumental concern (Sen 
1995) towards the realization of predetermined or “given” ends. Thus, by using utility 
maximization as its central behavioral principle, neoclassical economists cannot pinpoint 
the role of meaning of life in economic behavior. Also, utility maximization reflects an 
instrumental or means-ends rationality, the dominance of which in contemporary society 
was considered to be the main problem for questions of meaning of life in Chapter 1. This 
leads to two questions with regard to the way behavioral economists incorporate meaning 
in economic behavior. First, does the work of behavioral economists offer opportunities 
for identifying the role of meaning of life as a motivation in economic behavior? Second, 
can it do so without being limited to instrumental concerns –and instead understand 
meaning of life as an evaluative question? 
 As was elaborated in section 3.4, there are some behavioral economists who have 
ventured to study the role of meaning in economic behavior. Karlsson et al. (2004) have 
discerned four interpretations of meaning and investigated the relevance for economic 
behavior and possible connections to the utility maximization framework of these 
interpretations of meaning. In section 1.2, meaning of life was defined as the directedness 
towards an ultimate horizon of meaning that encompasses “all of life” through the pursuit 
of central values. If the interpretations of meaning by Karlsson et al. and the definition 
presented in chapter 1 are compared, the affinity with public theology‟s understanding of 
meaning of life can be assessed. To this effect, the four interpretations of meaning –as a 
guide to what one really values (1), as a social and temporal extension of self (2), as an act 
of sense-making (3), and as the assertion of free will (4)– are related to the general 
definition that was given in chapter 1.  
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The first interpretation stresses the evaluative character of meaning, by linking 
meaning to the values of the economic actor. The second and third interpretations are both 
focused on the relation between the economic actor and the perception of and connection 
to the reality “outside” the economic actor. That is, by extending the self and making sense 
of the reality surrounding her, the economic actor establishes a meaningful relation with 
her social, cultural, historical (etc.) context. In this way, the second and third 
interpretations can be understood in the same way as the horizons of meaning that were 
discerned in section 1.2. In extending the self socially and historically, and in making sense 
of reality, the economic actor constructs a viewpoint from which meaning is attributed to 
her context, thus creating a horizon of meaning. For instance, in the work of Elias Khalil 
(2000, 2004), the context in which an economic choice takes place can generate “symbolic 
utility”. Although Khalil only refers to pride, prestige, and identity, symbolic utility might 
be understood in a broader sense, also encompassing aspects that are part of someone‟s 
ultimate horizon of meaning (Wijngaards and Sent 2011). Symbolic utility reflects a 
relation between an object and its context that somehow leads the economic actor to value 
a good differently than as a (mere) substantive good. If a context contains elements that 
refer to the ultimate horizon of meaning of an economic actor and have an impact on her 
decision process, these aspects can also be considered as symbolic utility, as they motivate 
the actor to make a certain decision. 
The fourth interpretation links meaning to the assertion of free will. As was 
elaborated in section 1.2, questions of meaning come to the fore most ardently in times of 
great change or suffering (cf. Hijmans and Van den Hoogen 2002). These are exactly the 
times when making conscious and purposeful decisions becomes an urgent matter. 
Therefore, the fourth interpretation of meaning by Karlsson et al. can also be considered to 
be congruent with the definition of meaning of life provided in section 1.2. 
Yet, although the first two interpretations –meaning as a guide to what one really 
values and meaning as social and temporal extension– can be integrated in the utility 
maximization framework according to Karlsson et al., considering meaning as an indicator 
of an indiscriminate –or even “vacuous” (Loewenstein 1999)– sense of “pleasure”, does 
not help public theologians in their understanding of the way people deal with questions 
of meaning of life in economic behavior. On the contrary, by making meaning a factor that 
contributes to utility, the quest for meaning of life is put in an instrumental perspective. 
Incorporating meaning in the utility maximization framework makes meaning a means to 
the (assumedly higher) end of utility –broadly conceived as “pleasure”. While public 
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theologians consider the horizon of meaning that constitutes meaning of life to be the 
ultimate horizon of meaning, in the utility maximization framework the realization of an 
indiscriminate maximal “pleasure” is considered to be of ultimate value74. 
Some behavioral economists, however, advocate the idea that meaning should not 
be seen as a means that contributes to the end of “pleasure”. For instance, George 
Loewenstein (2007) challenges this “instrumental” relation between meaning and utility 
maximization, by using the candid example of parenthood: while research indicates that, 
overall, being a parent decreases one‟s utility (in terms of “pleasure”), few parents will 
retrospectively consider their decision to have children to be misguided for this reason. 
That is, according to Loewenstein, having children is not only evaluated on a scale of 
“pleasure”. The reason for wanting to have children and for being happy to have raised 
them is not that it makes the parents‟ lives as pleasurable as possible (i.e., a maximization 
of utility). Instead, “meaning” may prove to be a far more important factor in the parents‟ 
decision to try to have children, and in evaluating the experiences related to raising them. 
In summary, some behavioral economists have ventured to study meaning as a 
motivation for economic behavior. All four interpretations of meaning provided by 
Karlsson et al. can in principle be aligned with the definition of meaning of life provided in 
chapter 1. Behavioral economists can thus identify meaning as a motivation for economic 
behavior, and interpret meaning in a way that is in line with a perspective from public 
theology. Therefore, behavioral economists appear to have more affinity with questions of 
meaning of life in economic behavior than neoclassical economists. Yet, behavioral 
economists do not discard the framework of utility maximization framework altogether. 
Utility maximization appears to function as a benchmark for behavioral economics (Davis 
2006, Sent 2004). As Floris Heukelom (2009) argues, behavioral economists rather seek 
to amend the utility maximization framework, in order to make it more realistic, than to 
replace it with an alternative framework. Therefore, the underlying idea of utility 
maximization can still prove to be a hurdle, because it can lead to an instrumental 
interpretation of meaning, which conflicts with the way public theologians interpret 
meaning of life (i.e., as referring to an ultimate horizon of meaning). 
 
  
                                                 
74 This tendency to “instrumentalize” horizons of ultimate meaning to other ends has been criticized by 
 theologians. For instance, Karl Rahner once argued that this creates a “theological underpinning of a life of 
 middle-class ethics supervised by God” (Rahner 1979: 10, quoted in Beaudoin 2003: 106).  
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3.6.2 Public theology and behavioral economics: contributing to a viable civil society 
As was elaborated in 3.5, behavioral economists are highly interested in translating the 
findings of their research into economic policy. In doing so, they are not afraid of choosing 
an evaluative approach, in which the choices that are made by economic actors are 
influenced. This is a major difference with the neoclassical perspective on policy issues that 
was discussed in chapter 2. In a neoclassical perspective, an economist is to limit herself to 
a “positive”, value-neutral analysis, in which the “sovereignty” of the economic actor 
(Lerner 1972) is crucial, as in neoclassical economics it is believed that the (fully) rational 
optimization of economic choice by individual actors will lead to the most efficient 
outcome for the economy as a whole. 
 The neoclassical outlook –in the sense of a positive theory of economic behavior 
and policy– has been criticized by behavioral economist Richard Thaler (1980) for being 
misguiding regarding the positive and normative elements of its theory. Thaler claims that 
the full rationality and virtually unlimited calculative capabilities that are ascribed to 
economic actors in neoclassical theory, are not “positive” in the sense of an adequate 
description of the way economic actors actually make decisions. Instead, full rationality is a 
normative benchmark, based upon which the most efficient outcome is postulated to be 
realized. As the findings of behavioral economics research indicate, economic actors are far 
from “fully rational”, and therefore, in Thaler‟s view, it is behavioral economics represents 
a “positive” theory of economic behavior, while in his view neoclassical economics follows 
a normative approach (Thaler 1980, see also Schooler, Ariely, and Loewenstein 2003, 
Wilkinson 2008: 424). 
 With regard to evaluative issues regarding economic policy, a similar point can be 
made. Loewenstein and Haisley (2008) conclude their essay on The Economist as 
Therapist by defending “A Methodology of Normative Economics” (Loewenstein and 
Haisley 2008: 41-42). In doing so, they make an allusion to the highly influential 
Methodology of Positive Economics by Nobel laureate Milton Friedman (1953). While 
Friedman argues that economics is a positive science, Loewenstein and Haisley claim that  
 
economists, we believe, should be, and, as we have documented, to a very great 
extent already are, in the business of “discussing criteria of what ought to be” and 
attempting to devise economic institutions that maximize the likelihood that what 
ought to be in fact occurs (Loewenstein and Haisley 2008: 42, italics in original). 
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Therefore, behavioral economics can be argued to reiterate the neoclassical positive-
normative distinction in two ways. First, with regard to the study of economic behavior, 
behavioral economists claim to follow a descriptive approach, while they consider 
neoclassical economics to be normative. Second, with regard to economic policy, 
behavioral economists argue that economists should be, and often already are, normatively 
engaged with economic issues. In contrast with neoclassical economics, they are not only 
interested in achieving maximal efficiency, but also focus on the “criteria of what ought to 
be” (Loewenstein and Haisley 2008). 
 As was argued above, neoclassical economists are only interested in questions of 
efficiency (cf. sections 2.3 and 2.4). Therefore, in neoclassical economics, there is no 
interest in the ends or “criteria of what ought to be”, but only for the optimal achievement 
of given ends. As Amartya Sen (1977, 1995) has argued, this (neoclassical) approach 
reflects an instrumental concern: “An „instrumental rationalist‟ is a decision expert whose 
response to seeing a man engaged in slicing his toes with a blunt knife is to rush to advise 
him that he should use a sharper knife to better serve his evident objective” (Sen 1995: 
16). In the instrumental perspective, the only important criteria are consistency and 
efficiency. There is no attention for the validity of one‟s choices. 
Behavioral economists, however, do have an interest in the validity of choices. 
They ground the validity of choices in what they discern as the “true” preferences of 
economic actors. In the words of John Harsanyi, the “true” preferences are the preferences 
the economic actor “would have if he had all the relevant factual information, always 
reasoned with the greatest possible care, and was in a state of mind most conductive to 
rational choice” (Harsanyi 1982: 55, quoted in Heukelom 2009: 140).  
True preferences can be contrasted with the “revealed” preferences that are used as 
inputs for economic choice in neoclassical economics. As was outlined in section 2.2, 
revealed preferences reflect the idea that an economic actor knows what is in her best 
interest, so that her choice “reveals” her preference and thus her best interest (Samuelson 
1948). In contrast to the neoclassical approach, behavioral economists “clearly do not 
always equate revealed preference with welfare” (Thaler and Sunstein 2003: 175). That is, 
because of, for instance, context effects, it depends whether the true preferences of the 
economic actor will be revealed75 (Heukelom 2009: 140). 
                                                 
75 However, there are some behavioral economists who disagree with the idea of “true” preferences. While some 
 authors argue that true preferences exist –although they can be influenced by elicitation effects–, others argue 
 that the context completely determines the economic actor‟s preferences (cf. Fisschoff 1991). 
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The idea of true preferences that are not always discerned by economic actors 
themselves opens up a two-sided evaluative space for behavioral economics. First, if a 
theoretical distinction is made between true preferences and “inferior choices” (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2003: 140), in actual policy questions, the behavioral economist also has to 
discern between true and misguided preferences. Second, in designing a “choice 
architecture”, the behavioral economist has to decide upon which preferences are to be 
elicited, and to which degree, also with regard to consequences the choice architecture has 
for the freedom of choice of “fully rational” decision makers. 
The central evaluative question underlying this two-sided evaluative space, is from 
which viewpoint the “trueness” of the preferences of economic actors is to be decided. If, 
using Sen‟s example that was related above, someone is really adamant about cutting his 
toes, how is a behavioral economist to determine whether it is truly in this person‟s 
interest? And, if cutting one‟s toes is considered to be undesirable, how far are behavioral 
economists prepared to go in “nudging” the decision-maker to refrain from doing so? 
Apart from being prepared to intervene in the choice process –based on the idea that any 
choice architecture is normative–, the scope of “nudging” (Thaler and Sunstein) or 
“economic therapy” (Loewenstein and Haisley) needs to be determined: is it rather a 
smoothening of the instrumental considerations or is it about determining what truly 
desirable ends are? In the examples that behavioral economists provide, they appear to refer 
to an evaluative idea of “common sense” –for instance in the examples Loewenstein and 
Haisley provide about credit card debt and obesity, quoted at the end of section 3.5. 
Although common sense may sound like a solid point of reference for evaluative 
deliberation, it is a culturally and historically conditioned point of view. Because that what 
counts as common sense is conditioned, it is required that the evaluative criteria that 
determine what is common sense are made explicit, in order to be able to engage in an 
evaluative argument about these matters. Behavioral economists, however, refrain from 
elaborating an evaluative framework. Therefore, although behavioral economists are clearly 
willing to engage in evaluative deliberations about questions of economic policy, it appears 
that they are ambivalent in the determination of the trueness of preferences. Thus, in this 
regard, behavioral economists cannot meet at an equal footing with public theologians, as 
they lack an approach to determine an evaluative orientation in their work. 
The desire of behavioral economists to contribute to questions of economic 
policy, in order to improve the decisions that are made by people, can be considered as an 
evaluative commitment to actual practices in society (for instance, with regard to decisions 
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about health care and retirement savings, cf. Loewenstein, Brennan, and Volpp 2007, 
Benartzi and Thaler 2004). Therefore, it can be argued that behavioral economists want to 
contribute to society through their evaluative orientations on policy concerns, a motivation 
which they share with public theologians. Although the concept “civil society” is not used 
explicitly by behavioral economists, the openness in behavioral economics towards 
evaluative deliberations about the ends of economic policy could be considered as a 
principal openness towards contributing to a viable civil society. Yet, as behavioral 
economists do not explicate an evaluative orientation for the contribution they want to 
make, there still remains a lacuna that needs to be addressed, if public theologians and 
behavioral economists are to meet on an equal footing in contributing to a viable civil 
society. 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter started with the question whether behavioral economics can offer public 
theologians a more promising perspective on creating a connection than neoclassical 
economics, based on the two central interests of public theology, meaning of life and 
contributing to a viable civil society. To this effect, an inquiry was made of the ways in 
which behavioral economists have attempted to integrate meaning in their theory of 
economic behavior. Also, the new perspective with regard to questions of economic policy 
that is proposed by behavioral economists was outlined, in order to test the willingness of 
behavioral economists to provide an evaluative contribution to a viable civil society. 
 The evaluation of the possibility of a connection between public theology and 
behavioral economics in this final section leads to ambiguous results. On the one hand, 
there are behavioral economists who focus directly on meaning (Karlsson et al. 2004, 
Loewenstein 1999), or whose work can be used in understanding meaning in economic 
behavior, for instance by using the concepts “identity” (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2010) 
or “symbolic utility” (Khalil 2000, 2004). A cautionary note with regard to meaning in 
the work of behavioral economists is that the framework of utility maximization still 
appears to function as a benchmark (Davis 2006, Sent 2004, Wijngaards and Sent 2012), 
which may lead to an instrumental understanding of meaning.  
With regard to their interest in improving the economic decisions that people 
make, there is a lacuna in the work of behavioral economists, as they do not outline an 
evaluative approach to determine what the true preferences of people are. Although it is 
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clear that behavioral economists do want to make an evaluative contribution to society, it is 
unclear how the content of this evaluative contribution is to be given shape. 
  However, there are several recent approaches in economic theory that do outline 
evaluative orientations. For example, evolutionary economics, happiness economics, and 
the capability approach explicitly elaborate an evaluative perspective towards economic 
behavior and development. As these approaches apparently go further in developing their 
evaluative perspective, it is relevant to inquire whether they have affinity with public 
theology‟s central interest. But which of these approaches is the most promising in this 
regard? 
  Evolutionary economics focuses on questions of economic progress and 
development, by inquiring how to understand the dynamics of evolving markets (Nelson 
and Winter 2002: 23, cf. Schumpeter 1952). In their “evolutionary” approach, 
evolutionary economists are not necessarily Darwinian (Metcalfe 1998, Witt 2003), 
although they often do use analogies from biology in their explanations76 (Ruth 1996). 
The ultimate end of economic development is “survival”, which is considered as a problem 
in our time77. In their analyses, evolutionary economists often focus on the development of 
economic systems, instead of concentrating on the behavior of the individual. 
 Happiness economics is an approach to economics that seeks to expand the 
perspective on the ultimate ends of economic behavior and development, by arguing that 
these ends are not to be understood in terms of wealth only, but instead should encompass 
happiness (Frey 2008, Frey and Stutzer 2002, Layard 2005). Happiness economists have 
studied, for instance, the effects of income, inequality, unemployment, inflation, and 
economic institutions on the experienced happiness of people (Frey and Stutzer 2002). In 
doing so, they have focused on both happiness at the individual level (Angner 2010) and 
at the national level (Di Tella and MacCulloch 2006). 
                                                 
76 As for instance evolutionary economist Kenneth Boulding (1981) argues: “They, economics and evolution, are 
 both examples of a larger process. [This] evolutionary process always operates through mutation and selection 
 and has involved some distinction between the genotype which mutates and the phenotype which is selected. 
 The process by which the genotype constructs the phenotype may be described as „organization‟. Economic 
 development manifests itself largely in the production of commodities, that is, goods and services. It 
 originates, however, in ideas, plans, and attitudes in the human mind. These are the genotypes in economic 
 development. This whole process indeed can be described as a process in the growth of knowledge. 
 Knowledge and the growth of knowledge, therefore, is the essential key to economic development”.  
77 As evolutionary economist Peter Corning (1996) relates: “Survival is still a problem in the post-war era, 
 especially considering radical changes in the human biological and cultural environment (population growth, 
 resource depletion, globalization trends, and technological advances)”. 
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  The capability approach, which has been developed primarily by economist 
Amartya Sen and philosopher Martha Nussbaum can be considered as “a broad normative 
framework for the evaluation and assessment of individual well-being and social 
arrangements, the design of policies, and proposals about social change in society” 
(Robeyns 2005: 94). The central evaluative focus of the capability approach is on 
“effective freedom”, which encompasses both requirements at the level of agency and at the 
level of opportunities (Gasper 2007), that enable people to pursue the ends they have 
reason to value (Sen 1999). 
 Evolutionary economics, happiness economics, and the capability approach all 
involve an evaluative orientation in their study of economic behavior and development. 
However, both the systemic orientation and the ultimate end of survival make evolutionary 
economics a less suitable candidate. As was related in chapter 1, public theology‟s interest 
in questions of meaning of life focuses on the current individualized society. It can benefit 
most from an economic approach that not only focuses on the level of the system or 
society, but also on the level of the individual. Survival is an end that also holds especially 
at the systemic or aggregate level (i.e., all individuals come to pass away once, but the 
system adapts in order to survive). As was argued in section 1.2, for the individual, the 
opposite of survival –death– is not necessarily a threat to the meaningfulness of life, as it 
are the values that encompass “all of life” that make someone‟s life a meaningful enterprise.  
 Happiness economics and the capability approach, however, do focus on both the 
social and the individual level in formulating their evaluative orientations for economic 
behavior and development. Happiness economics and the capability approach share an 
interest in well-being, and for which they both seek to go beyond subjective notions, and 
instead intend to discern objective criteria (Sen 2008, Angner 2010, Veenhoven 2010). In 
doing so, they go beyond both neoclassical economics (which considers preferences as 
completely subjective) and behavioral economics (which does not explicitly outline criteria, 
for instance in terms of “true” preferences). For these reasons, both happiness economics 
and the capability approach appear to offer a promising perspective with regard to both 
central interests of public theology. Therefore, the next chapter inquires whether happiness 
economics and the capability approach have affinity with the central interests of public 
theology.  
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CHAPTER 4  
 
PUBLIC THEOLOGY, HAPPINESS ECONOMICS  
AND THE CAPABILITY APPROACH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As was argued in the first chapter, it is the goal of this thesis to establish a connection that 
enables the exchange of knowledge between public theology and economics. In order to 
ascertain whether such a connection is a viable possibility, the affinity of several approaches 
to economics is assessed based on public theology‟s two central interests, questions of 
“meaning of life”  and “contributing to a viable civil society”. In the second chapter, it was 
concluded that neoclassical economics has no affinity with these interests, because of the 
framework of utility maximization and the strict positive-normative distinction that 
neoclassical economists use in their work. For this reason, in the previous chapter, it was 
inquired whether behavioral economics could offer a more promising perspective. This 
resulted in both possibilities and limitations. Behavioral economists are explicitly interested 
in reinterpreting the perspective on economic behavior by, for instance, outlining specific 
motivations. In doing so, they go beyond a generic idea of utility maximization as it is used 
in neoclassical economics. Exploratory studies by behavioral economists offer promising 
insights concerning the role of meaning of life in economic behavior. With regard to 
evaluative questions of economic policy, the varieties of “light paternalism” that are 
proposed by behavioral economists show a readiness to engage in evaluative interventions 
in society in order to improve the outcome of economic choice. Behavioral economists 
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thus also challenge the neoclassical positive-normative distinction. Yet, as was argued at the 
end of the previous chapter, while behavioral economists are willing to engage in evaluative 
debates about economic policy, they lack an elaborated evaluative orientation to do so. 
Therefore, behavioral economics appears to be unable to go beyond an instrumental focus 
with regard to questions of contributing to a viable civil society. 
This chapter focuses on two approaches in economic theory that directly address 
the question how an evaluative orientation for economic behavior and development is to be 
given shape. These approaches are happiness economics and the capability approach. 
As was argued at the end of section 3.7, the reason that happiness economics and 
the capability approach are discussed in this chapter is that they both question the 
appropriateness of the traditional focus on utility maximization in neoclassical economics, 
and therefore propose a different perspective on the ultimate end of economic behavior 
(Frey and Stutzer 2002: 402, Di Tella and MacCulloch 2006: 25, Sen 1999: 3). 
Happiness economics and the capability approach both make use of the insights of 
a heterogeneity of disciplinary perspectives (Bruni, Comim, and Pugno 2008, Sen 2008, 
Van Hoorn et al. 2010, Sugden 2008). This shows a readiness to engage in debates that 
transcend disciplinary boundaries78. This attitude towards differing disciplinary viewpoints 
may prove useful in the search for affinity with the central interests of public theology –at 
the very least, it is not likely to hinder a discussion of its central interests.  
Although in each of the previous chapters only one approach to economic theory 
was explored, in this chapter two approaches are discussed. The reason for exploring two 
different approaches in one single chapter is a matter of focus. The question that is to be 
answered in this chapter is whether happiness economics and the capability approach have 
affinity with the central concerns of public theology –as approaches that explicitly discern 
an evaluative orientation for economic behavior and economic policy. That is, happiness 
economics and the capability approach are studied as examples of approaches in economic 
theory that try to provide evaluative orientations for economic behavior and policy. The 
                                                 
78 Happiness economists often engage in debates with scholars from other disciplines, such as psychologists 
 (Kahneman 2003a, 2003b, Seligman 2004, Haidt 2006, Csikszentmihalyi 1990) and sociologists 
 (Veenhoven 2000). In the capability approach, economists (Sen 1999, Bruni et al. 2008, Mabsout 2010) 
 engage in cooperative research with scholars from development studies (Gasper 2006, Alkire 2005), 
 philosophers (Robeyns 2005, Nussbaum 2000), and political scientists (Doyal and Gough 1991). 
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central focus is on the way they outline evaluative orientations, and in doing so, can be 
argued to have affinity with the central interests of public theology79. 
How are the evaluative orientations of happiness economics and the capability 
approach investigated? For each of these two approaches, one exemplary case of how an 
evaluative orientation is elaborated is explored. Each of the selected works contains a 
comprehensive outline of the evaluative orientation of happiness economics and the 
capability approach. By discussing two exemplary cases, the scope of the investigation is 
limited, as however influential or prominent the selected authors are, they can never speak 
for the entire approach. The advantage of this method is that it gives a clear focus to the 
investigation, while not claiming to be exhaustive by presenting a generalized or all-
encompassing perspective. 
There are several examples in which the empirical findings, theoretical perspectives, 
or the evaluative orientations of happiness economics are presented (cf. Frey and Stutzer 
2002, Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2004, Layard 2005, Bruni and Porta 2005). 
Which one of these is to be chosen? The focus of the present chapter is on the elaboration 
of evaluative orientations, and in this regard, Layard (2005) stands out from the others. 
Layard is widely recognized as an influential economist80, and is considered as one of the 
pioneers of happiness economics (Lyubomirksy 2006, Miller 2005, Pilgrim 2008). In 
Happiness: Lessons from a New Science (2005), Layard both recounts the findings of the 
“new science” of happiness, presents a clearly outlined evaluative perspective, and also 
reflects on implementing the results for the benefit of individuals and societies. This work 
will be discussed in section 4.2. 
Although there are several influential authors within the capability approach81, 
Amartya Sen82 is the “founding father” of this approach, and considered its most 
                                                 
79 It is, therefore, explicitly not the intention of this chapter to contrast and compare the relative strengths and 
 weaknesses of happiness economics and the capability approaches in general. 
80 Sir Richard Layard is a renowned British economist who founded the Center for Economic Performance 
 (CEP) at the London School of Economics and published many studies on labor economics and economic 
 policy (Layard 1981, 1996, 2000). Layard‟s work on happiness and well-being dates back to the 1980s 
 (Layard 1980). 
81 See, for instance, Nussbaum 2000, Robeyns 2005, Alkire 2005, Gasper 2006). Each of these authors has 
 formulated their own perspective on the capability approach. Still, Sen‟s account of the capability approach 
 appears to function as a point of reference for all other views. 
82 Sen is an internationally well-known economist, who was awarded the Nobel prize in economics for his work 
 in welfare economics (Sen 1999b). Sen is still one of the main representatives of the capability approach, 
 together with philosopher Martha Nussbaum  (Nussbaum and Sen 1993). 
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influential author (Robeyns 2005, Mabsout 2010). As Sen has published a great number 
of books and articles on the capability approach, which one of these is to be selected? For 
the present chapter, Development as Freedom (1999) is the best option, as it can be 
considered as the accumulation of the works in which he developed the capability 
approach (Sen 1980, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1992, 1993, 1995, cf. Robeyns 2003, Clark 
2005).  Hence, it offers a comprehensive argument for Sen‟s interpretation of the 
capability approach. This work is elaborated upon in section 4.3.  
In summary, this chapter focuses on happiness economics and the capability 
approach as approaches in economic theory that explicitly focus on evaluative orientations 
for economic behavior, in order to explore whether these approaches have affinity with 
public theology‟s central interests. To this effect, first, Richard Layard‟s Happiness: 
Lessons from a New Science (2005) is analyzed (4.2). Second, Amartya Sen‟s 
Development as Freedom (1999) is investigated (4.3). In section 4.4, a reflection is given 
on the question whether happiness economics and the capability approach, as they are 
represented in the work of Richard Layard and Amartya Sen, have affinity with the central 
interests of public theology. Section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2 RICHARD LAYARD‟S HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE 
The starting point for Layard‟s argument is his idea that the neoclassical economic 
approach is insufficient, as it only focuses on wealth83. Therefore, he seeks to enrich this 
approach with “the new psychology of happiness (…), brain science, sociology, and 
philosophy” (Layard 2005: 4). Instead of only making use of the intellectual  resources of 
economics, he argues that “by bringing [these disciplines] together, we can produce a new 
vision of how we can live better, both as social beings and in terms of our inner spirit” 
(Layard 2005: 4). Layard seeks to “improve the human lot” –both at the level of the 
                                                 
83 In the preface to Happiness, Layard relates that “economics equates changes in the happiness of a society with 
 changes in its purchasing power” (Layard 2005: ix). Layard refers to the “Easterlin Paradox”, that was 
 formulated by the economist Richard Easterlin (1974, 1995, 2001, 2002). Based on a comparative study of 
 self-reported happiness (which is often also referred to as “subjective well-being”, cf. Frey and Stutzer 2002, 
 Van Hoorn et al. 2010), Easterlin (1974) concluded that the enormous increase in wealth in rich western 
 countries such as Japan and the USA led to no positive change in the self-reported happiness. On the contrary, 
 for some countries even a decrease in self-reported happiness was found. Happiness researchers Ruut 
 Veenhoven and Michael Hagerty have challenged these findings, and claim instead that an overall increase in 
 happiness can be measured. See Hagerty and Veenhoven 2003. 
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individual and of the society–, by not focusing on wealth only, but by taking up a different 
understanding of happiness. How does he conceive happiness instead? 
 
4.2.1 Layard‟s understanding of happiness: the ultimate goal for both individual and 
society 
Layard considers happiness to be supremely important because it is our overall 
motivational device (Layard 2005: 24). That is, human beings seek to feel good and to 
avoid pain –not on a momentary basis, but overall. As human beings, Layard argues, we are 
constantly confronted with different drives and urges. These drives are not followed upon 
randomly, because there is an “overall evaluation going on that compares how different 
drives contribute to our overall satisfaction” (Layard 2005: 25). This process of evaluation 
often takes place unconsciously, yet, it also involves deliberate planning for the future, 
which sometimes leads people to deny themselves some pleasure in the present for the sake 
of future gratification (Layard 2005: 26). 
 The things that make human beings feel good84, –food, sleep, warmth, sex, etc.– 
are vital for their survival. Therefore, Layard places the desire for feeling good and being 
happy in an evolutionary perspective (Layard 2005: 26-27). The aim of the survival of the 
individual and the species propel human beings forward in the search for the things that 
help in this survival, and the psychological “payoff” is the feeling of happiness. Layard‟s 
approach can be interpreted as a version of the “hedonic psychology” formulated by 
                                                 
84 In line with other scholars who are interested in studying happiness, Layard is an advocate of asking people 
 how happy they are, by using surveys (Layard 2005: 13). Layard admits that, by relying on self-reported 
 accounts of happiness, there is a risk of measuring merely subjective states (Layard 2005: 14-16). He counters 
 the potential skepticism that this kind of data might foster amongst fellow economists by providing several 
 arguments for the objectivity of the states of happiness to which the self-reports refer. First, the self-report of 
 the happiness of a person is closely matched by the happiness ratings for that person by other people (Layard 
 2005: 14). That is, the happiness ratings given by people themselves can be verified intersubjectively. Second, 
 happiness researchers are interested in the actual feelings of happiness, yet Layard stresses that they focus on 
 “long-term average happiness” (Layard 2005: 17). This means that the momentary fluctuations are to be 
 straightened out to show a more general image of someone‟s happiness at a certain point in time. Third, 
 Layard refers to neuroscientific research that has been able to gain insight into which processes take place 
 when someone feels happy or unhappy. In doing so, Layard argues that these findings can provide an objective 
 foundation for feelings of happiness, as they indicate a link between subjectively reported feelings of happiness 
 and objectively verifiable neurological processes (Layard 2005: 17-18). As Layard puts forward, 
 neuroscientists have been able to influence the feelings of happiness by stimulating parts of the brain using 
 powerful magnets (Layard 2005: 18). For these three reasons, Layard is convinced that the subjective reports 
 of feelings of happiness can be based on objective foundations. 
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Daniel Kahneman and others (cf. Kahneman, Diener, and Schwartz 1999), as it focuses 
entirely on the hedonic aspects (i.e., enjoyment, pleasure) of experience. 
 In line with the happiness-unhappiness duality in his psychological understanding 
of happiness, Layard considers Jeremy Bentham‟s utilitarianism as the most suitable 
philosophical tradition to place his own approach in (Layard 2005: 111). He considers 
happiness the “ultimate goal” of human conduct. It is “ultimate”, because “unlike all other 
goods, it is self-evidently good”, as, in his view, there can be no further reasons for striving 
for happiness than happiness itself (Layard 2005: 113). Instead, goods such as health, 
autonomy, and freedom are instrumental goods, as in Layard‟s perspective there can be a 
more ultimate reason for valuing them (Layard 2005: 113) –that is, the feeling of 
happiness. Next to happiness, a second principle that is highly important in Layard‟s 
utilitarian view is “equality”. This entails that the happiness that is to be strived for in a 
society is to be distributed in a fair and equal way: every individual person is equally 
important, and has an equal right to happiness (Layard 2005: 112). Although Layard 
provides an elaborate argument for choosing happiness as a central principle, he does not 
give a similar account of the reasons for adopting equality. He only suggests that through 
“reason”, human beings can “come to value the happiness of everyone equally” (Layard 
2005: 125). Based upon the two principles of happiness and equality, Layard advocates the 
principle of the “Greatest Happiness” (Layard 2005: 111-126): a maximal happiness both 
on the individual and social level85. 
 In order to demarcate his position, Layard argues against (neo-)Aristotelian 
perspectives on happiness. According to Layard, Aristotle believed that the “object of life 
was eudaimonia, or a type of happiness associated with virtuous conduct and philosophical 
reflection” (Layard 2005: 22, italics in original). Layard concedes that people who achieve 
a sense of meaning in their lives –which he associates with purpose, autonomy, and 
personal growth– are happier than people who do not have a similar sense of meaning. 
Still, Layard disagrees with Aristotelian thinkers that this indicates that some types of 
happiness are intrinsically better than others86 (Layard 2005: 23). In contrast with 
                                                 
85 As Layard argues: “The obvious aim is the greatest happiness of all. If we all really pursued that, we should all 
 be less selfish, and we should also be happier. (…) People want to be happy. But we also have a moral sense, 
 which tells us to consider other people as well as ourselves. Our reason helps us think how to do this, so that 
 we come to value the happiness of everyone equally. That should be the rule for private behaviour and public 
 choice.” (Layard 2005: 125). 
86 Layard agrees that, for instance, the pleasure that is given by using drugs and sadist practices should be 
 avoided. Still, he is against the Aristotelian position because it is, in his view, fundamentally paternalist. This is 
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Aristotelian thinkers, who attribute priority to certain sources of happiness, the 
indiscriminate feeling of happiness, combined with an egalitarian perspective on the 
distribution of happiness, is the only point of concern in Layard‟s approach.  
The sole focus on the feeling of happiness as the only important factor in life 
might be considered as an argument to use an “experience machine” like the one that was 
proposed as a thought-experiment by philosopher Robert Nozick (1974: 43). This 
experience machine would be able to deliver any pleasant experience, and even give 
someone the sense of leading an active and conscious life. Although this may sound like 
the ideal solution for achieving maximal happiness, Layard discards Nozick‟s hypothetical 
pleasure machine, as it would cause people to lose their autonomy in real life, and because 
it is too far removed from our actual reality (Layard 2005: 114-115).  
Summarizing, for Layard, happiness is to be understood in a hedonic sense, based 
upon a pleasure/pain duality. Happiness is the ultimate goal, both at the level of the 
individual and for society, which is captured in the principle of the Greatest Happiness. In 
the next two subsections, the focus lies on the achievement of happiness both at the 
individual level, and at the level of a community of individuals who live together in a way 
that equally enables the individual members to attain happiness. 
 
4.2.2 The individual good: determinants of happiness at the individual level 
At the individual level, Layard argues that happiness comes both “from without and 
within” (Layard 2005: 55). In part, the blueprint that is present in the genes of every 
individual person plays an important role. Genes predetermine some factors that influence 
happiness, such as, for instance, the likelihood that psychological problems will arise and 
someone‟s susceptibility for addiction to alcohol and drugs (Layard 2005: 56-58).  
Apart from the genetic blueprints, Layard argues that both the social environment 
and personal freedom and values play a central role in someone‟s happiness. Layard 
identifies five dimensions of life that affect happiness: family relationships, financial 
situation, work, community and friends, and health (Layard 2005: 63). Furthermore, there 
are two other key factors, personal freedom and personal values. Together, these form the 
                                                                                                                                     
 an approach that Layard does not support, as he argues that “no good feeling is bad in itself – it can only be 
 bad because of its consequences” (Layard 2005: 23). 
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“Big Seven” (Layard 2005: 63). The importance of family, community, and friends, and 
the role of personal freedom and values is shortly elaborated upon87. 
Of the five dimensions of life, family and other close relationships are the most 
important determinants of happiness. Marriage, living together, and having children, all 
contribute to someone‟s happiness88. In a similar vein, community and friends are of 
importance because of the social embeddedness that they provide (Layard 2005:68-69). 
Friends are a stable source of happiness, even when other circumstances in life change89. 
 Personal freedom and personal values are also crucial factors in determining 
happiness. Layard relates personal freedom to the political situation in a country, and its 
quality of government. Comparative research indicates that, for instance, differences in the 
entitlement to hold referenda in various cantons in Switzerland, is correlated with the 
happiness of the citizens (Frey and Stutzer 2000, 2002). Layard suggests that the more 
democratic a country is, the more personal freedom the citizens have, which makes them 
happy (Layard 2005: 70). The importance of personal values for happiness is described by 
Layard by using the concepts “inner self” and “philosophy of life” (Layard 2005: 71). By 
training their moods and minds90, people can “learn to appreciate what they have, whatever 
it is” (Layard 2005: 72). 
                                                 
87 In Layard‟s argument, the other factors receive a less prominent place. The financial situation and work are 
 partially related. Having a job in most cases helps someone to acquire the financial means to take care of her 
 needs (Layard 2005: 67-68). Being employed also gives a person a social status, enables social contact with 
 colleagues, and, most importantly, according to Layard, it gives a sense of purpose through setting goals 
 (Layard 2005: 73). Layard argues that health is a less important factor than people tend to think (Layard 
 2005: 69). Although, for instance, severe injury or illness leads to an immediate downward “shock” in 
 happiness, over time, even with sustained disability, the level of happiness returns to its original level, or –
 intriguingly– even improves (Layard 2005: 69, Loewenstein and Schkade 1999). On the other hand, people 
 can never fully adapt to chronic pain or mental illness (Frederick and Loewenstein 1999). 
88 As Layard puts it: “We need other people, and we need to be needed. Increasingly, research confirms the 
 dominating importance of love. People who are in loving relationships with another adult have better 
 hormonal balance and better health” (Layard 2005: 66). 
89 The quality of community is sometimes expressed as “social capital” (Putnam 2000, Atherton 2008). One 
 result of a well-functioning community that has good social capital, is that it engenders trust. This, in turn, is 
 closely related to the reported levels of happiness (Knack 2001, Layard 2005: 68-69). 
90 In Layard‟s perspective, cognitive therapy, Buddhist mindfulness, or the spiritual exercises of St. Ignatius, can 
 all serve as a way to discipline the mind, and find comfort from within (Layard 2005: 72, 187-192). For 
 instance, Layard presents Buddhism as “essentially a psychological practice” (Layard 2005: 192), that aims at 
 eliminating negative thoughts and replacing them with positive ones. By directing its followers towards 
 compassionate behavior and the avoidance of suffering, Buddhism can foster happiness (Layard 2005: 189). 
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 These seven factors, the “Big Seven”, are the main contributors to the individual‟s 
happiness. As Layard points out, these factors almost all contain a social dimension 
(Layard 2005: 125). Layard connects this to his central ideas, which are based on 
utilitarian philosophy: happiness and equality. If the factors contributing to individual 
happiness are known, individual happiness should be available to all members of society in 
an equal sense. As Layard puts it: “our reason helps to think how to do this, so that we 
come to value the happiness of everyone equally” (Layard 2005: 125). Therefore, the 
individual good and the common good appear to be related in Layard‟s perspective. In the 
next subsection, Layard‟s understanding of a common good is explored. 
 
4.2.3 The common good: the principle of the Greatest Happiness 
In his argument on the possibility of a “common good”, Layard relates that various 
schools of thought have challenged the possibility of such a perspective. For instance, in 
Darwin‟s theory of evolution, according to Layard, the focus is on the “survival of the 
fittest”, which leads to a world of “zero-sum games” –i.e., it is a question of either the 
survival of the one, or the survival of the other. Therefore, a “common” interest is simply 
not an option (Layard 2005: 95-96). Other scholars have argued that human beings are 
fundamentally self-interested and anti-social, and that the only possibility for ensuring 
good behavior towards other people is through enforcement by, for instance, courts of law 
or contracts. That is, people are to be forced to cooperate, for fear of being punished 
(Layard 2005: 98-99, cf. Hobbes 1642 and Becker 1981). 
 Against these pessimistic perspectives on the possibility of the common good, 
Layard presents research that proves that “there is more to moral behavior than purely 
rational [self-interested] behavior” (Layard 2005: 100). By far, most people have an innate 
sense of fairness91, and are willing to pursue goals that are not in their self-interest. In a 
similar vein, the happiness that is experienced from giving something away is in many cases 
greater than the happiness experienced from taking or receiving something (Layard 2005: 
104-105). 
  Thus, Layard concludes that there is a potential for achieving a common good, as 
people have a moral sense that directs them towards acts of fairness and commitment 
(Layard 2005: 107-108). It is this moral sense that enables people to strive for goals that 
go beyond their self-interest, and to encompass the interest of others or the community as 
                                                 
91 See, for instance, Henrich et al. 2004, Gintis et al. 2005. 
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a whole (Layard 2005: 179-180). Therefore, Layard sees room for a common good in 
terms of the Greatest Happiness (Layard 2005: 111).  
Having delineated Layard‟s ideas on happiness as the ultimate goal, and explained 
how an individual and common good can be founded on this principle, the final topic that 
is to be discussed is the way Layard translates these perspectives into policy advice. 
 
4.2.4 Questions of economic policy 
Layard considers orthodox neoclassical economics to be highly limited in helping to 
achieve the principle of the Greatest Happiness through policy. According to Layard, 
economics has traditionally analyzed policy questions by using the principle of voluntary 
exchange between self-interested individuals (Layard 2005: 128-129) as the fundamental 
tenet and constituting element of a “free market”. He agrees that such an economic system 
can result in a high level of efficiency (Layard 2005: 129). Yet, efficiency is not Layard‟s 
primary concern, as the “efficient” outcome of a market process of voluntary exchange may 
be both unfair and undesirable92 (Layard 2005: 129). 
 Instead of aiming at maximal efficiency, Layard argues that policies and rules are 
to be directed at the ultimate end, happiness. All rules and regulations that are used to 
implement policy are to contribute to happiness, and are to be judged according to that 
principle (Layard 2005: 124). For example, if a measure that benefits health conflicts with 
a measure that benefits freedom, the matter can be decided by comparing the happiness 
effects of both measures93. Aspects of human existence like health and freedom are ends 
that ultimately are to be directed at achieving happiness. Therefore, based on the principle 
of the Greatest Happiness, a hierarchical relation can be created between different rules, 
regulations, and goals of public policy (Layard 2005: 124). In Layard‟s opinion, this 
approach to policy issues will call for a revolution in both academia and government. 
                                                 
92 As Layard argues: “the most important things that touch us do not reach us through voluntary exchange” 
 (Layard 2005: 231). 
93 Layard offers several suggestions for public policy strategies to help attain higher levels of happiness. One 
 important way is through “education of the spirit” (Layard 2005: 200). Education, as a public good, should 
 be geared at teaching children about understanding and managing their feelings, the appreciation of beauty, 
 love, family values and parenting, political participation, and philosophical and religious ideas. In doing so, an 
 attempt can be made to “encourage more wholesome attitudes and more robust and virtuous characters” 
 (Layard 2005: 200-201). Another way of increasing happiness that is proposed by Layard, is by levying 
 specific taxes, for instance on pollution and income. This can help create a better environment, and a help 
 people achieve a better work-life balance (i.e., the more someone works, the more income is generated, but this 
 does not necessarily makes someone happier, cf. Layard 2005: 152-160). 
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Traditional views, stressing the importance of the growth of GDP and the “sovereignty of 
the consumer” (cf. Lerner 1972) are to be replaced by a perspective that makes happiness 
the central goal of policy (Layard 2005: 145, 147, 152). 
Having explored Layard‟s views on happiness, in the following section, Sen‟s 
perspective on the  capability approach is inquired, as he elaborates it in his Development 
as Freedom (1999). 
 
4.3 AMARTYA SEN‟S DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 
In Development as Freedom (1999), Amartya Sen offers his perspective on human 
development. Sen marks both the great advances that have been made in our times and the 
severe problems that are still present in our societies. On the one hand, many people “live 
in a world of unprecedented opulence”, and in societies that use “democratic and 
participatory governance as the preeminent model of political organization” (Sen 1999: 
xi). On the other hand, many others live a life of poverty, deprivation, destitution, and 
oppression (Sen 1999: xi). Sen searches for ways to address these problems by focusing on 
the different kinds of free agency that enable the individual to counter these afflictions. He 
considers freedom –free choice and the opportunity to exercise one‟s reasoned agency– to 
be the core of human development (Sen 1999: xii). In the following subsections, Sen‟s 
understanding of freedom and the implications for the individual and social good are 
explored. 
 
4.3.1 Freedom as the ultimate end of economic development 
Sen relates that traditionally in economics, the focus has been on wealth in terms of 
matters such as household income and GDP. Instead, Sen argues that wealth is only a 
means to achieve other things. He quotes Aristotle, who says that “wealth is evidently not 
the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else” 
(Aristotle 1980, quoted in Sen 1999: 14). Sen points out that income and wealth are 
therefore “not desirable for their own sake, but (…) are admirable general-purpose means 
for having more freedom to lead the kind of lives we have reason to value” (Sen 1999: 14). 
Sen considers the traditional understanding of development in economics as limited94, and 
                                                 
94 An example of how Sen considers a sole focus on wealth and GDP to be misguided as a standard for 
 development is poverty in affluent countries. (Sen 1999: 20) For instance, during the 1980s, unemployment 
 was relatively high in many Western European countries. Unemployment does not only result in a lack or 
 diminishment of income, but also leads to social exclusion, loss of self-reliance and self-confidence, and to 
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therefore seeks to go beyond it the by claiming that “an adequate conception of 
development must go beyond the accumulation of wealth and the growth of gross national 
product and other income-related variables” (Sen 1999: 14).  
 Instead of focusing on the means of development only, Sen proposes to also 
concentrate on the end that makes development important for human beings: the 
expansion of “substantive freedom” (Sen 1999: 3). The expansion of substantive freedom 
–the freedom to pursue the ends someone has reason to value– is enabled by instrumental 
freedoms, such as political and economic freedom. Sen argues that as these instrumental 
freedoms are “the constituent components of development, their relevance for 
development does not have to be freshly established through their indirect contribution to 
the growth of GDP” (Sen 1999: 5). Therefore, in Sen‟s argument, a connectedness 
between freedom as an end and freedom as a means can be discerned. In Sen‟s approach to 
development “the intrinsic importance of human freedom, in general, as the preeminent 
objective of development, is strongly supplemented by the instrumental effectiveness of 
freedoms of particular kinds to promote freedoms of other kinds” (Sen 1999: xii). 
Sen argues that his freedom-centered view of economic development is an agent-
oriented view (Sen 1999: 11). For Sen, an “agent” is “someone who acts and brings about 
change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives” 
(Sen 1999: 19). The “freedom to bring about change” encompasses both the processes 
that allow freedom of actions and decisions, and the actual opportunities that people have, 
given their social circumstances95 (Sen 1999: 17). 
Although he does not claim to provide an exhaustive overview, Sen distinguishes 
between five “instrumental freedoms” –instrumental, in the sense that they enable the 
agent to act upon her situation in order to pursue her values and objectives. These are: 
political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and 
protective security (Sen 1999: 10). Each of these instrumental freedoms is discussed 
shortly. 
                                                                                                                                     
 psychological and physical health problems (Sen 1999: 21). Using GDP –which tends to be relatively high in 
 Western European countries–as the sole benchmark for development can thus mask problems that are present 
 in relatively wealthy countries. 
95 Sen provides examples of how both processes and opportunities can lead to (un)freedom in someone‟s agency. 
 For instance, voting rights and other civil liberties can allow people to engage in and contribute to political 
 processes, through which they can attempt to realize objectives that are valuable to them. Another example of 
 the elementary opportunity to exercise free agency is being able to escape premature mortality or involuntary 
 starvation, by being provided with sufficient food and adequate health services (Sen 1999: 17). 
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 First, political freedoms reflect the opportunity to determine who should govern, 
to scrutinize and criticize authorities, and to enjoy the freedom of uncensored press and 
political expression (Sen 1999: 38). According to Sen, these are examples of entitlements 
that are associated with democracy, in the broadest sense of the term. 
 Second, economic facilities refer to the range of opportunities that allow 
individuals to “utilize economic resources for consumption, production, and exchange” 
(Sen 1999: 39). These encompass, for instance, the resources available for use and the 
conditions of (market) exchange. Sen notes that in addition to questions of the aggregate 
wealth of a society, also, the questions of distribution in terms of the economic 
entitlements of individuals are of importance (Sen 1999: 39). 
 Third, social opportunities are matters such as education and health care. These 
institutional arrangements represent both a precondition for agency (in terms of, for 
instance, health), and the features that allow people to participate in a more effective way 
(such as, being able to read and write) (Sen 1999: 39). 
 Fourth, Sen argues that trust and openness, which he refers to as “transparency 
guarantees”, are vital conditions for agency in a well-operating society. Corruption and 
underhand dealings are examples that reflect a lack of openness and trustworthiness, and 
are notorious for their detrimental effect on development (Sen 1999: 39-40). 
 Fifth, by “protective security”, Sen points to the need to have some kind of 
assurance that basic necessities are provided for when an individual agent encounters dire 
problems, and is unable to take care of these matters herself. Sen gives examples of both 
fixed institutional arrangements, such as a “social safety net”, and ad hoc measures such as 
famine relief or public employment (Sen 1999: 40). 
 Sen argues that these aspects of freedom are both interrelated and 
complementary96. Having outlined Sen‟s perspective of freedom, the next subsection 
                                                 
96 Sen uses a comparison between India and China to illustrate this point. Both China and India are engaged in a 
 process of changing their economy towards an open, internationally active, market-oriented economy (China 
 from 1979, India from 1991, Sen 1999: 42). At the moment of turning to a market-oriented economy, China 
 had two distinct advantages in comparison with India: a relatively high level of education, and well-
 functioning health-services. The social opportunities of education and health care enabled a more widespread 
 market-oriented economic development in China than in India (Sen 1999: 42). The greater degree of political 
 freedom in India, however, can be connected with the absence of famines in India since 1947. China, in 
 contrast, did suffer from massive famines, for instance in the 1960s. Sen attributes this difference between 
 China and India to the “protective power of democracy”: democracy allows for a greater flexibility of 
 economic policy, and a more adequate responsiveness of public action to social crises and unforeseen disasters 
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focuses on the way Sen criticizes the traditional focus in economics on income, and 
translates his perspective of freedom into a new viewpoint on economic behavior and 
development.  
 
4.3.2 Freedom: The actual living people manage to achieve or are free to achieve 
Sen analyzes the perspective of economic behavior based upon the idea that utility97 is a 
reflection of someone‟s preferences –which, in his view, is still widely used in economics 
nowadays– as follows (Sen 1999: 68-69). The economic actor has a set of well-defined 
preferences, which can be translated into a “demand function”, which is a mathematical 
relation between the individual actor‟s demand for different goods. The economic actor is 
confronted with different “commodity bundles”: different configurations of quantities of 
goods, from which she can choose. Given her preferences, the economic actor chooses a 
commodity bundle that optimally resembles the relation between different goods as it is 
specified in her demand function. The chosen commodity bundle stands for the utility 
generated from the economic choice. Sen refers to this perspective as the “commodity 
basis” of utility (Sen 1999: 69). In short, according to this utilitarian economic 
perspective, the commodity bundle that someone acquires, reflects her utility or well-being. 
 Sen argues that in this understanding of the relation between economic action and 
utility, the only determinant of well-being is real income, as income determines the size of 
the commodity bundle that can be acquired, which in turn determines utility (Sen 1999: 
69). Although most economists understand economic choice in this way, Sen discerns 
several reasons98 that challenge the sole focus on real income as a determinant of utility 
                                                                                                                                     
 (Sen 1999: 43). By elaborating this example, Sen highlights the interconnectedness and complementarity of 
 social opportunities and economic facilities, political freedom, and protective security. 
97 Sen relates that early utilitarian philosophers defined the notion “utility” as happiness, pleasure, or fulfillment 
 of desire. However, in the twentieth century, a change occurred in the understanding of utility. 
 Methodological positivists, such as economist Lionel Robbins, issued an attack on the idea of “interpersonal 
 comparisons” of utility between different individuals. Robbins, quoting W.S. Jevons, argued that “every mind 
 is inscrutable to every other mind and no common denominator of feelings is possible” (Robbins 1938: 636, 
 quoted in Sen 1999: 67). For this reason, utility came to be interpreted as a representation of someone‟s 
 preferences, rather than experienced happiness or pleasure (Sen 1999: 68, cf. Loewenstein 1999, sections 2.1, 
 2.3, 3.3 and 3.5). 
98 These are the influence of personal heterogeneities (age, gender, illness, or physical disability), on the way 
 income can be used; environmental circumstances, (climate, presence of infectious diseases, and pollution); 
 social conditions (public education, prevalence of crime, and the nature of community relationships); 
 differences in relational perspectives (conventions and customs that connect financial resources with social 
 status); and the distribution of income within a family or household (Sen 1999: 70-71). 
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(Sen 1999: 70-71). Therefore, according to Sen, real income –as it is used by most 
economists, both at the individual level and in terms of an aggregated GDP– can provide 
only “a limited guide to welfare and the quality of life” (Sen 1999: 71). If real income is 
not an appropriate indicator of well-being or quality of life, how does Sen provide an 
alternative, based on his perspective of “development as freedom”?  
In Sen‟s view, in the study of human development, an economist should take the 
viewpoint of the “actual living that people manage to achieve (…), or the freedom to 
achieve actual livings that one can have reason to value” (Sen 1999: 73, italics in original). 
By taking the realized or potential actual living as the focus of his analysis, Sen can go 
beyond the traditional account of development in terms of income or other means of good 
living, towards the question what the possibilities for a good living actually are for people. 
Thus Sen seeks to include a great variety of influences in order to improve the 
understanding of the relation between income and actual well-being (1999: 72-73). 
 Sen connects his interest in the lives that people actually lead to earlier perspectives 
on the  human good that have argued in a similar vein. For instance, Aristotle claimed that 
it was necessary to “first ascertain the function of man”, the various things someone can do 
or be, in order to inquire the “life in the sense of activity” as the starting point of 
evaluative analysis (Aristotle 1980, Sen 1999: 73, 308). Within economics, Sen notes that 
Adam Smith was one of the economists who was interested in the actual capability to 
realize certain modes of living. As Sen puts it: “What counts as a „necessity‟ in society is to 
be determined, in Smithian analysis, by its need to generate some minimally required 
freedoms, such as the ability to appear in public without shame, or to take part in the life 
of the community” (Sen 1999: 73). Therefore, Smith did not solely focus on the income 
that was available to people, but also on the possibilities that people had to achieve actual 
states of being. 
 In order to be able to translate his evaluative approach to development in terms of 
the expansion of substantive freedoms to concrete situations, Sen uses several concepts, 
three of which are shortly discussed here (Sen 1999: 74-75). 
First, there are the personal characteristics and circumstances that govern the 
conversion of means of good living into the person‟s ability to promote her ends. These are 
the “conversion factors”, such as personal health, (dis)ability, and age, that determine how 
effectively a bundle of goods can be used to establish a desired level of well-being (Sen 
1999: 74). 
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 Second, Sen uses “functionings” to denote the “various things a person may value 
doing or being”, which encompass “elementary ones, such as being adequately nourished 
and being free from avoidable disease, to very complex activities or personal states, such as 
being able to take part in the life of community and having self-respect” (Sen 1999: 73). 
Sen notes that this concept has distinct Aristotelian roots, as the quotation of Aristotle 
above indicates. 
 Third, the concept “capability” reflects the alternative combinations of 
functionings that are feasible for someone to achieve. As Sen explains, this makes capability 
a specific kind of freedom: capability entails “the substantive freedom to achieve alternative 
functioning combinations” (Sen 1999: 75). Or, as he puts it less formally, “the freedom to 
achieve various lifestyles” (Sen 1999: 75). 
 With the help of these concepts, Sen claims that his capability approach can be 
used to evaluate either “realized functionings (the actions someone can actually do) or the 
capability set of alternatives (someone‟s opportunities)” (Sen 1999: 75). In order to 
explain the two different evaluative foci, Sen marks the difference between a person who is 
fasting and a person who is forced to starve to death (Sen 1999: 76). Although both 
persons share the same functioning (i.e., not consuming any food), the fasting person has 
alternatives to her fasting, while the other person does not have the freedom to choose 
otherwise. In this respect, Sen argues that the capability approach can illustrate that  
having a choice between different options “itself can be seen as a valuable functioning” 
(Sen 1999: 76). 
 This subsection has discussed how Sen translates his perspective of freedom to his 
interpretation of human development as the expansion of substantive freedoms, and the 
concepts he formulates to discern and interpret actual situations of action and opportunity. 
The next subsection explores how the general idea of the expansion of substantive 
freedoms can be used to formulate a perspective of an individual and a common good. 
 
4.3.3 The individual and social good: evaluative reasoning and the pluralist public realm of 
a democracy 
Although he has often been pressed to formulate a “list” of basic goods, rights, and 
necessities in which the “individual good” is summarized, Sen has always refused to give 
such a specific overview (Sen 2004b). In Development as Freedom, Sen does give some 
general indications of capabilities that represent elementary substantive freedoms, such as 
“being able to avoid such deprivations as starvation, undernourishment, escapable 
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morbidity and premature mortality as well as freedoms that are associated with being 
literate and numerate, enjoying political participation and uncensored speech” (Sen 1999: 
36). These capabilities can be perceived as “basic”, in the sense that they are necessary for 
pursuing other ends in a human society. As Sen repeatedly puts it, the individual is to be 
able to strive for the ends “she has reason to value” (Sen 1999: xii, 4, 10, 14, 74, 77-78).  
This might appear to leave, in principle, all options open. Yet, Sen qualifies the 
“evaluation” by the individual, by stressing that it are the objectives she has reason to value. 
Sen explicitly argues that –apart from following evolutionary motivations and norms 
established by convention–, human beings are capable of “reflection and analysis” which 
may lead to the emergence of the “values that influence us” (Sen 1999: 272-273). 
Therefore, Sen suggests that reasoned reflection has to take place before ends and 
objectives are selected. One important example of this kind of reasoned evaluative 
reflection for the “individual good” is what Sen describes as “individual freedom as a social 
commitment” (Sen 1999: 282). As Sen argues, the freedom of every individual should be a 
concern for all members of a community or society. It should even be a “commitment”, 
that is, a concern that has nothing to do with someone‟s self-interest. Through such a 
commitment without personal advantages, the freedom of each individual can be 
reflectively guaranteed (Sen 1999: 270-274, 282-285). Thus, although Sen stresses the 
importance of the freedom of individual reasoned agency, he also stresses that there is a 
“deep complementarity between individual agency and social arrangements” (Sen 1999: 
xii). That is, the freedom of the individual cannot be thought without, and is deeply 
dependent on, social relations. 
 How does Sen relate the individual good to a social or “common” good? Sen 
points to the importance of reflection about how different aspects of someone‟s well-being 
are to be evaluated at the individual level. At the social level, he argues that a reasoned 
“consensus” of some kind is needed (Sen 1999: 78). In this exercise of “social choice”, the 
weight or a range of weights have to be identified as standards for evaluation (Sen 1999: 
78-79). 
 Sen argues that an important difference in this regard is whether these weights are 
determined through “democracy” or “technocracy” (Sen 1999: 79). Although Sen shows 
some consideration for technocratic tendencies because of the “messiness” of democratic 
processes, he distinctly chooses for the democratic option: 
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a choice procedure that relies on a democratic search for agreement or a consensus 
can be extremely messy, and many technocrats are sufficiently disgusted by its 
messiness to pine for some wonderful formula that would simply give us ready-
made weights that are “just right”. However, no such magic formula does, of 
course, exist, since the issue of weighting is one of valuation and judgment, and not 
one of impersonal technology (Sen 1999: 79). 
 
In line with his argument against a “technocratic” determination of “ready-made weights”, 
Sen argues against the idea that real income and market-based prices are the only possible 
metric for making such evaluations. As he puts it:  
 
in this context, the fact that market-price-based evaluation of utility from 
commodity bundles gives the misleading impression –at least to some– that an 
already available “operational metric” has been preselected for evaluative use is a 
limitation rather than an asset (Sen 1999: 80, italics in original). 
 
In Sen‟s view, if, in a democratic system, all members of a society are to be seriously 
involved in the scrutiny of the “weights” for social evaluation, such implicit values as real 
income or exchange value are to be made explicit –as choices for a certain evaluative metric, 
that can be discarded if deemed necessary. In his words,  
 
there is thus a strong methodological case for emphasizing the need to assign 
explicitly evaluative weights to different components of quality of life (or of well-
being) and then to place the chosen weights for open public discussion and critical 
scrutiny. (…) The real issue is whether we can use some criteria that would have 
greater public support, for evaluative purposes, than the crude indicators often 
recommended on allegedly technological grounds, such as real-income measures 
(Sen 1999: 81). 
 
In order to enable the possibility of an evaluative framework, with regard to the standards 
and metric of evaluation, Sen claims that his capability approach is “inescapably pluralist” 
(Sen 1999: 76). Although, according to Sen, this might seem to be an embarrassing fact to 
some, he considers it a necessity in a democratic society, and criticizes approaches that 
limit themselves to a single metric. As he puts it: 
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to insist that there should be only one homogeneous magnitude that we value is to 
reduce drastically the range of our evaluative reasoning. (…) To insist on the 
mechanical comfort of having just one homogeneous “good thing” would be to 
deny our humanity as reasoning creatures (Sen 1999: 77) 
 
Sen points to the limits of, for instance, utilitarianism, which does outline a “Royal road” 
for evaluation (Sen 1999: 85). Utilitarianism considers “maximal utility” or “pleasure” as 
the highest goal in all matters of evaluation. Sen, on the contrary, argues that “the priorities 
in deciding what should be at the core of our normative concern” are to be a matter of 
public and democratic debate (Sen 1999: 81, 85). 
 
4.4 EVALUATION: PUBLIC THEOLOGY, HAPPINESS ECONOMICS AND THE CAPABILITY 
APPROACH 
At the beginning of this chapter, it was related that behavioral economics offers 
possibilities of incorporating meaning in its theory of economic behavior, but does not 
elaborate an explicit evaluative orientation for economic behavior and development. 
Therefore, it was argued that it was necessary the affinity of two other approaches that do 
outline an explicit evaluative orientation with the central interests of public theology: 
happiness economics and the capability approach (4.1). Each of the two approaches was 
explored by means of an exemplary case, Richard Layard‟s Happiness for the happiness 
approach (4.2), and Amartya Sen‟s Development as Freedom for the capability approach 
(4.3). In this final section, the central question is whether happiness economics and the 
capability approach –as approaches that explicitly outline an evaluative orientation for 
economic behavior and development–, have affinity with the central interests of public 
theology. 
 The first step that is taken to answer this question is an analysis of the arguments 
that Layard and Sen elaborate with regard to the evaluative orientations for economic 
behavior and policy. In the second step, their line of argument is related to the two central 
concerns of public theology, “questions meaning of life” and “contributing to a viable civil 
society” (cf. section 1.3). Based on the findings of the second step, it is concluded whether 
happiness economics and the capability approach –as presented in the exemplary cases of 
Layard‟s Happiness and Sen‟s Development as Freedom– have affinity with the central 
interests of public theology.  
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4.4.1 The central line of argument in Layard‟s “Happiness”: Hedonist Utilitarianism 
Layard begins his concluding chapter, in which he wraps up his most important findings 
and recommendations, with the following quotation: 
 
“Nature, Mr. Allnut, is what we are put into this world to rise above”  
(Katherine Hepburn to Humphrey Bogart in 
The African Queen, Layard 2005: 223) 
 
The starting point of many of Layard‟s arguments lies in the sphere of evolutionary, 
biological, and neuroscientific ideas and findings. These provide the foundational ideas for 
what human beings are and where they “come from”. Human beings cannot shed their 
biological heritage, and are thus beings who have both positive and negative experiences. 
The insights provided by the scholars who are working together in their research on 
happiness (neuroscientists, psychologists, sociologists, economists, etc.) can help in 
mastering “nature” by showing a way to less negative experiences (unhappiness, suffering) 
and to more positive experiences (happiness).  
To this effect, Layard relates that scientists claim to have discovered what 
happiness is: it consists in activity in a specific part in the brain. Also, happiness researchers 
have formulated a list of the things that make people happy in their life (the “Big Seven”). 
These are matters like family, friends, good health, and political freedom and religion. 
These are the scientific findings that can help people transcend their natural heritage, by 
increasing happiness and relieving suffering. Thus, in Layard‟s interpretation of happiness 
economics, it is known what human beings are, what human beings want, and what ways 
there are to achieve the things human beings want. Based on these findings, it is the task of 
scholars and government to help people achieve the “Greatest Happiness”.  
 In summary, Layard argues that all matters that are of concern to human beings 
are to be viewed in light of their effect on the experienced happiness of people, as 
happiness is the ultimate goal. As he puts it:  
 
happiness is that ultimate goal because, unlike all other goals, it is self-evidently 
good. If we are asked why happiness matters, we can give no further, external 
reason. It just obviously does matter (Layard 2005: 113).  
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By considering happiness –in the sense of pleasant experience– as the ultimate goal, Layard 
connects his work to the utilitarian tradition of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and 
others (Layard 2005: 4-5). As Layard‟s perspective focuses on happiness as an effect or 
experience, his approach can be qualified as “hedonist” (Layard 2005: 20-22). Therefore, 
his fundamental line of argument can be characterized as “hedonist utilitarianism” (Layard 
2005: 4-6, 20-22). 
 
4.4.2 Layard‟s hedonist utilitarianism and “meaning of life”  
Layard argues that all that is ultimately of importance is the feeling of happiness, albeit 
measured over a longer period of time. This line of thought leads to a limited view on 
questions of meaning of life. By elaborating two examples, it can be illustrated how 
Layard‟s argument runs the risk of becoming reductionist. 
First, in Chapter 3, an example that explains the limited relation between the 
(long-term) experience of happiness and meaning of life was presented. Behavioral 
economist George Loewenstein (2007) reflects on the fact that, on average, people who 
have children, report a lower level of “overall happiness” than people of the same age who 
do not have children. From a perspective that only considers the experience of happiness as 
ultimately of importance, people without children are better off. Yet, although the “lows” 
in experienced happiness (worrying about children when they are sick, about their future, 
etc.) apparently offset the positive experiences (children helping one another, expressing 
their love to a parent), and thus shift the overall balance of happiness to the negative (i.e. 
compared to the levels of self-reported happiness of people without children), 
Loewenstein, rhetorically, wonders whether this would be a reason for people to –in 
retrospect– question their decision to try to have children. That is, if the scope of 
evaluative criteria is limited to the experience of happiness, certain factors that do 
contribute to the meaning of someone‟s life, but do not contribute to her experiences of 
happiness, cannot be accounted for. Experiences that do not fall under Layard‟s category of 
“happy experiences” may prove to be meaningful, but are left out if the experience of 
happiness is the only category that can be qualified as ultimate. 
 Second, in discussing “philosophies of life” as one of the “Big Seven”, Layard 
considers them to be a contributing factor to experienced happiness. For instance, Layard 
describes Buddhism as “essentially a psychological practice” (Layard 2005: 192) that is 
geared at increasing the experience of happiness (Layard 2005: 189). The accuracy of this 
interpretation of Buddhism is questionable. The idea that Buddhism is a “psychological 
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practice” might arise if one only takes into account the books that can be found in the 
esoteric and “self-help” sections in a bookstore in Europe or the United States, or the Zen-
meditation courses that companies offer to employees (Van der Velde 2009). Yet, if a 
more encompassing observation of the teachings, traditions, and practices of Buddhism is 
made (for instance, see Bechert and Gombrich 1991, Van der Velde 2010a, 2010b), it is 
impossible to defend the idea that its end consists in achieving an accumulation of pleasant 
feelings in life. Although it is difficult to make generalized statements about a world 
religion such as Buddhism, the teachings of the Buddha can be said to aim at finding a 
“Middle Path” (Harvey 1998). The Buddhist “Middle Path” does not consist in seeking 
hedonic experiences only, but rather in finding a way between the extremes of ascetism and 
indulging in hedonic pleasures, in order to attain a life without the “fires” of desire and 
attachment (Harvey 1998). By treating Buddhism as a “psychological practice” directed at 
achieving hedonic pleasure only, Layard strongly reduces the scope of Buddhism as a 
religion, and makes a questionable reinterpretation of the content of the message of the 
Buddha, in order to make religion (or “philosophy of life”) fit his hedonist utilitarian 
approach to happiness. In doing so, Layard misrepresents the evaluative directedness of 
Buddhism, –the Middle Path, which shapes the horizon of ultimate meaning for 
Buddhists– in terms of  hedonic experiences (a similar point can be made with regard to 
Layard‟s reference to St. Ignatius of Loyola‟s Spiritual Exercises, cf. Layard 2005: 187-
192). 
 These two examples show that Layard‟s focus on the experience of happiness leads 
to a limited perspective on meaning of life. From his perspective of hedonist utilitarianism, 
Layard can only account for meaning of life as an accumulation of happiness, while the 
example provided by Loewenstein indicates that there is more to meaning of life than the 
hedonic experience of happiness. Also, Layard reduces the scope and message of, for 
instance, a religious tradition such as Buddhism. By making it a “psychological practice” 
geared at making people feel happy, the message of Buddhism is –at best– selectively 
represented, but is no genuine representation of its views of meaning of life. 
 This critical review of Layard‟s views on happiness in relation to meaning of life is 
not intended to “shut all doors” between happiness economics and a discussion of 
questions of meaning of life. Layard shows a genuine and elaborate interest in values, 
philosophies of life, and religion, in his discussion of the “Big Seven”.  Happiness can be 
argued to be an important topic when it comes to meaning of life (cf. Aquinas 2006), but 
a reductionist line of reasoning that makes all things in life subservient to the experience of 
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happiness, does not allow for other values to be part of someone‟s ultimate horizon of 
meaning. Therefore, if the strict focus on happiness as a pleasant experience were to be 
loosened, and room was created for other interpretations of happiness, this would enable a 
more promising account of meaning of life in happiness economics. 
 
4.4.3 Layard‟s hedonist utilitarianism and “contributing a viable civil society” 
Layard‟s hedonist utilitarianism has the experience of happiness of the individual as its 
primarily focus. Still, Layard is concerned with many questions that go beyond the interest 
of the individual, and are a matter of a social or common good, as “people are calling out 
for a concept of the common good” (Layard 2005: 5). Layard presents the principle of the 
“Greatest Happiness” as the shared ultimate goal for a community or society (Layard 
2005: 111-125). Some of Layard‟s arguments appear to be geared at creating a public 
sphere that allows for free and critical citizenship in which people can contribute to a 
greater good that goes beyond their own interests. Yet, the arguments that he provides are 
not strictly conducive to his ultimate goal of the Greatest Happiness. 
 For instance, when it comes to the issue of equality and fairness, Layard discusses 
an example in which an “impartial spectator” is to redistribute happiness between a happy 
person and a miserable person. The question is whether this impartial spectator would 
make the miserable person (even) unhappier, in order to give the happy person a relatively 
greater increase in happiness. If, from a hedonist utilitarian perspective, only the total 
magnitude of experienced happiness is considered, an impartial spectator is to do this, as 
the total happiness increases by this action. Yet, Layard argues that  
 
the impartial spectator would surely care more about what happened to the 
miserable person than to the person who was already happy. He would therefore 
give a different “weight” to changes in happiness according to how happy the 
person was already. But how much weight? That is a value judgment. 
 
and therefore concludes that 
 
the time is ripe for a serious debate on the “weights” to be given to changes in 
happiness when people differ in their existing level of happiness (Layard 2005: 
122). 
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This “serious debate on the weights to be given to changes in happiness” appears to be 
unrelated to Layard‟s fundamental line of argument of hedonist utilitarianism, as the only 
“weight” that –strictly– can be invoked from the perspective of the “Greatest Happiness” 
is the overall magnitude of happiness99. 
 The ambiguity that Layard displays regarding his “hedonist utilitarianism” 
(Layard 2005: 4-6, 20-22) comes to the fore in other parts of his argument about the 
public sphere as well. For instance, he sounds like a true Aristotelian when speaking about 
the importance of “robust and virtuous characters” to be shaped by good public education 
(Layard 2005: 201). Also, his reasoning sometimes is deontological, for instance, when 
making a connection between the individual and common good (Layard 2005: 125). 
Therefore, although Layard‟s fundamental line of argument is hedonist utilitarianism, his 
reasoning, at times, goes beyond the sole focus on the experience of happiness as the 
ultimate good. It appears as if Layard implicitly ascertains that only considering the 
experience of happiness as a guiding value is not sufficient as an ultimate end. 
 
4.4.4 Public theology and Layard‟s hedonist utilitarianism 
In summary, in his central line of argument, Layard is unable to give a satisfactory account 
of “meaning of life”, and diverts from this central line when considering a “viable civil 
society”. For these reasons, it is doubtful whether Layard‟s account of the happiness 
economics has affinity with the central interests of public theology. The sole focus on the 
experience of happiness appears to provide a too narrow view of the concerns that are at 
stake in both “meaning of life” and a “viable civil society” to be able to speak of a true 
affinity with the central concerns of public theology. 
Although Layard seems to implicitly realize the limits of his focus on experienced 
happiness, other influential representatives of happiness economics have explicitly 
acknowledged that there is indeed more to life than the experience of happiness. As Daniel 
Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz (1999) argue,  
 
                                                 
99 Layard‟s perspective of the “Greatest Happiness” might be interpreted as a concern for the most efficient 
 achievement of happiness (i.e., a maximization of happiness based upon the most efficient allocation of 
 resources). This would be in line with the (neoclassical) Kaldor-Hicks criterion, that was discussed in section 
 2.4. Yet, Layard appears to argue that the concern for efficiency (that is achieved, for instance, by making a 
 happy person even happier and at the same time making a miserable person even more miserable) is not to be 
 decisive. Nevertheless, he does not outline evaluative criteria that are to determine the weight of the changes in 
 happiness. 
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any evaluation of quality of life is embedded in the cultural and social context of 
both the subject and the evaluator. Alternative views of what constitutes a good 
life must be part of the analysis. In particular, the serious student of well-being 
soon discovers that quality of life cannot be reduced to the balance of pleasure and 
pain, or to assessments of subjective life-satisfaction; other values contribute to the 
judgment (Kahneman et al. 1999: x). 
 
The critical evaluation of Layard‟s argument in this subsection is, of course, not intended 
to thwart his –undoubtedly– noble intentions, nor to cast doubt on the many crucial 
insights that Layard provides regarding the ways that people can be made happier. The 
points made here are merely aimed at considering the affinity with public theology‟s central 
interests, based on the relation between Layard‟s basic line of argument and “meaning of 
life” and “a viable civil society”. 
 
4.4.5 The central line of argument in Sen‟s “Development as Freedom”: The perspective 
of freedom 
Sen also uses a quotation to pinpoint the distinctive element of his approach at the end of 
his Development as Freedom: 
 
“Freedom has a thousand charms to show, That slaves, howe‟er contented, never 
know”  
(Cowper, quoted in Sen 1999: 298) 
 
The core of Sen‟s argument is that by focusing on substantive freedom, a perspective can 
be given on what human (economic) development fundamentally encompasses. This 
perspective goes beyond other accounts that focus on, for instance, income or utility 
(“contentment”) as the only metric that is used to measure development.  Substantive 
freedom is defined as the freedom to pursue ends that someone has reason to value (Sen 
1999: xii, 4, 10, 14, 74, 77-78). This freedom is given shape in a “reasoned agency”, in 
which someone acts upon her actual functionings and possibilities to realize new 
functionings. Substantive freedom is interrelated with several instrumental freedoms –such 
as political, social, and economic freedom–, that allow someone to enact her substantive 
freedom, and which, in turn, are reinforced by substantive freedom. 
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 Sen‟s focus on development as freedom is conjoined by a perspective on society as 
a pluralistic democracy. In a pluralist democracy, people from various backgrounds and 
with different aims in life participate through their political, social, and economic 
freedoms, in order to realize the ends they have reason to value. 
 Apart from acknowledging the crucial importance of substantive and instrumental 
freedoms, Sen does not outline a “Royal road” with regard to a concrete metric for a 
homogeneous evaluation of all possible ends, both at the individual and social level. At the 
individual level, Sen considers a person‟s capacity to exercise reason as the principal way of 
determining what is valuable. At the social level, Sen argues that “the priorities in deciding 
what should be at the core of our normative concern” are to be a matter of public and 
democratic debate (Sen 1999: 81, 85). In the following subsections, the implications for 
the question of meaning of life and the question of a viable civil society are reflected upon. 
 
4.4.6 Sen‟s perspective of freedom and “meaning of life” 
As was remarked above, Sen is hesitant to outline specific human needs in a “list”, except 
for some basic matters such as sufficient food, clothing, and housing, that are to enable 
someone to pursue the ends she has reason to value100. This might seem to suggest that as 
soon as some basic needs are met, Sen does not describe anything more specific about the 
content of the ends that are to strived for, which might lead to a sense of a randomness 
that excludes the “directedness” that was discerned as constitutive for meaning of life in 
Chapter 1. Yet, he adds a crucial qualification to his notion of the pursuit of ends. It is to 
be a reasoned pursuit of ends, in the sense that there is to be evaluative deliberation about 
the ends that are to be chosen. Therefore, unlike neoclassical economists who perceive the 
preferences of economic actors as “given” inputs for economic action (Stigler and Becker 
1977), Sen explicitly considers evaluative reasoning to be part of that action. In fact, Sen 
was one of the first economists who criticized the dominant understanding of rationality as 
too narrowly concerned with instrumental considerations (Sen 1977, 1995, Pauer-Studer 
2007). Still, he does not want to predetermine the content of the evaluative arguments by 
means of a “metric”, such as “the feeling of happiness” in Layard‟s argument. Instead, Sen 
leaves a fundamental openness towards the ends that are to be pursued –except for the fact 
that someone‟s sense of reason must be able to validate them. 
                                                 
100 It is at this point that Sen has received the most criticism on his capability approach. See, for instance 
 (Williams, 1987: 96, Nussbaum 1988: 176, Qizilbash 1998: 54, Sugden 1993: 1952-1953). 
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 How does this combination of an openness regarding the specific content of the 
ends that are to be pursued and the claim that the way these ends are to be founded is to 
be based on evaluative reason, fare with the concept “meaning of life” as it was presented 
in chapter 1? In section 1.2, an account of meaning of life in terms of a directedness to 
ultimate values that are “larger than life” was given. As Sen displays an openness regarding 
the content of the ends, he leaves ample space for the consideration of ultimate values in an 
evaluative argument. Furthermore, Sen repeatedly stresses the role of evaluative reasoning 
in substantive freedom, and in his thought on rationality –implicitly101– seeks to go 
beyond instrumental (or means-ends) rationality (Pauer-Studer 2007), which opens the 
possibility of an understanding of “the pursuit of ends” as an evaluative orientation in line 
with a “value rationality” in terms of which Weber considered questions of meaning of life 
–that is, because of the intrinsic goodness or rightness of the ends that are to be pursued. 
When taken together, these two points show a promising affinity with regard to the 
concept “meaning of life” in Sen‟s argument. 
Sen even provides a concept that might be helpful in articulating the place of 
ultimate values in economic behavior: as a “commitment”. As was related above, a 
commitment refers to an end or objective that someone is willing to contribute to, without 
the expectation of a return (i.e., strictly, there is no “self-interest” involved). As the 
ultimate values are “transcending” in the sense that they are “larger of life” and encompass 
“all of life” (cf. 1.2), they fall outside the realm of things that are attainable or acquirable 
for someone. The reason for pursuing a commitment is that someone believes it to be of 
intrinsic value, not because of a pay-off that is extrinsic to the commitment itself. In this 
regard, Sen has remarked that a distinction has to be made between “intrinsic” and 
“evidential” concerns (Sen 2008). Although an experience of satisfaction may indicate that 
the pursuit of a certain end is important, this is an “evidential” concern. The experience of 
satisfaction has no intrinsic value, while the pursuit of the end does, as it is directed at 
something that the actor has reason to value. This distinction can be used with regard to 
meaning of life as well. The pursuit of ends that give meaning to someone‟s life may lead 
to an experience of satisfaction, yet, this sense of satisfaction is not the intrinsic reason for 
                                                 
101 Sen does not explicitly reflect on a change in the economic concept of rationality –traditionally understood in 
 terms of efficiency and consistency, cf. Hausman and McPherson 2006. Nevertheless, the general thrust of his 
 work on economic development can be considered to require a concept of rationality that also encompasses 
 evaluative deliberations. For an exploration of this issue, see Peter and Schmid 2007. 
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pursuing them. The intrinsic reason for pursuing them is that they are part of an evaluative 
orientation that is of ultimate importance to someone. 
 
4.4.7 Sen‟s perspective of freedom and “contributing to a viable civil society” 
As Sen‟s discussion of the instrumental freedoms makes clear, political, social, and 
economic freedom are crucial foundations for the exercise of substantive freedom. Hence, 
Sen considers matters such as free speech, voting rights, and freedom of association and 
enterprise as basic ways to bring the freedom to pursue objectives that someone has reason 
to value into practice. These instrumental freedoms are all directed at the free and 
voluntary interaction between individuals in a public sphere, which are constitutive 
elements of a “civil society” (cf. Chapter 1). 
For Sen, active participation in public debates is of central importance in a 
pluralist democracy. As was referred to above, Sen does not believe in a single, 
homogeneous metric such as income for the evaluation of all policy questions in a society. 
Instead, he wants the standards of evaluation to be constituted through public debates. As 
he puts it: 
 
the need to discuss the valuation of diverse capabilities in terms of public priorities 
is, I have argued, an asset, forcing us to make clear what the value judgments are in 
a field where value judgments cannot be –and should not be– avoided. Indeed, 
public participation in these valuational debates –in explicit or implicit forms– is a 
crucial part of the exercise of democracy and responsible social choice. In matters 
of public judgment, there is no real escape from the evaluative need for public 
discussion (Sen 1999: 110).  
 
In other words, just as in the individual pursuit of ends and objectives, Sen places 
“valuational debates” at the core of debates in the civil society of a pluralist democracy. In 
what way should the evaluative parameters be set, given that no evaluative metric is 
available in advance? According to Sen, the public debates should be aimed at gaining a 
positional objectivity  (Sen 1993, 1999, 2004, Mabsout 2010). Positional objectivity is 
not a “neutral” viewpoint, in the sense of a “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986), but a 
“view from a delineated somewhere” and “a view from no one in particular” (Sen 1993). 
That is, in every specific situation, in a particular society and point in time, an evaluative 
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framework has to be found that is suitable for that situation, and that is impartial (i.e., it 
should not a priori benefit a certain group or person). 
In this way, an evaluative metric is to be discerned through active participation in 
public debates by all members of a society, thus exercising their substantive freedom. 
Clearly, Sen considers the civil society to be of fundamental importance, both as the place 
where people can exercise their substantive freedom by engaging in public debates, and as 
the place where a positional objectivity regarding evaluative questions is to be found. 
 
4.4.8 Public theology and Sen‟s perspective of freedom 
With regard to both central themes for public theology, “meaning of life” and “a viable 
civil society”, Sen‟s capability approach offers more affinity than any of the other 
approaches to economic theory discussed so far. By not specifying a content for the ends 
that are to be pursued, and by giving evaluative reasoning a pivotal role in the discernment 
of ends, Sen clears the road for including questions of meaning of life in his approach. As 
he places the burden of finding evaluative metrics for specific situations on the 
participation in public debates in a pluralist democracy, the “civil society” receives a 
prominent place in his evaluative approach to development. Notably, Sen invokes 
“evaluative reasoning” and “positional objectivity” as concepts that carry the burden of 
setting ends and objectives, at the individual and social level, respectively. Therefore, Sen 
brings evaluative arguments –which were argued to be of crucial importance to both 
central interests of public theology in section 1.3– that are to take place in the actual 
individual and social practices of people exercising their substantive freedom into the field 
of questions that are of interest for his work as an economist. Sen thus goes beyond the 
neoclassical idea that economists cannot take part in evaluative discussions, and, in contrast 
to behavioral economists, outlines an elaborated evaluative orientation for economic 
behavior in his work.  
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter inquired whether two recent approaches in economic theory that both 
elaborate a specific evaluative orientation, happiness economics and the capability 
approach, display affinity with the central interests of public theology. Based on the 
findings of this chapter, it can be concluded that happiness economics, in the perspective 
of Richard Layard, considers meaningful orientations to life (values, philosophies of life, 
religion) to be of central import to achieving happiness. The importance of strong social 
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relations is also stressed in Layard‟s argument, and he clearly outlines how he thinks 
economists and other scholars have the possibility to and should contribute to society. The 
capability approach, as presented in Amartya Sen‟s Development as Freedom, offers ample 
room for the question of “meaning of life” in his view of substantive freedom, and his 
works offer the possibility of understanding meaning of life as a “commitment”. Sen‟s 
views on the need for public debates on finding a positional objectivity with regard to an 
evaluative metric, show his concern with the viability of the civil society. 
Hence, with regard to both central interests of public theology, there is 
considerable affinity in happiness economics and the capability approach. Together with 
the results of chapter 3 on behavioral economics, this chapter opens up a promising 
perspective for public theologians who want to connect their work to the analyses of 
economists. In the next chapter, the focus lies on the second step of this thesis, the 
construction of a framework that establishes a connection between public theology and 
economics. 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
A FRAMEWORK FOR CONNECTING  
PUBLIC  THEOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapters 2, 3, and 4, it was investigated whether neoclassical economics, behavioral 
economics, happiness economics, and the capability approach have affinity with the two 
central interests of public theology. This first step was geared at ensuring the viability of a 
connection between public theology and economics. That is, if there is no affinity or 
resonance in economics with the central interests of public theology, it is useless to 
construct a framework for this connection. The results of the first step indicate that 
behavioral economics, happiness economics, and the capability approach offer some 
promising openings with regard to the central interests of public theology. Therefore, we 
can now proceed to the second step that was put forward in section 1.3, the construction 
of a framework that connects public theology and economics. 
 
5.1.1 The second step: a framework that establishes a connection based upon evaluative 
arguments 
The second step consists in the construction of a framework that establishes a connection 
between public theology and economics that allows for the exchange of knowledge. This 
chapter is focused entirely on the framework. As was argued in section 1.3, evaluative 
deliberation and arguments are crucial elements in both central interests of public theology.  
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In the previous chapters, an assessment of the affinity with these central interests in the 
different approaches in economics has taken place. Thus, indirectly, the way they conceive 
evaluative deliberation and arguments was inquired. The importance of evaluative 
arguments is acknowledged in behavioral economics, happiness economics, and the 
capability approach. Yet, in order to outline a framework that enables public theologians 
to connect to the work of these economists, a further step is to be taken. If a framework 
that connects public theology and economics is to be elaborated in which evaluative 
arguments have a central role, it is a necessary presumption that these evaluative arguments 
can in principle be understood, articulated, and criticized. That is, if an argument about 
evaluations is to be discussed, it must be deemed possible to agree or disagree about 
evaluative points of view, based upon an exchange of reasoned viewpoints. In other words, 
“value objectivity” should be considered a viable option: an ordering or prioritization of 
values in a specific context and historical situation, that is intelligible and criticizable for 
anyone who is engifted with the capability to use her intelligence. As this epistemological 
point is a fundamental issue for a connection between public theology and any of the 
approaches that show affinity with its central interests, it is necessary to provide an 
argument based on which value objectivity can be defended. 
 Value objectivity is not a self-evident matter. As was related in chapter 1, the 
influential social theorist Max Weber (1978) viewed any reasoning about values (“value 
rationality”) as incapable of being objective. In Weber‟s interpretation, modernity can be 
viewed as a process of rationalization in terms of means-ends rationality, which is a 
reasoned reflection about the means that are necessary to achieve certain ends. As means-
ends rationality is concerned with the causal and effectual relations between means and 
ends, it is a matter of factual analysis. It seems that underlying the distinction between 
means-ends rationality and value rationality with regard to the possibility of objectivity, an 
epistemological understanding of facts and values is present that leads to a dichotomy 
between the two types of rationality when it comes to the question of objectivity 
(Davydova and Sherrock 2003). A similar distinction is made in neoclassical economics. 
As was outlined in Chapter 2 neoclassical economists only want to deal with facts, and the 
“facts about values”. In this “positive” approach, the neoclassical economist seeks to be 
value-neutral, as values are considered to be matters of irrational whim, “about which men 
can ultimately only fight” (Friedman 1953). Behavioral economics, happiness economics, 
and the capability approach appear to understand this relation differently, as they do not 
raise an insurmountable barrier between allegedly “objective” facts and “subjective” values. 
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However, even Sen –who, in comparison with behavioral economists and happiness 
economists places the strongest emphasis on evaluative deliberation– does not provide a 
foundation for these evaluative arguments (cf. Peter and Schmid 2007). 
 In order to establish a connection between public theology and the different 
approaches to  economic theory that have been explored, and to counter the Weberian and 
neoclassical understanding of a strict dichotomy between facts and values that hinders a 
connection, a perspective on evaluative argumentation has to be found that does allow for 
“value objectivity”. A good example of such an argument can be found in the pragmatist 
philosopher Nicholas Rescher‟s work on value-theory, objectivity and rationality (Rescher 
1988, 1993, 1997, 2004). But why use the work of a pragmatist philosopher? And why 
specifically Rescher? 
 
5.1.2 Reasons for choosing Rescher‟s pragmatist account of evaluation, objectivity, and 
rationality 
The first question that needs to be answered is whether public theology and the pragmatist 
tradition are, in principle, commensurable. Cornel West, in his influential historical 
account of the development of American pragmatism, The American Evasion of 
Philosophy – a Genealogy of Pragmatism (West 1989) argues that prominent pragmatists 
consider their work as concerned with a political mode of cultural criticism (West 1989: 
5). As West puts it:  
 
The distinctive appeal of American pragmatism in our postmodern moment is its 
unashamedly moral emphasis and its unequivocally ameliorative impulse. In this 
world-weary period of pervasive cynicisms, nihilisms, terrorisms, and possible 
extermination, there is a longing for norms and values that can make a difference, a 
yearning for principled resistance and struggle that can change our desperate plight 
(West 1989: 4). 
 
The analysis of the current situation as one of cynicism echoes a concern about that was 
outlined in Chapter 1. In section 1.2 the disappearance of a given cultural and religious 
embeddedness, and the focus on technological solutions to problems was connected to the 
diagnosis of our time as “an age that cannot name itself” (Tracy 1994: 3). This cynical 
situation is problematic for questions of meaning of life, as the loss of a guiding evaluative 
orientation and the inability to formulate new evaluative perspectives in effect bereaves 
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people of the possibility to create meaningful perspectives on their life. Evidently, the 
pragmatist quest for norms and values in order to counter the cynical and nihilistic 
viewpoints stems from a similar concern as public theology‟s. The need for a critical 
conversation –instead of an “easy” return to grand narratives– is noted by West, as he 
continues: 
 
The turn to (…) American pragmatism is neither a panacea for our ills nor a 
solution to our problems. Rather, it should be an attempt to reinvigorate our 
moribund academic life, our lethargic political life, our decadent cultural life, and 
our chaotic personal lives for the flowering of many-sided personalities and the 
flourishing of more democracy and freedom (West 1989: 4). 
 
In this quotation, West illustrates the pragmatists‟ aim at contributing to a rejuvenation of 
a trust in “human creative power” (West 1989: 150) by a cultural criticism at both the 
individual and at the social level (West 1989: 4). Therefore, also the second concern for 
public theology as it was presented in Chapter 1 –a “viable civil society”– can be 
considered as a crucial topic for pragmatism. As pragmatist philosopher Benjamin Barber 
notes: 
 
Politics (…) is the forging of common actuality in the absence of abstract 
independent standards. It entails dynamic, ongoing, common deliberation and 
action and it is feasible only when individuals are transformed by social interaction 
into citizens (Barber 1988: 209, quoted in West 1989: 213).  
 
Barber‟s image of the nature and task of social interaction appears to be a concrete 
description of what a “viable civil society” is to be like: a social sphere in which there is an 
ongoing exchange of views and arguments, in which individuals participate in order to 
become members of a society (Dekker 2002). Thus, the tradition of American pragmatism 
shares a concern for the central themes of public theology as they were outlined in Chapter 
1, “meaning of life” and “a viable civil society”, which offers –in principle– a 
commensurability with public theology‟s concerns.  
However, the pragmatists go beyond a statement of a “concern”, by offering value-
theoretical perspectives that allow for a foundation of evaluative arguments in a “common 
actuality” (Barber 1988: 209). The basic idea that allows for this foundation of evaluative 
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arguments is a reinterpretation of the relation between facts and values, which is one of the 
distinctive elements of a pragmatist approach (Putnam 1993, 2002, Rescher 1993, Dewey 
1905, Khalil 2006, Ryan 2006: 20-21), as will be explored below. 
Thus, pragmatist philosophy both shares the concerns of public theology, and can 
possibly offer an answer for the epistemological question regarding value objectivity, which 
can help establish a connection between public theology and economics. It is important to 
note that the case for using the work of pragmatist philosophers that is given here, is not 
meant to give the impression that pragmatist philosophy is the unique and exclusive option 
for providing such an approach. Instead, it intended to argue that pragmatist philosophy is 
a good option. In the present argument, pragmatist philosophy is used because it shares 
public theology‟s concerns, and is likely to be able to “do the job” of providing an 
epistemological framework for establishing a connection between public theology and 
economics102. 
 Why specifically choose Nicholas Rescher from the ranks of pragmatist 
philosophers? First, Rescher shares public theology‟s concerns of “meaning of life” 
(Rescher 1993: 140-154, 2007) and “a viable civil society” (Rescher 1995). He also 
offers a complete value theory, in which he directly deals with the distinction between facts 
and values, and in which he includes an elaborate account of the constitution of “value 
objectivity” (Rescher 1993, 1997, 2001, 2004). Furthermore, Rescher has provided a 
reinterpretation of the concept rationality, that springs forth from his discontentedness 
with the isolated and limited disciplinary views of rationality that are used nowadays 
(Rescher 1988, 1993). Rescher‟s value-theoretical approach and his work on rationality 
can help in the construction of the framework for connecting public theology and 
economics. Finally, Rescher shows a basic openness to theology103, and elaborates 
perspectives in the philosophy of religion that are closely related to his value theory and 
approach to rationality, which may prove helpful for public theology. For these reasons, 
                                                 
102  That is, pragmatist philosophy is used as an “instrument” to establish a connection between public theology. 
 Pragmatist philosophy –in this thesis– is not an end in itself, but a good option: other philosophical 
 approaches may also be able to provide a value-theoretical perspective that enables this connection. 
103  The commensurability based on the shared interest in questions of “meaning of life” and “a viable civil 
 society” can be hindered by other considerations, such as the anti-theological perspective provided by 
 prominent (neo-)pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty (Anderson 1998: 13-28, Murray 2004a). The 
 commensurability of Rescher‟s work with theology has been elaborately inquired by Paul Murray (2004a, 
 2004b). 
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Rescher‟s work could function as a good example of how a framework that allows for the 
exchange of knowledge between public theology and economics can be constructed. 
Thus, the goal of this final chapter is to formulate a framework that establishes a 
connection between public theology and economics, using Rescher‟s value theory and work 
on rationality. To this effect, in section 5.2, a notion of “value objectivity” is elaborated, 
based on Rescher‟s value theory. In section 5.3, this value-theoretical perspective is related 
to Rescher‟s concept of rationality. Based on Rescher‟s concepts of value objectivity and 
rationality, a framework that allows for a connection between public theology and 
economics is constructed. Also, in 5.3 the implications of Rescher‟s value-theoretical 
perspective and his interpretation of rationality for the Weberian dichotomy between 
means-ends rationality and value rationality –that were considered to be a major hindrance 
for questions of meaning of life in section 1.2– are explored. In section 5.4, a specific 
approach to public theology is advocated: a public theology that focuses on axiological 
(value-based) theism. Chapter 5 ends with an example of the work of a public theologian 
whose approach to economic questions resembles this axiological focus. 
 
5.2 THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTING EVALUATIVE ARGUMENTS: A VALUE-
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR THE CONNECTION BETWEEN PUBLIC THEOLOGY AND 
ECONOMICS 
As was argued above, the distinction with regard to the possibility of objectivity of 
Weber‟s concepts of means-ends rationality and value rationality hinges on a dichotomy 
between facts and values (Davydova and Sherrock 2003). That is, Weber considers it 
possible to assess means-ends rationality in an objective way, as it deals with calculative 
questions of causality and efficiency, which are factual affairs. Instead, in Weber‟s view, 
value rationality cannot be objective, as the basic ideas about what is “valuable” (i.e., what 
is to be valued) that are the “input” for value rationality cannot be rationally explained or 
defended (Brubaker 1984: 27). In other words, in Weber‟s view, facts and values belong to 
fundamentally different categories of epistemological validity. Rescher‟s value-theoretical 
approach departs from the idea of a strict split between facts and values, by focusing on 
the way facts and values are constituted as interpretations of our experience. 
 
5.2.1 The difference and similarity between facts and values 
Basically, the concepts of “fact” and “value” are used to refer to two different kinds of 
interpretations of experiential data (Rescher 2004). In someone‟s practical engagement 
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with experienced reality, two distinctive interpretive relations can be identified: cognitive 
and evaluative104. Cognitive relations between a subject and its experienced context are 
aimed at gaining a grasp of the existence of objects. Evaluative relations between a subject 
and its experienced context are aimed at the appreciation of objects. 
What “experience” of observed objects do cognition and evaluation refer to? 
Rescher (2004) points out three categories of properties that can be discerned in an object: 
 
(1) primary properties: these represent descriptive features of the physical makeup 
of an object (weight, shape, size) 
(2) secondary properties: these represent sensory perceptible features (color, taste, 
smell) 
(3) tertiary properties: these represent cognitively or evaluatively discernible 
features (uniqueness of an event, similarity to something else, desirability) 
(Rescher 2004: 14-15) 
 
Primary and secondary properties are entirely cognitive affairs, yet, tertiary properties can 
be both cognitive or evaluative (Rescher 2004: 15). For example, if someone has the 
experience of a wasp crawling on her nose for the first time in her life, the “uniqueness” of 
this event is a tertiary property in the cognitive sense. If she considers the wasp to be a 
threat to her health, and therefore an undesirable presence on her nose, being an 
“undesirable threat” is an evaluative tertiary property of the wasp. The central point about 
seeing values as tertiary properties is that they are aspects of an object that are discerned by 
intelligence, as Rescher puts it:  
 
the crucial fact is that value is not sense-perceptible but mind-judgmental: 
something to be determined not simply by observation of some sort but by 
reflective thought duly sustained by background information and suitably 
equipped with an awareness of principles (Rescher 1997: 195-196). 
 
                                                 
104  After the initial indiscriminate experience, in which cognitive and evaluative data (i.e. “givens”) are 
 intermingled, intelligence enables human beings to distinguish between the two and reflect upon the 
 cognitive and evaluative “input”, cf. Dewey 1905.  
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Therefore, in both cognitive and evaluative relations, certain properties of an object are 
identified by the intelligent reflection of the experiencing subject105. How does this process 
work? The formation of cognitive beliefs entails bridging the gap between reality as it is 
experienced (“there appears to be a wasp on my nose”) and reality as it actually exists 
(“there is a wasp on my nose”). The formation of an evaluation entails bridging the gap 
between what appears to be appropriate (“removing the wasp from my nose seems to be 
the right thing to do”) and what is appropriate (“removing the wasp is the right thing to 
do”). As such, in both the formation of cognitive beliefs and evaluations, a gap has to be 
bridged between “reality as it is experienced” and “reality as it is believed to exist” 
(Rescher 1993: 65). In order to overcome this gap, both cognition and evaluation involve 
a “leap” from the experience of certain data to the tentative and temporary affirmation of 
“facts” and “evaluations”. Therefore, the idea that facts reflect “truth” as a correspondence 
to reality, while values are based on an irrational (i.e., unintelligible, uncriticizable) choice 
or conviction, is to be rejected. Facts and values share a similar epistemological status of 
tentative affirmation and uncertainty106. For this reason, a fact-value dichotomy is no 
longer tenable.  
 
5.2.2 Cognitive and evaluative systematization and value objectivity 
The step from “data as perceived” to “data as believed or appreciated” involves a process 
of systemization, which involves a confrontation between tentative beliefs and evaluations 
based on the raw data of experience and prior beliefs, evaluations, standards, and norms, 
that results in (presumably) correct statements and appropriate evaluations (Rescher 1993: 
57-60). Returning to the example of the wasp, in the cognitive case, a tickling feeling and 
seeing a black and yellow striped insect moving on someone‟s nose, is matched to her prior 
beliefs that (1) when she sees something and feels something on her nose, there actually is 
something on her nose and (2) a black and yellow insect with such and such proportions is 
                                                 
105  Therefore, there is an important difference with the idea of value as “taste”, because intelligent reflection 
 allows for a change in evaluation based upon new information or argument. For instance, in the case of the 
 wasp, someone could argue that the wasp is not an “undesirable threat”, because the wasp is just hunting for 
 some small insects, and will probably go away soon if it is not bothered or angered. 
106  The pattern of tentative affirmation and reformulating of either cognitive or evaluative affairs is called 
 “recursive fallibilism” by Rescher (Rescher 1993, Murray 2004a: 113-116). Although at some moment an 
 affirmation of a factual or evaluative statement needs to be made, this affirmation always remains “fallible” –
 capable of being wrong– and therefore the observing or evaluating person constantly needs to reassess (i.e. 
 “recursive”, from Latin recurrere – “turning or flowing back”) the adequacy and correctness of the affirmed 
 statement. 
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a “wasp”. In the evaluative case, the risks and benefits of having a wasp on her nose are 
balanced against the risks and benefits of removing it (i.e., the desirability of the presence 
of the wasp is assessed). Rescher calls the similar pattern of systematization, which he 
reveals by comparing what he describes as “alethic107 epistemology” and “axiological108 
epistemology”, the “parallelism of inquiry and evaluation” (1993: 83). It can be 
represented schematically: 
 
 
        (Rescher 1993: display 4.1, 83) 
 
Rescher‟s scheme of the parallelism of inquiry and evaluation indicates that there is a 
parallel between the formation of cognitive beliefs and evaluative appreciations: the pattern 
by means of which the raw cognitive or evaluative data of experience become shaped into 
(presumably) correct statements or appropriate evaluations is the same (Lawlor 2005). 
Based on this parallelism between the formation of beliefs and appreciations, Rescher 
concludes that “objectivity” cannot be restricted to “facts”, and withheld from “values”. As 
he puts it: 
 
                                                 
107  Rescher‟s idea of “truth” (Ancient Greek “aletheia”: alethic epistemology), is based on his coherentist view of 
 science. That is, the “small” truths that are formulated by human beings are not understood as a 
 correspondence with Truth (i.e. “reality as it really is”). Instead, truths are socially and historically located, 
 and are validated in relation to other (relative) truths, see Rescher 1973, 1987, 1992, and McCloskey 1994). 
108  From the Ancient Greek “axioô”, “to deem worthy, to value” (Rescher 2007: 1). 
(Prescriptively) 
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Systematization 
2. AXIOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
(VALUE CRITERIOLOGY) 
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Experiential Data 
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This fundamental parallelism means that value issues should also be seen in a 
“realistic” light. Matters of value, too, can and should be regarded as objectively 
validatable. The possibility of rational agreement or disagreement, of criticism, 
correction, and the like, arises on the evaluative side also. One must avoid the 
confusion of values and tastes. “There‟s no disputing about tastes” may be true, 
but “There‟s no disputing about values” is certainly not. Values too can be 
altogether objective. The status of value judgments as appropriate or 
inappropriate, correct or incorrect can be subject to person-indifferent standards, 
on whose basis value claims admit of rational support through impersonally cogent 
considerations (Rescher 1993: 84). 
 
Rescher approaches the similarity in the pattern of the formation of beliefs and values 
from a different angle, when he asks the question “is reasoning about values viciously 
circular?” (Rescher 2001). An adherent to the fact-value dichotomy, like Weber, would 
confirm this vicious circularity, as in his opinion, values stem from a fundamentally 
subjective and uncriticizable choice. In this perspective, if someone wants to defend her 
evaluative position, this can only be done by referring to the evaluative framework that she 
has subjectively outlined beforehand.  
Rescher, however, comes to a different conclusion. By arguing that reasoning 
about facts is circular, Rescher disarms the idea that circularity as such is a problem in 
reasoning109. The question then remains whether reasoning about values is viciously 
circular. Here Rescher argues that it is not necessarily so, as long as standards of objectivity 
are appropriately addressed110.  
                                                 
109 Rescher, as many other pragmatists, is a “coherentist”, instead of a “foundationalist” (Rescher 1973, 1987, 
 Van Huyssteen 1999). In a foundationalist approach, some principles or beliefs are taken to be unshakeable 
 truths on which all further theory can rest. Constructing a theory, in a foundationalist approach, is like 
 building a house: once the foundations are in place, the rest of the house can be built on a stable ground. A 
 coherentist approach does not assume any principles or beliefs to be infallible, but creates and judges a theory 
 on its internal coherence and support. It can be likened to a raft floating on a river: the most important thing 
 is that the raft stays afloat on the river, and can be amended in different circumstances (Sosa 1980). 
110 As Rescher argues: “To be sure, various theorists mock reason as an exercise in futility. „Any defense of reason 
 is predetermined to failure. For it must make use of the very instrument that is in question, and therefore 
 commits the vicious circle fallacy‟. What nonsense! Whatever circularity is at issue is altogether virtuous. 
 Reason is and must be self-endorsing; self-validation is the only thing that makes sense here. The only defense 
 of reason worth having is of course a rational one. What more –or what else– could a sensible person ask 
 for?” (Rescher 1993: 249). 
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 Summarizing the above, facts and values express different kinds of relations to 
experiential data. Both facts and values refer to certain properties of objects. The pattern 
by means of which human beings acquire (presumably) trustworthy beliefs and valid 
evaluations is similar. Based on this line of thinking, a strict dichotomy between facts and 
values cannot be upheld. Although facts and values are different types of interpretations of 
experience, the pattern by means of which they are constituted, is similar. 
Rescher‟s reinterpretation of the relation between facts and values is the first 
epistemological step that enables the construction of an objective evaluative argument. The 
question how an evaluative argument can validated is elaborated in the next subsection. 
 
5.2.3 Constructing an objective evaluative argument (I): human flourishing as a shared 
interest 
In order to validate an evaluative argument, the argument must gain a sense of 
“objectivity”. How an evaluative argument can gain objective status, hinges on the 
question: objective for whom? Objectivity, as such, is a matter of compliance with certain 
standards (Rescher 1997). The standards of the objectivity of values, for Rescher, are 
related to the fact that we are human beings, and that as human beings, apart from our 
idiosyncratic interests, we have certain shared interests. As Rescher argues: 
 
there is a large body of real interests that people share in common, for example as 
regards standard of living (health and resources) and quality of life (opportunities 
and conditions), and it is these factors of life sustainment and enrichment that are 
ultimately determinative of the validity of individualized interests (Rescher 1997: 
182). 
 
Therefore, for Rescher, the validity of individualized interests makes that 
 
we humans have various valid needs [such as] nourishment, maintenance of health, 
information, affection, freedom of action, and much else besides. Without such 
varied goods we cannot thrive as human beings, we cannot achieve the condition 
of human well-being that Aristotle called “human flourishing” (Rescher 1997: 
181). 
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Thus, according to Rescher, for human beings, the overarching end of the realization of 
their real (and therefore, best) interests, is “human flourishing”. Yet, human flourishing is 
not to be attained by only seeking the satisfaction of needs and wants, but also by pursuing 
values that transcend the individual‟s life, and place someone‟s life in a meaningful frame: 
 
Human self-development is not simply a matter of self-aggrandizement but one of 
self-improvement. Behind the impetus toward the “goods” that represent our 
needs and wants in this world (ranging from food, shelter, and clothing to wealth, 
power, and status), there also lies an impetus to “the good” –to the cultivation of 
values and ideals. We want those we care for to be not just well off but content 
and happy. And we desire for them (and for ourselves) a contentment that is not 
just a matter of satiation but one of reflective and rational satisfaction (Rescher 
1993: 247). 
 
Thus, Rescher concludes that the attainment of human flourishing can be considered to be 
an intrinsic good for human beings (Rescher 1997: 181). Therefore, the standards for the 
objectivity of values are to be found in arguments that connect a specific value judgment to 
a generalized notion of human flourishing (in terms of, for instance, health and quality of 
life). Human flourishing is the “overarching desideratum that validates the rest”, the 
question how human flourishing “is particularized in the concrete situation of specific 
individuals is something complex and internally variegated” (Rescher 1997: 181). 
Rescher‟s interpretation of human flourishing is relevant for both public theology and the 
new approaches in economics that were explored in Chapters 3 and 4, especially for the 
capability approach. First, Rescher‟s view of human flourishing not only refers to 
alleviating basic needs such as food and clothing, but also encompasses the cultivation of 
ideals and values. These ideals and values –the things people consider the most worthy 
ends that can be strived for–, can be considered to be part of their ultimate horizon of 
meaning. This makes Rescher‟s concept of human flourishing relevant for public theology. 
Second, Rescher‟s understanding of human self-development as “self-improvement” in the 
sense of a “reflective and rational satisfaction” echoes the concern that is expressed in, for 
instance, Sen‟s understanding of human development: the freedom to pursue the ends 
people have reason to value. 
Having discerned the overarching end that can constitute value objectivity, the 
next step in constructing an objective evaluative argument is finding a way by means of 
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which concrete practices and decisions are connected to the notion of human flourishing 
(within a specific historical and cultural frame). In the next subsection, Rescher‟s method 
for making such a connection, –by means of “cultivation hierarchies”–, is presented. 
 
5.2.4 Constructing an evaluative argument (II): Cultivation hierarchies 
In order to be able to construct an objective evaluative argument that connects concrete 
practices to a notion of human flourishing, Rescher introduces the concept “cultivation 
hierarchies”111 (Rescher 2004: 29). A cultivation hierarchy starts, at the top level, with a 
finality. A finality defines the aims of any kind of operation, such as, for instance, “health”, 
“morality”, “well-being”, or “development”. These finalities are general conceptions that 
are inherently related to the image of human flourishing within a specific historical and 
cultural setting. Yet, the finalities need to be explicated in order to give them a more 
concrete meaning. Therefore, at the second level, governing values and principles are 
formulated that define the finality that is at stake. For example, in the case of health 
(Rescher 2004: 30), “curing illness and disease”, “restoring and maintaining normal bodily 
functioning”, “removing painful symptoms” can be considered as governing values and 
principles. These governing values and principles define the matters that deal with 
“health”, instead of other finalities. In turn, these governing values and principles have to 
be translated to norms, standards, and criteria. This happens at the third level of a 
cultivation hierarchy. At this level, there are clear descriptions of how the governing values 
and principles are to be measured and assessed. To stay with the example of health, 
questions like “what constitutes an „illness‟?”, “when is someone in good health 
psychologically?”, and “what does „normal functioning‟ indicate?” are answered. At the 
fourth level of a cultivation hierarchy, the norms and standards are translated into rules of 
procedure, such as “treat a normal headache with an aspirine”, and “use both medicine and 
psychotherapy to treat a depression”. The rules of procedure outline how matters of health 
are to be dealt with in everyday affairs. The fifth and final level of a cultivation hierarchy is 
the level of the warranted rulings: the level of actual practices. If someone shows up at the 
doctor‟s office with a mild headache because of stress at work, the doctor may propose to 
take a day off, take some aspirine, and go for a walk in the forest to relax. This ruling for 
the specific situation is an evaluatively warranted ruling because it connects to the finality 
of health through the intermediate levels of the cultivation hierarchy, and the finality of 
                                                 
111 Rescher alternatively uses the term “nomic” hierarchy.   
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health, in turn, is a “real interest” for a human being, and therefore is part of human 
flourishing. Schematically, a cultivation hierarchy can be displayed as follows: 
 
1. Finalities 
2. Basic principles and controlling values 
3. Governing norms, standards, and criteria 
4. Rules of procedure 
5. Warranted rulings 
(Rescher 2004: 30) 
 
The further one goes down the cultivation hierarchy, the more variation amongst different 
times in history and different cultures will be encountered. The idea of what constitutes 
“health”, in, for instance, a state of the art hospital in a wealthy country in the twenty-first 
century, of course, differs from the idea of “health” in a rural society two thousand years 
ago.  
Thus, a cultivation hierarchy allows to connect a real interest –something that 
concerns all human beings (universally)–, like health, or development, or morality, to 
concrete practices in a specific time and culture (contextually). 
By means of a cogent argument that connects an individual ruling or decision to 
the governing principles of a finality, an evaluation in a specific situation can gain objective 
status. As Rescher argues, only through standards can we reach the impersonality and 
generality of application that is crucial to objectivity:  
 
What separates evaluations from mere preferences is that the former involves 
standards. In evaluating we bring criteria to bear on whose basis the ideas in 
question are rated as good or bad, superior or inferior, just or unjust, etc. 
Evaluations will, as such, have to be backed by reason articulated in terms of the 
relevant norms –norms which ultimately inhere in the architecture of our 
generalizable needs (Rescher 1997: 185).  
 
By connecting evaluations to the “architecture of our generalizable needs”, which are 
directed at the realization of human flourishing, Rescher thus creates the possibility for 
concrete rulings and decisions at the level of actual practices to become objectively 
warranted rulings and decisions (Rescher 1993: 85-92). 
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 Summarizing the above, Rescher argues that as “objectivity” is “objectivity for 
human beings”, value objectivity is to be grounded in the needs and real interests of human 
beings. Therefore, a notion of “human flourishing” can be discerned as the intrinsic end of 
formulating objective evaluative arguments. By outlining “cultivation hierarchies”, that 
connect a “finality” (an aspect of human flourishing) to a “concrete ruling” (actual 
practice), such an evaluative argument can be constructed. 
 As Rescher indicates, a search for satisfaction in life by searching for as many 
“goods” as possible will not lead to true satisfaction, as people need an overarching “good” 
to which they can direct (all of) their life (Rescher 1993). For this reason, Rescher claims 
that rational reflection is necessary to ascertain what can be a source of “true satisfaction” 
based on real interests (Rescher 1993: 247). This suggests a crucial connection between 
rational reflection and evaluation. Indeed, Rescher outlines a concept of rationality of 
which evaluation makes up a central part. In the next section, first, Rescher‟s concept of 
rationality is explored. Second, based on Rescher‟s concept of rationality, a framework for 
the connection between public theology and economics is outlined112. Third, the 
implications of this concept of rationality for the Weberian distinction between means-
ends rationality and value rationality are assessed. 
 
5.3 A FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONNECTION BETWEEN PUBLIC THEOLOGY AND 
ECONOMICS BASED ON EVALUATIVE RATIONALITY 
5.3.1 The cognitive, practical, and evaluative dimensions of rationality 
Rescher‟s motivation to focus on the nature of rationality directly is his concern about the 
overly narrow conceptions of rationality that are used in different disciplines, as he argues: 
 
The logician takes consistency to be the bulwark of rationality, the scientist 
evidential cogency, the economist efficiency. All are right, but only partially so. 
Each focuses upon what is no more than part of reason –that one particular aspect 
of intelligent procedure that is of primary importance for his own field (Rescher 
1988: 8). 
 
                                                 
112 As was argued above, the foundation for the connection between public theology and economics that is 
 elaborated by means of the work of Rescher, is presented here as a possible approach to this connection. As it 
 appears to be possible to establish a connection between public theology and the economics based on 
 Rescher‟s work, it is used as a useful “means to an end”, not as the unique way of doing so. 
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Rescher seeks to provide an account that captures the full range of questions that can be 
object of rationality. To this effect, Rescher defines rationality as “the intelligent pursuit of 
appropriate ends” (Rescher 1988: 1, 1993: 3). This definition comprises several important 
elements, each of which be commented upon below. 
 First, rationality is about the use of one‟s intelligence. Rescher considers rationality 
as a human being‟s capacity to use her mind or “intelligence” to reflect upon her experience 
and actions. Intelligence is the instrument that aids human beings in the achievement of the 
things that are of importance to them.  Rescher even calls rationality and intelligence the 
“survival instrument of Homo Sapiens” (Rescher 1988: 2), as it is the distinctive capacity 
of human beings that gives them an advantage over other living creatures in an evolutionary 
sense. Whereas bears are stronger, cheetahs are faster, and frogs are more prolific, human 
beings have the distinctive advantage of being able to reflect on their actions. For a human 
being, “to behave rationally is to figure out the best thing to do in the circumstances” 
which Rescher identifies as “a means to adaptive efficiency” (Rescher 1988: 2-4). Rescher 
even considers it a necessity to use the gift of rationality, as he argues that: 
 
The imperative to rationality is a matter of the fundamental impetus to self-
optimization, to making good use of our opportunities under the conditions in 
which we labor. We have here a rationale that grounds obligation in axiology –in 
the consideration that a being endowed with the capacity for value realization 
ought to exercise it (Rescher 1993: 22). 
 
Therefore, according to Rescher, human beings should use their rationality, as it is the 
crucial aspect of their capacities that helps them to improve their situation, and achieve the 
things that they value –as human beings113. Put less formally, because human beings are 
what they are, they should make the best of their lives, using the best methods they have at 
their avail. 
 Second, the use of intelligent reflection is geared at two different aspects that are 
relevant for the human “pursuit of ends”. On the one hand, by qualifying “pursuit” as 
“intelligent pursuit”, Rescher indicates that intelligence is used to reflect on the means that 
are used to achieve goals. From the perspective of rationality, the means that are to be used 
are not random, but are “intelligently selected means” (Rescher 1993: 7). On the other 
                                                 
113 Although he focuses on the human capacity of rationality, Rescher explicitly does not want to claim that 
 human beings always behave rationally (Rescher 1993: 4). 
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hand, by qualifying “ends114” as “appropriate ends”, Rescher introduces the necessity of an 
evaluation of different possible ends. In doing so, Rescher distinguishes the human rational 
“pursuit” from acting on instinct: rationality is a matter of finding cogent arguments for 
actions, both with regard to the means and the ends that are involved. As Rescher puts it: 
“It is silly to dedicate shrewd means to inappropriate ends; it is foolish to pursue worthy 
ends by ineffective means” (Rescher 1988: 7). 
 The importance of providing cogent arguments for someone‟s thoughts and 
actions leads to the question how the cogency of a rational argument can be assessed. 
According to Rescher, cogency is  
 
rooted in the nature of interest. Something can be in my (real) interests only by 
being an item of a generic type that is in everyone‟s real interests. (…) Any valid 
interest –any that merits the acknowledgment of reason– must inhere in a 
universal interest (Rescher 1993: 6). 
 
Therefore, according to Rescher, the question whether a cogent (rational) argument can be 
provided for an action, is whether it contributes to the real interests that are shared by all 
human beings (as human beings). This is the universal aspect that is captured in the nature 
of rationality as the intelligent pursuit of appropriate ends. However, the standards for 
what counts as a rational action are heavily dependent on the specific historical and social 
context in which that action is to take place (Rescher 1993: 2-3, cf. Stenmark 1995). As 
such, Rescher strikes a balance between the universality and contextuality of rationality. He 
puts it as follows:  
 
our concrete rational commitments are indeed universal, but only circumstantially 
universal in a way that makes room for the variation of times, places, and the 
thousands of details of each individual and situation (Rescher 1993: 4). 
 
Rescher connects the universal interests and contextually situated actions by cultivation 
hierarchies, which were introduced in the previous section. The crucial point with regard 
to rationality is that the cogent reasons that constitute the “intelligent pursuit of 
                                                 
114 It is important to realize that for Rescher, “ends” encompass both concrete ends (such as “a tomato salad” or 
 “a Ph.D. degree in Economics”), and more diffuse values (such as “solidarity”, “justice”, and “freedom”). Cf. 
 Rescher 1988: 8. 
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appropriate ends” are not “something subjective or idiosyncratic; [instead,] that good 
reasons indeed are good reasons is something that is objective and lies in the public 
domain115” (Rescher 1993: 4). 
 Rescher elaborates the general concept of rationality as the “intelligent pursuit of 
appropriate ends” by discerning three distinct domains of rationality (Rescher 1988: 2-4). 
The first domain is the cognitive domain. The goal of cognitive rationality is to acquire 
reliable and relevant information; that is, facts. If someone is to engage in a successful 
action, she needs accurate information about her surroundings, on which to base her 
beliefs. The second domain is the evaluative domain. The goal of evaluative rationality is 
to select appropriate values, ends, priorities and preferences. As soon as someone has 
mapped the interests and values that are relevant, she needs to decide which of them 
outweigh the others. The third domain is the practical domain. The goal of practical 
rationality is to outline a course of action that will achieve the ends someone has selected 
(based on evaluative rationality) given the information available (based on cognitive 
rationality). 
 Although these domains can be distinguished, they are interrelated, 
interdependent, and intermingled in everyday life. Before a course of action is decided 
upon, trustworthy beliefs and proper evaluations are needed. The only way to acquire 
adequate (or at least workable) beliefs and evaluations is by engaging in actions that will 
lead to the necessary cognitive and evaluative input. Likewise, the satisfactoriness of beliefs 
is based on evaluative standards, and the validity of evaluations cannot be defended 
without beliefs based on adequate information. Thus, while the cognitive, evaluative, and 
practical domains of rationality can be distinguished, in everyday life they are interrelated 
and interdependent (Rescher 1993: 12-18). 
 In sum, Rescher presents a concept of rationality that encompasses all possible 
objects of human action. Rationality follows a universal principle, but concrete rational 
deliberations always take place in a context, that needs to be taken into account. That is, 
“the intelligent pursuit of appropriate ends” is the nature of rationality, while the standards 
of rationality differ in various contexts. Rescher discerns three domains of rationality –
                                                 
115 It might appear that Rescher refers to an idea of “consensus” in the public domain as a criterion for 
 objectivity. While some kind of agreement can create practical possibilities, Rescher does not consider 
 “achieving consensus” as the substantive end or ideal in the public domain (cf. Rescher 1995). Instead, he 
 argues that “the crux of community lies in reciprocity” (Rescher 1997: 14). That is, objectivity is always a 
 temporary and preliminary result of a process of interactions between different members of a community, 
 instead of a hammered out ahistorical and context-free consensus (Rescher 1995, 1997). 
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cognitive, evaluative, and practical– that have different objects, but are interrelated in 
everyday practice. 
 Having elaborated Rescher‟s concept of rationality, in the next subsection an 
inquiry is made of how this concept of rationality can be helpful in constructing a 
framework for a connection between public theology and economics. 
 
5.3.2 A framework for establishing a connection between public theology and economics 
As argued above, Rescher‟s value theory safeguards the idea of “value objectivity”, which 
enables public theologians and economists to construct cogent evaluative arguments. These 
cogent evaluative arguments shape one of the three dimensions of human rationality, 
evaluative rationality.  
For public theologians, evaluative arguments are focused on the interpretation, 
articulation, and critique of the horizons of ultimate meaning that are present in everyday 
practices, in order to contribute to a viable civil society. As was elaborated in previous 
chapters, the different approaches to economic theory that have been explored show an 
interest in evaluative arguments. Behavioral economics argue that each “choice 
architecture” that is constructed is evaluative although they do not outline an explicit 
evaluative orientation for these interventions. Happiness economics does explicitly outline 
an evaluative orientation, although it fixates the ultimate end of economic behavior and 
development in the experience of happiness. The capability approach allows for open 
evaluative deliberation, both at the individual level (“evaluative reasoning”) and at the 
social level (“positional objectivity”). As the evaluative perspective in Sen‟s account of the 
capability approach is both more explicitly elaborated than the perspectives in behavioral 
economics, and formulated in a more open way than in Layard‟s understanding of 
happiness economics, in this section, Sen‟s interpretation of the capability approach is used 
as an example of how an approach in economics can be connected to public theology, 
using Rescher‟s theoretical framework of value objectivity and rationality. 
Both someone‟s ultimate horizon of meaning and her freedom to pursue the ends 
that she has reason to value within the different domains of life, refer to a “good” that is 
inherently related to her situation in life, her possibilities and impossibilities for choosing 
certain paths of action within her context. It is this “good” which determines what is 
(ultimately) valuable. As Rescher argues: 
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Values provide the requisite means for the orientation of our thought. And they 
accordingly make a crucial contribution to the formulation of our worldview, in 
particular, to our view of our own proper place within the scheme of things. (…) 
It is our dedication to values that ultimately gives meaning to our lives. In the final 
analysis, our yearning for transcendence is not a “selfish” yearning for something 
that appertains specifically to our own personal, individual selves –we have too 
“realistic” an appreciation of our finitude to demand the impossible. Our impetus 
to transcendence reflects a commitment to something abstract and timeless –to 
principles, ideals, and values. As we should, and generally do realize, such factors 
are not just more durable, but also something “higher” than ourselves (Rescher 
1993: 249) 
 
Values are thus considered by Rescher as points of orientation for someone‟s thought, –
and, as a result, as an orientation for someone‟s actions116–, and function to determine 
someone‟s position within the larger frame of human life, or even “all of life” (cf. section 
1.2). Values –which provide guidance as to what choices are to be made in everyday 
actions– can therefore be argued to connect these everyday actions as a pursuit of the 
things that someone has reason to value to her ultimate horizon of meaning. The 
realization of the values that represent the ultimate horizon of meaning in the different 
domains of freedom, as Rescher puts it, “reflects a commitment to something „higher117‟ 
than ourselves” (Rescher 1993: 249). 
Someone‟s ultimate horizon of meaning thus consists of an image that reflects an 
ultimately valuable good or situation that is not yet realized, but to the realization of 
which someone can contribute through her actions. That is, there is a tension that is 
inherent to the discrepancy between someone‟s current situation in life, and a(n imaginary) 
situation in which her ultimate values are realized; a tension that can motivate someone to 
choose actions that improve her current situation in light of the values that she deems to be 
ultimate. On the side of Sen‟s understanding of development, the political, economic, and 
                                                 
116 This is not to say that all human actions are consciously deliberated upon. Research indicates that a great part 
 of our actions take place as a result of habitual patterns (cf. Dijksterhuis et al. 2006). Still, this research also 
 confirms that there are actions in which human beings use their capacity of rationality in order to reflect upon 
 both the ends and means of their conduct (Rescher 1993). 
117 By using the word “higher”, Rescher does not refer to an “otherworldly” reality, but to the idea that the values 
 that are of ultimate importance to someone, for her, transcend “all of life”. These values are of such great 
 importance, that all of life should be directed toward their realization.  
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social domains of life are the evaluative spaces in which someone can pursue the ends that 
constitute an improvement to her situation. In the rationale of the capability approach, in 
each of the domains of life, someone has reason to value certain ends –and “development” 
refers to an increased freedom (i.e., the “capability”) to strive for the realization of these 
ends in order to improve her situation in life.  
As such, the “good” that is captured in someone‟s ultimate horizon of meaning 
and her evaluations in the different domains of life, both point to a situation in which 
someone acts to realize that what is of the highest value to her. In such a situation 
“ultimate value” and “that which someone has reason to value” are aligned.  
This situation, in which someone acts to realize an ultimately good way of living 
(for her, in her specific context, etc.), can be captured by Rescher‟s concept “human 
flourishing”. As was related in section 5.2, human flourishing is the result of the 
fulfillment of the various needs that are inherent to being human. As Rescher argues, these 
needs are not limited to “nourishment and protection against the elements for the 
maintenance of health” but also encompass “information (cognitive orientation), affection, 
freedom of action, and much else besides” (Rescher 1997: 181). Human flourishing also 
refers to a situation in which life as a human being is enacted and realized in a “full” or 
“optimal” way, that is, lived in such a way that its actions are congruent with that which 
someone considers to be ultimately important, her ultimate horizon of meaning (Cf. 
Csikszentmihalyi 1990, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2000). 
By using the concept “human flourishing” to connect the enactment of freedom 
(within the different domains discerned by Sen) and the ultimate horizon of meaning, an 
intricate interrelation between practical rationality (considerations on finding the best 
mode of action, making decisions, etc.) and evaluative rationality (deliberation about what 
is valuable) is constituted. The scheme below illustrates the connection between the 
ultimate horizon of meaning, human flourishing, the different domains of human action 
(as freedom to pursue the ends that someone has reason to value) and someone‟s concrete 
actions. 
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Someone‟s ultimate horizon of meaning reflects an image of human flourishing (I). This 
means that the ultimate horizon of meaning contains an image that symbolically represents 
human existence (beliefs and values) and actions as human beings in an ultimately good, 
true, and beautiful way. Human flourishing, then, can be elaborated118 by means of the 
different domains of freedom discerned by Sen, such as the “political”, “economic”, 
“social”, “security”, and many other things that are inherently important to “being 
human”. Using Rescher‟s cultivation hierarchies (5.2), these fundamental domains of 
freedom as aspects of being human can be connected to decisions and choices at the level 
of actual practices of people (III). That is, a concrete decision in a certain context and time 
can be connected via the different levels of a cultivation hierarchy (rules, norms and 
criteria, controlling values) to a governing finality within one of the domains of freedom 
(such as “welfare” for the economic, and “friendship” for the social domain). These 
finalities within the domains of freedom as they are discerned by Sen, when united and 
thought as realized in a perfect balance all at the same time, comprise the image of human 
flourishing (II). 
                                                 
118 As was indicated, Sen‟s evaluative perspective in which he discerns different domains of freedom is an example 
 of an approach in economics with which public theology can connect. The “Big Seven” that are elaborated by 
 Layard (2005) can also function as domains in which someone by means of cultivation hierarchies strives for 
 the realization of human flourishing. 
“Human Flourishing” 
Social 
Ultimate horizon  
of meaning 
Economic Political Security (other) 
Actual practices (decisions, choices) 
Cultivation 
Hierarchies 
Cultivation 
Hierarchies 
Cultivation 
Hierarchies 
Cultivation 
Hierarchies 
(1) 
(1I) 
(1II) 
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The enactment of someone‟s ultimate horizon of meaning in her attempt to realize 
human flourishing is relevant for the community and surroundings in which she lives. As 
was argued in section 1.2, the characterizing aspect of an ultimate horizon of meaning, is 
that it encompasses not just “someone‟s whole life”, but “all of life”. In the actions that are 
directed at human flourishing, and via human flourishing are connected to the ultimate 
horizon of meaning, an attempt is made to achieve something that is of relevance to “all of 
life”. The directedness towards this image of what is ultimately meaningful is thus not a 
“private” affair: human flourishing is not to be understood as an “isolated individual 
flourishing”, but as the enactment of being human within someone‟s context, the 
community and surroundings. Instead of being private –i.e., restricted to the individual and 
personal sphere of interests–, through connecting the horizon of ultimate meaning to 
everyday actions (via human flourishing and cultivation hierarchies), the publicness of the 
ultimate horizon of meaning is confirmed. This is a crucial point for both public theology 
and the capability approach. For the capability approach, as was related in sections 4.3 and 
4.4, the search for positional objectivity in open evaluative debates in a pluralist democratic 
society is pivotal for creating a perspective of the ends that are to be strived for in 
economic policy (in order to foster development as the freedom to pursue the ends that 
people have reason to value, cf. Sen 1999). For public theology, the affirmation that 
ultimate horizons of meaning are relevant for public life enables the contribution to a 
viable civil society that theologians want to make by the interpretation, articulation, and 
critique of these ultimate horizons of meaning. The fact that the ultimate horizons of 
meaning with which people live (whether these horizons are religious, secular humanist, or 
unaffiliated with any tradition) are related to the image of human flourishing and the 
search for its enactment in everyday actions in the different domains of life, outlines the 
importance of the ultimate horizons of meaning in the debates about economic 
development. 
 
5.3.3 The Weberian dichotomy between means-ends and value rationality revisited 
As was elaborated in Chapter 1, according to Weber, means-ends rationality is at its zenith 
in the economic domain. Economic decisions and transactions –formalized through 
exchanges of money– are exemplary cases in which the only question that is at stake is the 
determination of how to use the means that are available in the most efficient way, i.e., in a 
way that achieves the most ends. That is, the means-ends rationality at work in the 
economic domain according to Weber is one of cognitive “calculation and control” 
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(Carruthers and Espeland 1991: 32). In this understanding, the economic domain can be 
considered an isolated domain, in which only cognitive calculation is relevant. Questions 
about what is valuable and about which ends are to be pursued, thus fall outside the 
economic domain (cf. Becker and Stigler 1977).  
Moreover, as Weber‟s concept of value rationality –the concept of rationality by 
means of which there can be deliberation about what is valuable– is a subjective concept, 
the evaluative questions about meaning of life and contributing to a viable civil society 
cannot be taken up by public theologians and economists, as one of the basic tenets of 
academic discourse is that academic arguments are no matter of subjective preference, but 
strive for objectivity in the sense of intersubjectivity. As such, based on Weber‟s 
interpretation of rationality, a connection between public theology and economics is not 
possible. 
As the example of Sen‟s perspective on economic development makes clear, there 
are economists who do engage in creating an evaluative framework for economic 
development, and understand the economic domain as something that is closely 
interrelated and interdependent with other domains, such as the political and social. An 
argument such as Sen‟s thus appears to negate the Weberian view of the economic as 
purely calculative and bereft of evaluation: in Sen‟s perspective on the economic domain, 
there are other ends than “maximum efficiency” –which was outlined as the central goal of 
economic analysis by neoclassical economist Fox (cf. Chapter 2.3). Yet, while providing a 
more encompassing vision of what the economic domain comprises, Sen does not 
specifically address the question on the “divorce” between means-ends and value 
rationality, and subjectivity of value rationality that is raised by Weber‟s perspective119. 
 Rescher does directly deal with this “divorce” between means-ends and value 
rationality. He addresses the idea that value rationality is subjective by commenting on the 
work of David Hume (Rescher 1997: 176-186). In a famous passage, Hume argued:  
 
It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the 
scratching of my finger. It is not contrary to reason for me to choose my total 
ruin… It is as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledged lesser 
                                                 
119 As was argued in Chapter 4, Sen appears to endorse an evaluative concept of rationality, such as Rescher‟s. 
 Yet, he does not make his views on rationality explicit in this regard. See Peter and Schmid (2007), Pauer-
 Studer (2007). 
151 
good to my greater, and to have a more ardent affection for the former than the 
latter (Hume 1964: 458, quoted in Rescher 1997: 177). 
 
As such, Hume appears to claim that reason cannot contribute to an argument about what 
is valuable. That is, in his view, preferences are subjective and a matter of idiosyncratic 
whim. In Rescher‟s view, however,  
 
reason can and should deliberate not only about what it is ill-advised to believe 
(because it is probably at odds with the truth), but also about what it is ill-advised 
to esteem (because it is probably at odds with our interests) (Rescher 1997: 177). 
 
Instead of the “divorce” between questions about means and ends, between cognitive and 
evaluative affairs, that is created by Hume and Weber, Rescher considers means and ends 
to be both part of rational deliberation. The crucial point here, is that instead of referring 
to “preferences”, Rescher uses evaluative “interests” as a parallel to cognitive “truth”. The 
interests of human beings are not something subjective in Rescher‟s perspective, as they 
inhere in the needs that are intrinsically related to the nature of human beings. Therefore, 
he argues:  
 
Rationality involves two sorts of issues –means and ends. The rationality of means 
is a matter of factual information alone –of what sorts of moves and measures lead 
efficiently to objectives. But the rationality of ends is a matter not of information 
but of legitimation. It is not settled just by factual inquiry, but involves appraisal 
and evaluative judgment. And in the larger scheme of things both aspects are 
needed: ends without requisite means are frustrating, means without suitable ends 
are unproductive and pointless. Accordingly, rationality has two sides: an 
axiological (evaluative) concern for the appropriateness of ends and an 
instrumental (cognitive) concern for effectiveness and efficiency in their 
cultivation. The conception of rationality fuses these two elements into one 
integral and unified whole (Rescher 1997: 183). 
 
Hence, rationality encompasses both instrumental (cognitive) and axiological (evaluative) 
concerns. In rationality, questions of means and ends are interrelated: focusing on only on 
either means or ends leads to a limited and unsatisfactory account of the questions and 
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problems in human action. As was related in section 5.2, the objectivity of evaluative 
arguments –which Weber denies– is possible in Rescher‟s pragmatist philosophical 
framework. Cognitive and evaluative discernment and judgment follow a similar pattern, 
and the cogency of evaluative arguments can be grounded in cultivation hierarchies, that 
link concrete contextual decisions to overarching finalities of human action (which are the 
elements that, when taken together, shape the image of human flourishing). 
 Thus, based on Rescher‟s value theory and elaboration of rationality, the 
Weberian dichotomy between means-ends and value rationality can be overcome, by 
enabling value objectivity and by elucidating the interrelatedness between the cognitive and 
evaluative (and practical) domains of rationality. All of human action, of which economic 
behavior is part, can be characterized by a continuous interaction between the beliefs and 
values that people follow when they act, and new insights based upon new experience that 
someone acquires in the process of action. As such, in all domains of human action, 
including the economic, evaluative questions –determining what is valuable, and what ends 
are to be pursued– are relevant120. 
In sum, the concept of rationality that is elaborated by Rescher offers an 
encompassing view of (rational) human action. It integrates the questions of “means” and 
the questions of “ends” that were differentiated and perceived as separated and 
autonomous by Weber, based on the dichotomy between facts and values, and 
concomitant possibility of objectivity for (cognitive) means-ends and impossibility of 
objectivity of (evaluative) value rationality. Therefore, the hindrance that Weber‟s 
understanding of rationality poses for questions of meaning of life in economic behavior as 
it was perceived in Chapter 1, is resolved by Rescher‟s understanding of rationality. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that by using Rescher‟s work, a framework has 
been constructed that enables a connection between public theology and economics. The 
question that remains for public theology, is how the philosophical understanding of the 
evaluative relation between human flourishing and the ultimate horizon of meaning in the 
connection to economics can be understood theologically. That is, are there ways to 
theologically appropriate the philosophical connection between economic behavior, human 
flourishing, and horizons of ultimate meaning? In the next section, some indications are 
given on how public theologians can make use of the connection between economic 
behavior, human flourishing, and ultimate horizons of meaning that has been constructed 
                                                 
120 Several authors within economics have provided explorative analyses of setting ends and other evaluative 
 considerations within economic choice, see, for instance Sen 1977, Hirschman 1984, Crespo 2007. 
153 
in this section in their theological work, by interpreting transcendence in an axiological 
way. 
 
5.4 AN AXIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF TRANSCENDENCE IN RELATION TO 
ECONOMIC PRACTICES 
5.4.1 Axiological theism: transcendence as an evaluative perspective 
The connection between public theology and economics is based on the central tenet that 
human beings are not only seeking cognitive beliefs or pursuing actions, but are also, 
fundamentally, evaluative creatures, geared at flourishing as human beings (Rescher 1993: 
253, 1997: 181). The evaluative arguments regarding human flourishing encompass the 
complete range from concrete (economic) decisions about everyday basic needs (such as 
food, housing, social interaction) to the ultimate horizon of meaning that people have in 
their life. The pursuit of these interrelated aspects of human flourishing takes place in a 
dynamically recursive interaction between evaluative and practical rationality in human 
conduct (Murray 2004a). In elaborating his perspective on rationality and evaluation, 
Rescher considers both basic needs and the search for a meaningful life as inherent 
interests of human beings. He comments on the search for a meaningful life by expressing 
it as a “yearning for transcendence”: 
 
Being human involves a commitment to ideality –a striving toward something 
larger and better than life. Homo sapiens is a creature that yearns for 
transcendence, for achieving value and meaning above and beyond121 the buzzing 
confusion of the world‟s realities (Rescher 1993: 249). 
 
Rescher thus concludes that human beings yearn for and are directed towards a 
“transcendence” (Rescher 1993: 248-253). How can this “directedness towards a 
transcendence” be elaborated upon, in light of the connection between public theology and 
economics based on evaluative rationality that was constituted in this chapter? 
                                                 
121 Again, it needs to be emphasized that in speaking about something “above and beyond the buzzing confusion 
 of the world‟s realities”, this does not refer to something “otherworldly”. That is, while the achievement of 
 meaning of life inheres in a directedness towards values that encompass “all of life” and are thus “larger than 
 (someone‟s individual) life”, these values are part and parcel of human existence. I.e., they are not located in a 
 separate realm of the divine, such as the “super natura” of neoscholasticism. 
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A promising possibility for the understanding and appropriation of the 
directedness towards transcendence in the connection between public theology and 
economics is a concept that is used by Rescher: axiological theism (Rescher 2007). 
Rescher argues as follows: 
 
For the axiological theist, commitment to God is a matter of value-based desire 
and, at most, hope rather than a probatively assured confidence derived from the 
evidential impetus of (…) rational demonstration. (…) A fundamentally 
evaluative position is at issue rather than one that bears on existence as such, a 
position that reflects one‟s deepest hopes, wants, and fears. Does one want a God 
who would avenge one‟s wrongs and wreak havoc on one‟s enemies, (…) a God of 
justice to punish wrongs and reward good deeds, or a God of love, understanding 
and forgiveness? (Rescher 2007: 2) 
 
Axiological theism expresses an evaluative relation between a person and the transcendent 
reality or “God122” she believes in. That is, the person desires, yearns, and hopes for a 
certain God (Rescher 2007: 1-3, Greek axioô: to deem worthy, to value). This is a crucial 
difference compared to a cognitive or “doxastic” approach, in which the actual existence of 
God is the central concern123. The doxastic approach to transcendence pivots on a person‟s 
beliefs and convictions, while the axiological approach pivots on someone‟s values 
(Rescher 2007: 2). From the perspective of axiological theism, the question that is at stake 
in someone‟s actions and evaluations is not “do you believe in the existence of  (a) God?”, 
but rather, “if there were to be a God, what kind of God would you yearn and hope for?”.  
When considered from the viewpoint of axiological theism, the evaluative orientation in all 
of someone‟s actions –the yearning and hope for the realization of what is ultimately 
valuable– can be said to refer to an idea of God. Axiological theism functions as a 
philosophical concept in Rescher‟s theory, it is part of a reflection on God based on 
human reason only –not a theological reflection from a specific evaluative or dogmatic 
point of view. Yet, axiological theism can be appropriated theologically, as the content of 
axiological theism –the evaluative perspective on God– for a person in a specific context 
                                                 
122 Rescher uses the term “God” as a philosopher, not as a theologian. 
123 A doxastic approach can be discerned in the debates between “theists” and “atheists”, in which the atheists 
 often seek to convince the believers by arguing that there is no factual proof for the actual existence of God. 
 See, for instance, Dawkins 2006. 
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and time can very well be theological in the sense of a perspective on the meaning of life 
that allows for other sources of knowledge (tradition, revelation) than reason only, and 
thus goes beyond a philosophical approach. These other sources of knowledge (such as 
stories about the life and actions of the founder of a religion, or about “holy” persons) can 
–in conjunction with reason– be part of the ultimate horizon of meaning and the image of 
human flourishing that provide a directedness in someone‟s actions 
An example of an interpretation of the theological content of a specific tradition 
as an axiological relation can be found in the work of Paul Murray (2004a, 2004b). 
Murray considers the Christian directedness to God to be captured best by using an 
analogy, such as being in love, as he argues that: 
 
certitude in faith is best thought of as the conviction of being grasped by a reality 
that evokes one‟s trust while itself in turn eluding one‟s own grasp and the giving 
of cast-iron guarantees. (…) [Christian faith] is not a blind dogmatism (…) but a 
relation with the abundantly rich mystery of God which permanently eludes 
adequate understanding (Murray 2004b: 343, 344). 
 
It appears that Murray does not see Christian faith as a shape of doxastic theism, as he 
explicitly rejects certainty and adequate understanding (i.e., referring to cognitive 
knowledge, “facts”). Instead, Murray argues that 
 
Christian faith is most appropriately viewed as a venture lived in the face of 
abiding risk as the person of faith is continually exposed to the potentially 
disconfirming challenge of fresh situations (Murray 2004b: 344, original italics). 
 
Therefore, Murray takes an axiological approach to the understanding of the Christian 
faith in God, by focusing on the enactment of the three Christian theological virtues. 
These three virtues –faith, hope, and love– are all characterized by an “objective 
uncertainty” (Kierkegaard, cf. Murray 2004b: 343) regarding cognitive truth, yet they do 
contain an axiological or evaluative orientation. That is, the question whether someone‟s 
faith in God‟s existence is justified, or someone‟s hope for the realization of the Kingdom 
of God is realistic is irrelevant. What is relevant is the evaluative directedness in someone‟s 
actions. Murray summarizes this axiological focus in his interpretation of Christian 
discipleship, by relating that it entails  
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the dynamics of faithful attendance to the reality of things as held in being by God 
the sustaining source of all that is, of hopeful discerning of creative possibilities in 
the light of the ever fresh yet constant patterning of God‟s self-revealing truth and 
of loving enactment of certain of these possibilities inspired by the generative and 
transformative Spirit of God (Murray 2004: 341). 
 
Thus, Murray provides an example of how a Christian theological perspective on the 
directedness towards God can be interpreted and articulated as an axiological or evaluative 
directedness. 
How can axiological theism help in the theological appropriation of the 
connection between public theology and economics? The connection between public 
theology and economics centers on evaluative arguments. As was argued in 1.2 and 5.3, the 
ultimate horizon of meaning shapes the evaluative frame for all of a person‟s decisions and 
actions (via the idea of human flourishing and cultivation hierarchies, cf. scheme 5.3). 
Likewise, all of a person‟s decisions and actions are capable of contributing to the 
realization of the ultimate horizon of meaning. Each individual action and decision thus 
can be considered to contain an evaluative orientation, directed at the realization of 
something that is of ultimate value to the person. Therefore, axiological theism creates the 
possibility to reflect upon the theological perspective on God that is either explicitly or 
implicitly present in the ideas on what is of ultimate value that are present in someone‟s 
actions, evaluative arguments (cultivation hierarchies), idea of human flourishing, and 
ultimate horizon of meaning. 
 Arguing that a “perspective on God” is “implicitly present” might suggest that, by 
using axiological theism, it is assumed that all people are considered as implicit –or 
unknowing– “believers” –even if this goes against their own claim of being secularized, 
agnostic, or atheist. Yet, this is not the import nor the intention of axiological theism as it 
is proposed here. First, axiological theism is a concept that can enable a public theologian 
to interpret, articulate, and critique the evaluative orientation towards something that is of 
ultimate value in someone‟s actions and evaluative arguments, as if it were a commitment 
to a God. That is, the directedness towards a transcendent reality that can be discerned in 
the practices of people, has traditionally been interpreted by theologians as the relatedness 
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to “that what people name God 124”. The axiological commitment to God is thus the 
public theologian‟s concept or interpretive tool, just as economists (and philosophers and 
scientists) use interpretive tools to construct theories125. Second, it allows a public 
theologian to reframe the directedness towards or faith in the God of a particular religious 
tradition or philosophy of life as an evaluative orientation towards that what is deemed to 
be ultimately valuable. A public theologian can thus translate the evaluative import of a 
religious tradition or philosophy of life, and in doing so, contribute to a public debate on 
what is to be deemed valuable in a society. That is, public theologians can contribute to the 
search for positional (value) objectivity on the real interests of people, using the framework 
of cultivation hierarchies and human flourishing that was constructed in 5.3 based on 
Rescher‟s philosophical work. 
 In the next subsection, the work of a theologian is presented whose focus on 
“economic spirituality” can be understood as an example of an axiological focus on 
transcendence in an attempt to establish a connection between theology and economics. 
 
5.4.2 Consuming Faith: an example of an axiological perspective on transcendence126 
In his Consuming Faith: Integrating Who We Are with What We Buy, theologian 
Thomas Beaudoin (2006) reflects on the question how the decision to buy certain brands 
of products is related to someone‟s spirituality. That is, he focuses on the question, “how 
deeply ought I integrate who I am in faith with what I buy?” (Beaudoin 2006: 13). Brands, 
                                                 
124 “Et hoc est quod omnes dicunt Deum” (S.Th. I, II art. 3) Thomas Aquinas indicated five ways (viae) to God 
 (and not “proofs for the existence of God”, as some translations suggest, cf. Velecky 1994) that show how 
 human reason can encounter transcendence within perceived reality: matters that transcend human reason, and 
 therefore cannot be grasped by it. Having reached the limit of what natural theology (i.e. a purely 
 philosophical theology, based on human reason only) can attain, Aquinas adds that this transcendence is what 
 from a religious (in his case, Christian) viewpoint is named “God”. That is, a religious person takes the “leap 
 of faith” to name and interpret the encountered transcendence as her God, while someone who chooses the 
 follow reason only, will not. 
125 I.e., someone who is deciding whether to buy spaghetti or rice during her grocery shopping probably does not 
 conceive herself as a rational actor who strives to maximize her utility under the limitation of a budget 
 constraint, while standard economic theory does use concepts such as “rationality” and “utility maximization” 
 to interpret her behavior. Cf. Friedman 1953. 
126 In this subsection, the work of a theologian is discussed as an example of how an axiological perspective on 
 transcendence can be related to economics. Deirdre McCloskey‟s The Bourgeois Virtues could prove to be a 
 very good example of how an economist relates economic practices (i.e., the development of capitalism) to the 
 ultimate values that people adhere to (in McCloskey‟s approach, this is referred to as the “sacred”). For 
 reasons of brevity and cogency of argument, here, only the way a theologian uses an axiological approach is 
 discussed as an example. Cf. McCloskey 2006.  
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according to Beaudoin, are ubiquitously present in the market for virtually each kind of 
product, and guide a consumer in her economic choice. 
 The consumer is guided by brands, because brands refer to images and values –
such as “high-quality”, “real American”, “stylish and elegant”, or “environmentally 
responsible”– that can be meaningful to her (Beaudoin 2006: 5, cf. Klein 1999). Wearing 
a T-shirt from a fashionable brand discloses a message to the person who wears it, and to 
other people around her, about who she is and who she wants to be: choosing a T-shirt 
from a particular brand is part of the way she performs her identity. As such, Beaudoin 
argues that brands are connected to the search and sense of self (Beaudoin 2006: 5-7). 
 Beaudoin –a loyal buyer of certain brands himself– started an inquiry to find out 
how the brands he supported through his purchases produced their goods and managed 
their affairs. By means of this inquiry, Beaudoin wanted to know what kind of economic 
realities –the wages and work conditions of employees, production processes– were behind 
the brands that he patronized through his consumption of coffee, clothing, etc. (Beaudoin 
2006: xiii-xiv). The results Beaudoin managed to gather through many phone calls and 
internet searches were unsettling: the companies Beaudoin supported through his 
purchases, refused to take responsibility for the wages, working conditions, and well-being 
of the employees who (often in Third-world countries) actually made the products. That 
is, through working with intermediary companies, the companies behind the brands 
Beaudoin bought were able to shed direct responsibility for the situation of the people who 
produced the goods they sold under their brand. Although the brand companies in this 
way were not legally responsible, for Beaudoin, buying a cup of coffee or T-shirt from a 
certain brand –by means of which he expresses his identity–, meant an act of support for 
the –often, to Western standards, horrible– working conditions of the people who 
produced the brand products he bought. 
 Thus, in the purchase of brand products, Beaudoin discerns both an aspect of 
giving shape to his identity, and an aspect of devoting money to certain economic 
practices. The fact that these two aspects are both present in one action –buying brand 
products– allows Beaudoin to make a connection between spirituality127 and economics. 
                                                 
127 For Beaudoin, the concept spirituality provides a way to a “common faith language” for traditional believers 
 and secularized people. In his view, spirituality is often defined as “experiential, interior, individual, freeing 
 and trustworthy, pure, and a connector between religions”. For more information on the emergence of 
 “spirituality” as a concept for interpreting practices of meaning of life, cf. Kourie 2006, Waaijman 2002. 
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Beaudoin defines economics by the way economists function in a society: “an 
economist is someone who advocates for a particular distribution of goods or resources in 
a community” (Beaudoin 2006: 18).  Spirituality, in Beaudoin‟s interpretation, is  
 
a relationship with the mysterious and gracious power that we ourselves did not 
create and that we cannot control. Spirituality thus starts and ends not with 
ethereal doctrines, but with our experiences of everyday life, especially the 
experience of our relationships (Beaudoin 2006: 19). 
 
Beaudoin continues, by commenting on the “power” that constitutes spirituality: 
 
We all experience ourselves as able to act in relation to others under a power we 
do not control –a power to go “beyond” ourselves in friendship and forgiveness, a 
power to obey our conscience even at great personal cost, a power to release 
ourselves to hope in otherwise hopeless situations. Because this reality is a force in 
our lives, I call it a power. Because this power is available to everyone irrespective 
of status, I call it gracious. Because this gracious power is never captured or 
plumbed by our attempts to name it, even to name it God, I call this gracious 
power mysterious (Beaudoin 2006: 19-20, original italics). 
 
For Beaudoin, as spirituality principally is a relational matter, a spiritual person is someone 
who bears a responsibility both in her relationship to “the mysterious and gracious Other” 
–that is, the power that is experienced in life–, and to other people (Beaudoin 2006: 20). 
By defining spirituality in this way, and connecting it to everyday practices and 
experiences, in Beaudoin‟s perspective, every person can be spiritual. Likewise, according to 
Beaudoin, every person is an “economist”, in the sense that, by buying products, she 
advocates a particular distribution of resources in their community128. For Beaudoin, 
someone‟s spirituality is connected to her economic perspective and vice versa: 
 
                                                 
128 Beaudoin relates the case of a poor American child wearing a cheap logoed T-shirt as a “devastating symbol” 
 of how poverty and exploitation can go together in the current market system (Beaudoin 2006: 66). The child 
 is poor, as her parents have lost their job because of a company shifting jobs to a country where labor is 
 cheaper. Yet, by buying and wearing a cheap T-shirt, –unwillingly and unconsciously, and without a free 
 choice–  support is given to the dire labor conditions (i.e. sweatshops, child labor, deprivation of basic human 
 rights) in the low-wage country.  
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Our spirituality always has an economic dimension: the distribution of resources 
encourages or discourages people from living in fidelity to the Other and others. 
Further, living in relation to the mysterious and gracious power must influence 
how we think resources should be used and distributed. And likewise, our 
economics always has a spiritual dimension: every advocacy for a distribution of 
resources is a manifestation of that to which one is accountable. In every economic 
activity, we are stating who or what we stand for (Beaudoin 2006: 21). 
 
Therefore, Beaudoin proposes that someone‟s economic behavior –through which she 
advocates a certain distribution of resources– is anchored in her spirituality. For Beaudoin, 
this enables the possibility of what he calls “integrating who we are with what we buy” 
(Beaudoin 2006: 21). Economic behavior is “spiritually volatile”, it can be an enactment of 
either a directedness towards the Other and others, or an expression of narcistic self-
interest (Beaudoin 2006: 7, 19). In Beaudoin‟s view, economic spirituality –the 
interrelatedness between someone‟s spirituality and her advocacy for a particular 
distribution of resources– is to be defended publicly, in order to acknowledge that each 
person has obligations to the relationships, communities, and traditions that helped her 
become an individual (Beaudoin 2006: 18-19). 
In order to find a foundation for a Christian economic spirituality, Beaudoin finds 
inspiration in the way Jesus, whom he calls “God‟s Economist”, connected economics and 
spirituality. Beaudoin relates one of the parables in which Jesus presents his view on 
economic spirituality, the parable of Lazarus and the rich man. The core of Jesus‟ 
economic spirituality is that no human being “owns” his or her entitlement (i.e. the goods 
or money that he or she possesses) in an exclusive sense, and that all human beings have 
equal rights to a life of dignity and flourishing (Beaudoin 2006: 31-35, 103). Translated 
to concrete economic measures, this calls for a focus on the needs of people who lack 
certain resources (the “option for the poor”). In a Christian perspective, the entitlement 
that people have is part of Creation, which ultimately is not “owned” by them, but only 
belongs to God. Entitlement –possession of goods– thus becomes a “gift”. An important 
gift, nonetheless, as it is to create “an innate sense that we should be at peace and even 
flourish” (Beaudoin 2006: 105). Therefore, in Beaudoin‟s theological analysis of economic 
spirituality,  
 
161 
one‟s resources are never fully one‟s own and are to be used for  the sake of more 
life for all, especially those whose lives are most threadbare. (...) In the encounter 
with that power on which we all depend, we can only render ourselves faithful 
stewards of our gifts (Beaudoin 2006: 33, 35).  
 
An important point in this regard, Beaudoin argues, is that anchoring economic choice in 
spirituality is not a matter of “morality” or “moralizing”. The question is not one of 
thoughtlessly following certain rules, that, for instance, prescribe that every person who has 
abundant resources at her disposal, should give money to the poor. Beaudoin calls this “the 
big turn-off”, as it 
 
attempts to embarrass people into action by piously berating them or their habits. 
It replaces thinking; it substitutes the incitement of guilt for real economic analysis 
(Beaudoin 2006 41-42).  
 
Instead, economic spirituality entails a practice and process of acting out of freedom in the 
attempt to choose for a good and just distribution, from the personal responsibility that 
arises from the relationship with the mysterious and gracious power (Beaudoin 2006: 19-
21, 33-34) and not from a set of rules. 
 The final end of engaging in economic spirituality, in Beaudoin‟s perspective, is to 
let one‟s spirituality or faith become a “consuming faith”. That is, a faith that “constantly 
questions uncritical faith in consumption” and which “does not allow itself to be restricted 
to good intentions”, but instead “slowly, unevenly, and with many reversals influences the 
practices of purchasing” (Beaudoin 2006: 107). 
 
5.4.3 Economic spirituality as an axiological perspective on public theology 
There are several aspects in Beaudoin‟s economic spirituality approach that make it a good 
example of an axiological approach to public theology. 
 First, economic spirituality entails support for a particular distribution of 
resources, in line with who someone wants or strives to be from the perspective of her 
spiritual relationship with the experienced mysterious and gracious power. The spirituality 
thus manifests itself in a twofold evaluative way: in an evaluative image of who someone 
desires to become, which can be achieved or performed through making evaluative 
judgments in economic decisions –advocating a particular distribution of resources instead 
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of another one. Hence, both the image or identity that someone strives for, and the way 
she engages in economic decisions are evaluative affairs from the perspective of her 
economic spirituality. Using the framework that was elaborated in section 5.3, the 
evaluative image that someone desires to be can be related to her idea of human 
flourishing. That is, through aligning the evaluative judgments in economic decisions (i.e., 
following a cultivation hierarchy) with her image of human flourishing, someone can make 
her spirituality –her ultimate horizon of meaning– manifest. 
Second, Beaudoin provides a Christian interpretation of the spiritual relationship 
with the experienced mysterious and gracious power based on the life and teachings of 
Jesus of Nazareth. From this perspective, Beaudoin interprets the mysterious and gracious 
power as going “beyond” yourself in faith, hope, and love, in the friendship, compassion, 
and trust that are to characterize someone‟s relationships with others. Faith, hope, and love 
are the guiding values (theological virtues) in the Christian tradition. In Beaudoin‟s 
interpretation, these guiding values constitute the import for the enactment of a Christian 
person‟s spirituality. Spirituality is thus no “doxastic” matter, as it is not based on a 
cognitive or factual claim about the existence of the “power” which is the source of 
spirituality, or as Beaudoin puts it: spirituality entails no “ethereal doctrines” (Beaudoin 
2006: 18-20). The “power” is experienced as an evaluative –axiological– directedness, 
which is interpreted by Beaudoin using the Christian evaluative language of faith, hope, 
and love. In this way, Rescher‟s philosophical “yearning for transcendence” can be 
interpreted theologically. 
Furthermore, Beaudoin interprets anchoring economic behavior in spirituality as a 
responsibility. If someone desires to be a Christian, this is to be constituted by every day 
trying to perform it, and in this enactment an evaluative directedness emerges from the 
experienced “power” as a responsibility. Responsibility itself is an evaluative 
predisposition, as it indicates that someone is motivated or obliged to care for someone or 
something else, and holds herself accountable in this relationship. The responsibility for a 
Christian is translated to a “stewardship” over the gifts someone has received herself: 
someone‟s entitlement is not ultimately hers, but is to be used in such a way that it enables 
and fosters human flourishing and dignity, especially with regard to the poor. “Dignity” 
and “human flourishing”, again, are evaluative concepts, that make economic spirituality 
and its resultant responsibility for others an evaluative or axiological matter. 
Third, anchoring economic behavior in spirituality entails a responsibility to 
choose (and in doing so advocate) a particular distribution of goods, and therefore 
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presupposes a freedom to choose. Being free to choose and responsible for one‟s choice 
gives economic spirituality a profound public orientation in Beaudoin‟s work. That is, the 
responsibility based on which someone makes free, deliberate choices calls for a public 
accountability. The choices that are the enactment of someone‟s economic spirituality are 
no matter of instinctive behavior, nor of idiosyncratic whim. As someone is considered 
responsible from the perspective of her spirituality, she should be able to give a public 
account of her evaluative reasons for making particular choices. In Beaudoin‟s argument, 
this public dimension of responsibility in economic spirituality functions both to counter a 
narcistic tendency that can be discerned in some interpretations of spirituality (Beaudoin 
2006: 18-19), and a moralizing certainty about being “right” (Beaudoin 2006: 59, 107). 
Instead of moralizing –which Beaudoin considers as thoughtlessly following predetermined 
rules–, economic spirituality is a question of “getting the ends right”. Therefore, in 
Beaudoin‟s account of economic spirituality, evaluative deliberation is directly connected to 
both someone‟s ultimate horizon of meaning and to her public responsibility as a member 
of a society (Beaudoin 2006: 106). 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
After having explored the affinity of different approaches in economic theory with the 
central interests of public theology in the chapters 2, 3, and 4, in this chapter, a framework 
has been developed by means of which public theologians are able to connect to the work 
of economists. By using insights from Rescher‟s theory of value and theory of rationality, a 
foundation has been created for this connection, that can function as a “bridge” between 
public theology and economics. Both central interests of public theology, which were 
outlined in the first chapter, “meaning of life” and “contributing to a viable civil society”, 
can be addressed by this framework. In doing so, this chapter has also addressed the 
tension between the increased dominance of means-ends rationality in our society and the 
concomitant impossibility of answering questions of meaning of life that was discerned in 
Weber‟s social theory of modern society. 
The example of Beaudoin‟s theological approach to an “economic spirituality” has 
been used as an illustration of the way the framework –that was constructed using 
Rescher‟s philosophical work– can be appropriated in a theological way, by understanding 
economic spirituality in an axiological way. As the example of Beaudoin‟s work indicates, it 
is possible to engage in a theological analysis of economic practices by taking an axiological 
or evaluative approach. 
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In the next chapter, an overview of the results of this thesis is presented, its 
limitations are pinpointed, and suggestions for further research are given. 
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CHAPTER 6  
 
CONCLUSION  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, a framework that enables a connection between public theology 
and economics was elaborated. The present chapter concludes this thesis, by presenting an 
overview of the results, a reflection on the limitations, and suggestions for further research. 
This thesis started off with the observation that in our time, questions of meaning 
of life have become increasingly difficult to address, because of the developments of 
secularization, individualization, and loss of tradition. By using Max Weber‟s theory of 
modernization (cf. Weber 1978), in which he distinguishes between means-ends 
rationality and value rationality, the current situation was interpreted as the result of an 
ongoing process of means-ends rationalization. Means-ends rationality defines efficient 
and effective relations between given ends and various possible means, but cannot give any 
guidance with regard to what is valuable and meaningful. Furthermore, the economic 
domain of society was identified as the field in which means-ends rationality is at its 
zenith, and where questions of what is valuable and meaningful are therefore not 
addressed. Still, from the perspective of public theology, questions of meaning of life are 
relevant, also and especially in the economic domain, as it increasingly determines the way 
people live and the possibilities that people have for realizing the life they consider to be 
worth living. As was related in section 1.3, in their interest in studying questions of 
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meaning of life, public theologians are “engaged with the same questions that vex social 
analysts” (Stackhouse 2007: 49). That is, they share an interest in both descriptive 
knowledge (discerning what is going on) and evaluative knowledge (discerning what ought 
to be). As, for several reasons, the study of questions of meaning of life in the economic 
domain was argued to be urgent, it was proposed that public theologians search for a 
connection with the work of economists that allows for the exchange of knowledge. 
However, previous attempts by theologians at making such a connection have proven 
unsuccessful, as theologians lack a framework for doing so (Brennan and Waterman 
2008). This thesis has sought to contribute to public theology, by furthering the 
possibilities at making a connection to economics by public theologians. The general 
question of this thesis was therefore phrased as follows: 
 
How can a connection that enables an exchange of knowledge between public 
theology and economics be established? (cf. section 1.3). 
  
In order to be able to answer this question, two subsequent steps were outlined. The first 
step consists in an inquiry of the affinity that different approaches in economic theory have 
with the central interests of public theology: “meaning of life” and “contributing to a 
viable civil society” (chapters 2, 3, and 4). The second step involves the elaboration of a 
framework that establishes a connection between public theology and economics. In the 
following section, the results of these two steps are summarized (6.2). In the final section, 
a reflection on the limitations of this thesis is presented, and some suggestions for further 
research are given (6.3). 
 
6.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS  
6.2.1 The first step: the search for affinity with public theology‟s central interests in 
economics 
In the chapters 2, 3, and 4, the affinity of four different approaches in economic theory 
with “questions of meaning of life” and “contributing to a viable civil society” was 
explored. This first step was geared at the ascertainment that the attempt by public 
theologians to connect to economic theory is a priori viable. That is, if a certain degree of 
resonance can be discerned in economics with the central interests of public theology, it 
pays to make the effort of connecting the work of public theologians and economists. If 
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there is no such affinity or resonance, the construction of a framework to connect public 
theology to economics comes down to building a castle in the sky. 
In the chapters 2, 3, and 4, four different approaches to economic theory were 
explored for their affinity with the central interests of public theology, in order to ascertain 
whether a connection between public theology and economics can in principle be 
envisioned: neoclassical economics, behavioral economics, happiness economics, and the 
capability approach. 
Chapter 2 concluded that the “default option” for theologians who have tried to 
connect their work to economics, neoclassical economics, is not able to establish a relation 
between economic behavior and questions of meaning of life. Also, the strict positive-
normative distinction prevents neoclassical economists from contributing to a viable civil 
society through their analyses, as they seek to remain value-neutral in their work.  
Behavioral economics, which was explored in chapter 3, offers significantly more 
promising perspectives. Some behavioral economists have ventured to incorporate meaning 
as a motivation for economic behavior in their theories, although their remains a tension 
with the utility maximization framework. Behavioral economists consider translating their 
findings to help people make better decisions through different versions of “light 
paternalism” as part of their work as scholars, which opens up the possibility of a 
contribution to a viable civil society. However, there appears to be no elaborated evaluative 
orientation that guides behavioral economists in doing so.  
Chapter 4 explored two approaches that both do explicitly outline evaluative 
orientations for economic behavior. Happiness economics, in the perspective of Richard 
Layard, considers meaningful orientations to life (values, philosophies of life, religion) to 
be of central import to achieving happiness. Layard also stresses the importance of strong 
social relations, and clearly outlines how he thinks economists and other scholars have the 
possibility and duty to contribute to society. The capability approach, as presented in 
Amartya Sen‟s Development as Freedom, offers ample room for the question of “meaning 
of life” in Sen‟s view of substantive freedom, and Sen‟s works even offer an interesting 
possibility for understanding meaning of life as a “commitment”. Also, Sen‟s views on the 
need for participation in public debates on finding a shared understanding of an evaluative 
metric, in the sense of a positional objectivity, show his concern with the viability of the 
civil society. 
Hence, with regard to both central interests of public theology, there is 
considerable affinity in behavioral economics, happiness economics, and the capability 
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approach. Neoclassical economics, however, as the “default approach” with which 
theologians have attempted to establish a connection, does not display a similar affinity. 
As was indicated in section 1.3, in the case of both central interests of public 
theology the question focuses on whether there is place for evaluative deliberation or 
evaluative arguments  –deliberation or arguments about values. Therefore, the explorations 
of the different approaches to economic theory with regard to their affinity with public 
theology‟s central interests, have also shed light on the position of these approaches 
towards evaluative deliberation and arguments. Neoclassical economics places evaluative 
deliberation outside its disciplinary domain, as evaluative arguments are deemed to be 
incapable of objectivity. Behavioral economics takes a different approach, by arguing that 
each “choice architecture” that is constructed is evaluative, also if, from an allegedly 
“value-neutral” position, no intervention in the decision process of economic actors is 
proposed. Yet, behavioral economists do not outline an explicit evaluative orientation for 
these interventions. Happiness economics and the capability approach do outline these 
evaluative orientations. Happiness economics, however, fixates the ultimate end of 
economic behavior and development in the experience of happiness. The capability 
approach allows for open evaluative deliberation, both at the individual level (“evaluative 
reasoning”) and at the social level (“positional objectivity”). 
The results of the chapters 2, 3, and 4 in the search for affinity with the central 
interests of public theology in the different economic approaches are summarized in the 
following scheme: 
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Questions of  
Meaning of Life 
Contributing to a  
Viable Civil Society 
Evaluative orientations 
and arguments 
Neoclassical 
economics 
Cannot identify meaning of 
life within idea of utility 
maximization. 
Explicitly not interested, as 
economics is conceived as a 
purely positive science. 
Are no part of 
economics, based upon 
a strict dichotomy 
between positive and 
normative approaches. 
Behavioral 
economics 
Can identify meaning as a 
motivation for economic 
behavior. Utility framework 
remains a benchmark. 
Economists are willing to 
engage in normative 
questions, based upon 
varieties of “light 
paternalism”. 
Each “choice 
architecture” is value-
laden. No specific 
evaluative orientation is 
elaborated. 
Happiness 
Economics 
Meaning of life is an 
important contributing 
factor to the experience of 
happiness. 
The principle of the 
Greatest Happiness requires 
a society with strong social 
ties and interaction. 
The experience of 
happiness is the 
ultimate end of all 
evaluative arguments. 
Capability 
Approach 
The free pursuit of ends that 
people have reason to value 
is commensurable with 
questions of meaning of life. 
An open, democratic society 
is necessary for the debates 
in which criteria for 
development are to be 
determined. 
Evaluative arguments 
are crucial in achieving 
positional (evaluative) 
objectivity. 
 
Summarizing the inquiry of the affinity which the different approaches in economics that 
have been studied show with the central interests of public theology, the results are 
hopeful. Except for neoclassical economics –which, ironically, has often been chosen by 
theologians as the “default” option to connect with–, in all approaches promising leads 
were discovered with regard to the two central interests of public theology. These leads –
such as the work on identity and symbolic utility by behavioral economists (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2000, 2005, Khalil 2000, 2004) and the search for objective standards of 
evaluation in the capability approach (Sen 1999)– may function as starting points for 
collaborative research by public theologians and economists. 
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6.2.2 The second step: the elaboration of a framework to connect public theology and 
economics 
At the beginning of chapter 5, it was argued that the framework for the connection 
between public theology and economics needs to be founded upon an argument for the 
validity of evaluative arguments. The argument for the validity of evaluative arguments is 
necessary to enable the possibility of objectivity in the work of public theologians and 
economists, with regard to both central interests of public theology, meaning of life and 
the viable civil society. By using Nicholas Rescher‟s theory of value, objectivity, and 
rationality (Rescher 1988, 1993, 1997, 2004), the validity of evaluative reasoning was 
laborated. A central concept in this regard is “cultivation hierarchy”, which connects 
concrete decisions to finalities, the governing ends of human conduct.  
With the help of Rescher‟s theory of value, objectivity, and rationality, a 
framework for the connection between public theology and the capability approach (as an 
example of an approach in economics that has affinity with public theology‟s central 
interests) was constructed. The framework is displayed in the scheme below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Someone‟s horizon of ultimate meaning contains an image that symbolically represents 
human existence (in terms of both beliefs and values) and actions as human beings in an 
ultimately good, true, and beautiful way. Therefore, it can be argued that a person‟s 
horizon of ultimate meaning reflects an image of human flourishing (I). Human 
“Human Flourishing” 
Social 
Ultimate horizon  
of meaning 
Economic Political Security (other) 
Actual practices (decisions, choices) 
Cultivation 
Hierarchies 
Cultivation 
Hierarchies 
Cultivation 
Hierarchies 
Cultivation 
Hierarchies 
(1) 
(1I) 
(1II) 
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flourishing, then, can be elaborated by means of the different domains of freedom 
discerned by Sen, such as the “political”, “economic”, “social”, “security”, and many other 
things that are inherently important to “being human”. Using Rescher‟s cultivation 
hierarchies (5.2), these fundamental domains of freedom as aspects of being human can be 
connected to decisions and choices at the level of actual practices of people (III). That is, a 
concrete decision in a certain context and time can be connected via the different levels of a 
cultivation hierarchy (rules, norms and criteria, controlling values) to a governing finality 
within one of the domains of freedom (such as “welfare” for the economic, and 
“friendship” for the social domain). These finalities within the domains of freedom as they 
are discerned by Sen, when united and thought as realized in a perfect balance all at the 
same time, comprise the image of human flourishing (II). 
As was argued in chapter 5, the enactment of someone‟s ultimate horizon of 
meaning in her attempt to realize human flourishing is relevant for the community and 
surroundings in which she lives. As was argued in section 1.2, the characterizing aspect of 
an ultimate horizon of meaning, is that it encompasses not just “someone‟s whole life”, but 
“all of life”. In the actions that are directed at human flourishing, and via human 
flourishing are connected to the ultimate horizon of meaning, an attempt is made to 
achieve something that is of relevance to “all of life”. The directedness towards this image 
of what is ultimately meaningful is thus not a “private” affair: human flourishing is not to 
be understood as an “isolated individual flourishing”, but as the enactment of being human 
within someone‟s context, the community and surroundings. Instead of being private, 
through connecting the ultimate horizon of meaning to everyday actions, the publicness of 
the ultimate horizon of meaning is confirmed. 
 In order to theologically appropriate the enactment of the ultimate horizon of 
meaning in the pursuit of human flourishing, it was proposed that transcendence is 
interpreted in an axiological sense. This means that transcendence is to be understood in 
terms of evaluation, rather than cognition (i.e., transcendence refers to something that is 
desired or hoped for, not something that exists). The work of Thomas Beaudoin (2003) 
served as an illustration of how a theological reflection on economic behavior can be 
interpreted in this axiological sense. 
 In the next section, some of the limitations of this thesis are pointed out, and 
suggestions for further research are given. 
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6.3 LIMITATIONS OF THIS THESIS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
By indicating new ways of engaging with economics as an academic discipline in two ways, 
this thesis has sought to contribute to public theology. First, an inquiry has been made of 
the affinity that new developments in economic theory have with the central interests of 
public theology. Second, a framework has been designed through which a connection 
between someone‟s economic decisions and ultimate horizon of meaning can be conceived. 
These two steps are intended to show a way by means of which public theologians can 
engage in a “worldly” theology, a theology of economic practices, in which they cooperate 
and exchange knowledge with, for instance, behavioral economists, happiness economists, 
or capability approach economists. 
In establishing a connection that enables the exchange of knowledge between 
public theology and economics, the result of this thesis can be interpreted as “paving the 
way” for further studies. This points out a limitation: although the affinity with several 
approaches in economic theory has been explored, and a framework for establishing a 
connection has been constructed, a next step that is to be taken is an actual cooperative 
study in which a public theologian and an economist participate. That is, in this thesis, no 
actual “public theology of economic behavior” is elaborated, in which a public theologian 
connects to the work of economists. The intent and scope of this thesis are to provide a 
“mediation” of the perspectives of public theologians and some of the new developments 
in economic theory, and not the construction of an actual public theology. 
However, the investigations in chapters 2, 3, and 4 do offer some leads based on 
which the connection between public theology and economics can be further elaborated. 
For instance, in the work of Beaudoin (2003) that was discussed in section 5.4, several 
points can be indicated where Beaudoin‟s analysis might be connected to the work of 
economists. 
 As was related in section 5.4, with regard to the question of “meaning of life”, 
Beaudoin formulates his idea of an economic spirituality as “integrating who we are with 
what we buy”. The question who we are –and, from an axiological perspective, who we 
desire to be–, can be connected to two perspectives from behavioral economics that were 
presented in chapter 3. Both George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton (2000, 2005, 2010) and 
Elias Khalil (2000, 2004) have introduced “identity” into economic theory. For instance, 
Khalil argues that in an economic decision, “symbolic utility” is provided to a person, 
which can be distinguished from “substantive utility”. If someone buys a T-shirt, the 
warmth is provided by the T-shirt is its substantive utility, because any T-shirt –
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independent of its brand or context– provides this. The symbolic utility, however, can 
differ greatly between T-shirts from different brands. As Beaudoin argues, behind every 
brand there is are economic practices, such as the conditions under which the T-shirt is 
produced in less developed countries, and the (lack of) concerns for environmental 
sustainability in the production process. The conditions under which a T-shirt has been 
produced have nothing to do with the warmth it provides, i.e., its substantive utility. Yet, 
they can be meaningful to the buyer, because, for example, buying a T-shirt that was 
produced in sweatshops in a less developed country and thus indirectly supporting the 
horrible working conditions of the workers goes against the values of someone who 
supports human rights. That is, the symbolic utility that is connected to the T-shirt also 
refers to the identity of the person who buys it, i.e. the person “who she wants to be”. In 
this way, insights from behavioral economics can help in establishing the connection 
between a public theological reflection on economic practices and economic theory. 
Also, in Beaudoin‟s perspective on economic spirituality a shared concern with 
Amartya Sen‟s capability approach can be discerned. Beaudoin has a clear interest in the 
determination of standards with regard to the Christian principles (or, using Rescher‟s 
terminology, finalities) of human dignity and flourishing. As Beaudoin (2003: 98) puts it, 
“human dignity (…) can easily ossify into [a] buzzword. We continually have to find 
evocative ways of describing dignity”. This continuous search for the meaning of the 
concepts dignity and flourishing can be connected to Sen‟s concern for positional 
objectivity, in terms of the constitution of finalities through public debate in an open and 
democratic society. 
These points indicate that it might be possible to further elaborate on questions 
raised by a theologian, using insights from behavioral economics and the capability 
approach. It is more difficult to find a point of connection with happiness economics, 
which was also discussed as a promising new approach in economic theory. In Beaudoin‟s 
argument, no concern for happiness in terms of “pleasure” or “pleasant experiences” comes 
to the fore. Instead, Beaudoin appears to warn for indulging in naïve consumerism, as it 
might be the case that the coffee or T-shirt which give someone pleasant experiences, are 
produced in a way that conflicts with her values. Put differently, the “happiness” that is 
sought by Beaudoin, seems to be of a different nature than the utilitarian happiness of 
“pleasure”. For Beaudoin, economic spirituality is part of the process of “becoming a 
Christian”, a process which is governed by a different evaluative orientation than a focus 
on “pleasure”. Still, this difference might prove to be an interesting starting point for a 
174 
discussion on the meaning of “happiness” between public theologians and happiness 
economists. 
Apart from Beaudoin‟s interest in “branding” and the relation between 
consumption and economic spituality, there are many other topics with regard to which 
the inquiries of public theologians and economists can be connected. For instance, some of 
the examples that were presented in chapter 1 –such as business spirituality, social banking, 
and microfinance– can provide interesting topics for cooperative research on the 
relationship between economic behavior and ultimate horizons of meaning. 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
 
Dit proefschrift beoogt een bijdrage te leveren aan de ontwikkeling van de publieke 
theologie, door te onderzoeken of de wetenschappelijke analyses van publieke theologen en 
economen aan elkaar gerelateerd kunnen worden. De centrale vraag is: hoe kan een relatie 
gelegd worden tussen publieke theologie en economie, die kennisuitwisseling mogelijk 
maakt? 
Publieke theologie kan gedefinieerd worden als de interpretatie, articulatie, en 
evaluatie van zingevingsvragen in de alledaagse praktijken van mensen in de hedendaagse 
maatschappij. In deze alledaagse praktijken voeren mensen gesprekken –met familie, 
vrienden, op het werk, etc.–  waarin zij op zoek zijn naar wat waar, goed, en mooi is in hun 
leven. Door de interpretatie, articulatie en evaluatie van zingevingsvragen willen publieke 
theologen bijdragen aan een levensvatbaar maatschappelijk middenveld (a viable civil 
society). 
Mensen ervaren hun leven als zinvol als zij kunnen bijdragen aan het 
verwezenlijken van iets dat zij waardevol vinden. Zij zijn in hun handelen als het ware 
gericht op een betekenisvolle „horizon‟, een perspectief dat hen aanzet en motiveert om te 
handelen. Ieder mens heeft verschillende betekenishorizonten, die meer of minder belang 
hebben in het dagelijks handelen. Als echter gekeken wordt naar wat iemand het 
allerbelangrijkste vindt in haar leven, –datgene wat zo belangrijk is dat het haar eigen leven 
in betekenis overstijgt–, kan een ultieme betekenishorizon onderscheiden worden. Publieke 
theologen richten zich in hun interpretaties, articulaties, en evaluaties van zingevingsvragen 
op de evaluatieve relatie tussen mensen en hun ultieme betekenishorizon. 
In de huidige maatschappelijke context zijn de antwoorden op zingevingsvragen 
niet langer vanzelfsprekend. Door voortgaande modernisering in termen van 
individualisering, verlies van traditie, en secularisering, lijkt een „cultuur van cynisme‟ 
ontstaan te zijn. Er wordt alleen gereflecteerd op het behalen van concrete, realiseerbare 
doelen, terwijl er geen handvaten zijn om discussies over waarden te voeren. 
Gebruikmakend van het begrippenkader van de socioloog Max Weber, kan gesteld worden 
dat de calculatieve doel-middelrationaliteit hoogtij viert, maar dat waardenrationaliteit –op 
basis waarvan de intrinsieke waarde van iets bepaald wordt– uit het zicht verdwijnt. Voor 
zingevingsvragen heeft dit als consequentie dat juist in publieke discussies over wat waar, 
juist, en mooi is, geen overtuigende argumentaties geformuleerd kunnen worden. 
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Voor publieke theologen zijn zingevingsvragen in het economisch domein van de 
samenleving een nieuw werkveld. Het grote, en nog steeds toenemend belang van 
economische overwegingen in onze samenleving („economisering‟) onderstreept de urgentie 
om als publieke theologen aandacht te besteden aan economische kwesties. Het is echter 
ook een grote uitdaging om over zingevingsvragen in economisch keuzegedrag na te 
denken, aangezien in Weber‟s visie in het economisch domein de calculatieve doel-
middelrationaliteit op zijn hoogtepunt is. Als publieke theologen zingevingsvragen in 
economisch keuzegedrag willen analyseren, kunnen zij baat hebben bij de inzichten van 
economen. Eerdere pogingen om vanuit de theologie een gesprek aan te gaan met de 
economie als wetenschap zijn weinig succesvol gebleken. Om vast te kunnen stellen of er 
voor publieke theologen aanknopingspunten zijn in het denken van economen, worden in 
deze studie verschillende hedendaagse economische theorieën onderzocht op hun affiniteit 
met de centrale interesses van de publieke theologie (hoofdstukken 2-4). Ten eerste wordt 
in kaart gebracht of deze theorieën ruimte bieden voor zingevingsvragen in economisch 
gedrag. Ten tweede wordt vastgesteld of vanuit deze theorieën een bijdrage aan een 
levensvatbaar maatschappelijk middenveld nagestreefd wordt. Als deze exploratie naar de 
affiniteit met de centrale interesses van de publieke theologie tot een positief resultaat leidt, 
kan in een tweede stap een model ontwikkeld worden waarin economisch keuzegedrag en 
zingeving op elkaar betrokken worden (hoofdstuk 5). 
 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt onderzocht of neoklassieke economie affiniteit heeft met de centrale 
interesses van publieke theologie. In de pogingen die theologen tot dusver hebben 
ondernomen om economen in gesprek te gaan, is neoklassieke economie de 
„standaardoptie‟. Neoklassieke economie gaat er van uit dat mensen in hun economisch 
gedrag zoveel mogelijk hun voorkeuren willen verwezenlijken, volledig rationeel zijn, en 
complete informatie hebben over de markt. Op deze manier zijn mensen gericht op 
„nutsmaximalisatie‟. Neoklassieke economen willen een waardenvrije wetenschap beoefenen: 
zij willen zich beperken tot feitelijke en causale analyses, voor evaluatieve oriëntaties is geen 
ruimte in hun werk. 
 Met behulp van een concreet voorbeeld van een gesprek tussen een theoloog 
(Stephen Long) en een neoklassieke econoom (Nancy Fox), worden de verschillen in hun 
benadering verkend. De belangrijkste verschillen hebben betrekking op de vraag hoe 
„waarde‟ tot stand komt, en wat het leidend principe van een (markt)economie moet zijn. 
In de ogen van neoklassiek econoom Fox is de waarde van een goed volledig subjectief: een 
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goed bevat geen intrinsieke waarde. Voor theoloog Long hebben goederen wel intrinsieke 
waarde (bijvoorbeeld menselijke organen, kinderen), en mag daarom niet alles op de markt 
verhandeld worden. Echter, volgens econoom Fox levert een vrije markt optimale efficiency 
en geeft een markt ieder mens –in principe– dezelfde mogelijkheden om goederen uit te 
wisselen. 
 Op basis van het gesprek tussen Long en Fox wordt geconcludeerd dat 
neoklassieke economen weinig tot geen affiniteit hebben met de centrale interesses van de 
publieke theologie. Het principe van nutsmaximalisatie (gebaseerd op „hebzucht‟) maakt 
het onmogelijk om inzicht te krijgen in de rol van zingeving in economisch keuzegedrag: 
alle mogelijke motivaties worden tot een homogene categorie „nut‟ gereduceerd. Daarnaast 
maakt de keuze voor een „waardenvrije‟ wetenschap het moeilijk een bijdrage aan een 
levensvatbaar maatschappelijk middenveld na te streven. 
 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt onderzocht of gedragseconomie (behavioral economics), een relatief 
nieuwe economische benadering die inzichten uit de psychologie integreert, meer kansen 
biedt voor een verbinding met publieke theologie. Gedragseconomen streven op basis van 
empirisch en experimenteel onderzoek naar een adequater begrip van economisch gedrag 
dan het neoklassieke idee van de „homo economicus‟. Door hun onderzoek zijn 
gedragseconomen tot nieuwe inzichten gekomen wat betreft de rationaliteit en 
rekenkundige kwaliteiten van mensen in hun economisch gedrag. Sommige 
gedragseconomen betwijfelen zelfs of het idee van „nutsmaximalisatie‟ wel een behulpzaam 
begrip is. 
 Enkele gedragseconomen hebben exploratieve studies gedaan naar de rol van 
betekenisgeving in economisch gedrag. Ook al zijn deze studies verkennend van karakter, 
ze tonen aan dat er onder gedragseconomen interesse is in betekenis- en zingeving in 
economisch gedrag. Een vergelijking van de ideeën van gedragseconomen over 
betekenisgeving met het perspectief van de publieke theologie laat belangrijke 
overeenkomsten zien, die als aanzet voor een nader gesprek gezien kunnen worden. 
 Gedragseconomen kiezen ook voor een nieuwe benadering ten aanzien van hun rol 
als wetenschapper in relatie tot maatschappelijke vraagstukken. Waar neoklassieke 
economen zich nadrukkelijk afzijdig houden, willen gedragseconomen door middel van 
„licht paternalisme‟ een positieve bijdrage leveren. Door bijvoorbeeld de keuzeomgeving op 
een bepaalde manier in te richten, kan het keuzeproces beïnvloed te worden, om mensen 
zodoende een betere keuze te laten maken. 
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 In het werk van gedragseconomen is duidelijk meer affiniteit met zowel 
zingevingsvragen in economisch gedrag als het leveren van een bijdrage aan een 
levensvatbaar maatschappelijk middenveld dan in de neoklassieke economie. Echter, 
gedragseconomen hebben geen helder omlijnd evaluatief perspectief op de doelen van 
economisch gedrag. Om deze reden wordt in hoofdstuk 4 onderzocht of gelukseconomie 
(happiness economics) en de capability approach een concretere invulling aan kunnen 
geven. 
 De affiniteit van de gelukseconomie en de capability approach met de centrale 
interesses van de publieke theologie worden in hoofdstuk 4 besproken aan de hand van 
twee voorbeelden. Voor de gelukseconomie wordt „Happiness: Lessons from a New 
Science‟ van econoom Richard Layard onderzocht, voor de capability approach 
„Development as Freedom‟ van econoom Amartya Sen. Voor ieder van deze twee auteurs 
wordt geïnventariseerd of, en zo ja, hoe zij binnen hun economische theorievorming ruimte 
maken voor zingevingsvragen en het bijdragen aan een levensvatbaar maatschappelijk 
middenveld. 
 Binnen de gelukseconomie wordt veel belang gehecht aan de rol van waarden, 
levensbeschouwing, en religie met het oog op gelukservaring. Daarnaast onderstreept 
Layard de plicht die economen en andere wetenschappers  in zijn ogen hebben om door 
hun werk een steentje bij te dragen aan een betere samenleving. Amartya Sen‟s idee van 
substantieve vrijheid –het nastreven van doelen die mensen op basis van redelijke 
argumenten waarderen– biedt de mogelijkheid economisch gedrag te interpreteren als 
zinvol handelen. Ook hecht Sen veel belang aan publieke conversaties en debatten, die er 
toe moeten leiden dat een gedeeld evaluatief kader wordt gecreëerd.  
Zowel Layard‟s interpretatie van gelukseconomie als Sen‟s visie op de capability 
approach bieden veel ruimte voor zingevingsvragen in relatie tot economisch gedrag, en 
zijn er beide op gericht een positieve bijdrage te leveren aan een levensvatbaar 
maatschappelijk middenveld. Sen laat echter meer ruimte voor verschillende visies op wat 
uiteindelijk waardevol is, terwijl Layard vanuit een utilitaristisch perspectief de ervaring van 
geluk als het hoogste goed beschouwt. 
Op basis van de verkenning in de hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 kan geconcludeerd 
worden dat gedragseconomie, gelukseconomie en de capability approach duidelijk affiniteit 
hebben met de centrale interesses van publieke theologie. Om deze reden is het uitwerken 
van een model dat economisch keuzegedrag verbindt met een ultieme betekenishorizon een 
zinvolle volgende stap. 
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In hoofdstuk 5 wordt dit model uitgewerkt. Beide centrale interesses van de 
publieke theologie, –zingevingsvragen en het bijdragen aan een levensvatbaar 
maatschappelijk middenveld–, hebben betrekking op evaluatieve overwegingen. Volgens 
sommige wetenschappers, bijvoorbeeld neoklassieke economen, zijn waarden subjectief, en 
heeft het daarom geen zin om er binnen de academische context over te discussiëren. Om 
aan te tonen dat er wel degelijk overtuigende argumentaties te formuleren zijn op het 
gebied van waarden, wordt eerst op basis van de waardentheorie van de filosoof Nicholas 
Rescher het begrip waardenobjectiviteit uitgewerkt. 
Vervolgens wordt met behulp van Rescher‟s begrip „cultivation hierarchy‟ een 
verbinding gemaakt tussen een einddoel dat deel uitmaakt van menselijk welzijn 
(bijvoorbeeld gezondheid, vriendschap, economisch welbevinden) en een concrete 
beslissing in het alledaagse leven. Een cultivation hierarchy is een evaluatieve argumentatie, 
waarin abstracte begrippen stapsgewijs geconcretiseerd en gepreciseerd worden. De 
einddoelen vormen samen een begrip van „menselijk welzijn‟ (human flourishing), dat 
voortkomt uit een ultieme betekenishorizon. Dat wil zeggen: in de ultieme 
betekenishorizon ligt een idee besloten van wat menselijk leven uiteindelijk zou moeten 
omvatten, van wat het betekent om een voldragen menselijk leven te leiden. Door middel 
van Rescher‟s cultivation hierarchies kan de ultieme betekenishorizon, via het begrip 
menselijk welzijn, vertaald worden naar concrete beslissingen in de dagelijkse praktijk. 
Ten slotte wordt in hoofdstuk 5 de vraag uitgewerkt hoe de evaluatieve oriëntaties 
en argumentaties die economisch gedrag verbinden met een ultieme betekenishorizon, 
theologisch geduid kunnen worden. Hiervoor wordt het begrip „axiologisch theisme‟ 
gebruikt. Axiologisch theisme betekent dat niet de vraag „bestaat God?‟, maar de vraag „naar 
welke God verlang ik?‟ en „op welke God hoop ik?‟, centraal staat. Met behulp van het werk 
van theoloog Thomas Beaudoin op het gebied van „economic spirituality‟ wordt duidelijk 
gemaakt hoe een dergelijke axiologische benadering in een publiek-theologische analyse van 
economische vraagstukken toegepast kan worden. 
 
